Measuring Quality of Life in Dystonia: An Ethnography of Contested Representations by Camfield, Laura Emma Lilian
Measuring Quality of Life in Dystonia:
An Ethnography of Contested Representations
Laura Emma Lilian Camfield
Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
September 2002
Department of Social Anthropology
Goldsmith's College, University of London
PAGE NUMBERS CLOSE
TO THE EDGE OF THE
PAGE
SOME ARE CUT OFF
Acknowledgements
My thanks go firstly to my two supervisors Cris Shore and Sophie Day: Sophie for encouraging
me to pursue a new and potentially unanthropological topic, and Cris for supporting me during
my fieldwork and writing up, and demonstrating that the issues raised in this thesis are at the
heart of much contemporary anthropology. Thanks also to my Postgraduate committee,
especially Simon Cohn, who provided an insightful read through of my first draft. I received a
great deal of support from the Anthropology department at Goldsmith's and would like to thank
my fellow PhD students (especially the members of the writing up group) for their moral support
and stringent critique. I also received generous financial support from the ESRC and Mid
Glamorgan Higher Education trust fund, without which the PhD would have taken even longer
than it did.
Secondly, I would like to thank all the people who shared their research and their lives with me
during the past four years:
All the people living with dystonia who filled in long questionnaires on their "quality oflife" or
talked frankly about their lives to me
My friends and colleagues at the Dystonia Society, the European Dystonia Federation, and the
Institute of Neurology
The ESDE team, especially Tom Warner and Yoav Ben-Shlorno (colleagues, mentors and
friends)
The MSIS project, particularly Jeremy Hobart, who encouraged me to pursue my interest in
statistical measurement
Finally, I would like to thank my partner, Grant, who provided support and understanding from
the very beginning. I cannot express the debt lowe you here, but hope one day to be tirelessly
copy editing and deconstructing your manuscript (revenge is sweetl) Thanks too to my parents
for always encouraging me to pursue my interests and never suggesting there might be such a
thing as too much higher education.
Contents
Abstract
Acknowledgements
Contents
Preface
Chapter 1
2
3
4
7
Introduction
Defining disability
Anthropology of disability
Anthropology of audit
Foucault and Bourdieu
Anthropology of science and technology
Medical anthropology and the anthropology of the body
Dystonia
Dystonia research
Representations of dystonia
Causes of dystonia
Impact on people's lives
Treatments
The healthcare system in the UK
Evidence-based medicine and NICE
Conclusion
11
16
18
22
25
29
30
34
36
37
41
42
44
46
46
48
Section 1: Experiences of people living with dystonia
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
49
Living with dystonia 49
1: Understanding and representing changes in the body 51
2: Obtaining a diagnosis and maintaining relations of trust with
doctors 52
3: Communicating dystonia to others 55
4: Responding to dystonia 57
5: External responses to dystonia 59
Conclusion 62
Stories from people living with dystonia 63
Jane ~
Sarah 67
B~a m
~s n
Paul 75
Alan 77
Illness stories
Conclusion
81
85
Section 2: Encounters with bureaucracy
Chapter4
Chapter 5
86
Encounters with medicine: Derek's story 86
Conclusion 99
Professional or bureaucratic?: The dilemma of the Dystonia Society 100
"We're talking to ourselves here" (but who are "we"?) 102
4
Chapter 6
The Society's central office
Debating regionalisation
Conclusion
110
119
122
"Partnerships for progress"?
How pharmaceuticals use QOL in marketing
How pharmaceuticals work with patient support organisations
How pharmaceuticals influence doctors
How pharmaceuticals relate to the government
Partnerships between doctors and patient support organisations
Conclusion
123
129
130
136
138
140
144
Section 3: Quality of life
Chapter 7
Chapter 8
146
Defining and measuring QOL 146
QOL 147
What is QOL? 147
Health economics: QOL's "evil twin"? 161
How are Quality Adjusted Life Years used? 162
Treatment options for people with angina 163
Beta Interferon in Secondary Progressive MS 163
Treatment options for people with dystonia 164
The "Oregon experiment" 164
Prioritorising waiting lists 165
How are Quality Adjusted Life Years calculated? 166
1. Obtaining preferences 166
2. Combining preferences and QOL scores 167
3. Calculating Quality Adjusted Life Years 169
Conclusion 170
An ethnography ofQOL measurement 172
Designing measures of QOL: the Multiple Sclerosis Impact Scale 172
Using QOL measures in survey research: ESDE-QOL 179
Conclusion 184
Chapter 9 Realising the potential of QOL: The World Health Organisation 185
The WHOQOL-IOO 185
International Classification ofImpairment, Disability and Health 187
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health 188
The WHO's Global Burden of Disease Project 190
Disability Adjusted Life Years 193
Stage 1: Deriving disability weights 194
Stage 2: Calculating Disability Adjusted Life Years 196
1. Calculating years lost to a condition 196
2. Age weighting 197
3. Discount rates 197
Criticisms of the Disability Adjusted Life Year 197
Conclusion 200
Conclusion 201
Bibliography 206
5
Appendices 255
Appendix 1 MOS Short form 36 item generic measure of Quality of Life 255
Appendix 2 Preference-based measures 259
Appendix 3 Multiple Sclerosis Impact Scale 29 item 262
Appendix 4 Multiple Sclerosis Impact Scale table of correlations 264
Appendix 5 Table summarising partnerships between dystonia-related actors 267
6
Preface
Measures of quality of life (QOL)2 have become more numerous and prestigious over the past
decade as they receive funding from national health services, pharmaceuticals and the US
health insurance industry, and support from clinicians, social scientists, and patient support
organisations. This expansion is linked to increasing cost consciousness in medicine and the
need for more sensitive measures to compare (and position) treatments for chronic illness.
The three key questions of this thesis are:
1. If the disabling impact of dystonia cannot be fully represented by clinical measures, can it
be captured by a measure of QOL?
2. Do measures ofQOL give a voice to people with chronic conditions (as has often been
claimed)? If so, "why can't these natives speak for themselves?"
3. IfQOL measures cannot represent complex conditions like dystonia or give a voice to
people living with dystonia, why are they still so successful?
The thesis falls into three sections: the first (chapters 2 and 3) explores how people live with
dystonia, looking particularly at dystonia's representation within medical and popular
discourses and how this affects their experience of the condition.
The second section (chapters 4-6) looks at people's encounters with medical and social
bureaucracy and how this is mediated at the micro and macro levels by the Dystonia Society
and umbrella organisations like the European Federation for Neurological Advocacy. I look
at the difficulties the Society has in representing dystonia in a way that is both true to the
experiences of people living with dystonia and politically effective I also explore how
problems with representation and the Society's relationships with doctors and
pharmaceuticals influence their support of studies of QOL. The detailed ethnography of the
Society is valuable, as small voluntary organisations have been little studied by
anthropologists of organisations, even though they share many of the concerns of larger
structures. I also explore the appeal that QOL has to the different stakeholders identified in
this thesis and demonstrate how this network drives the development of QOL measures.
The third section (chapters 7-9) explores how QOL is defined and measured, and how QOL
measures are used in the UK and internationally, linking these practices to the classification
2These are typically questionnaires containing <50 questions about different areas of life (e.g. physical function)
which ask the respondent to indicate their performance/satisfaction in that area using a 5-point scale (from very
bad to very good). These scores are totalled (and often weighted) to produce an overall QOL score.
7
and hierarchisation of "audit culture" [Power 1994]. I describe how the expression of "the
patient perspective" through measures of QOL3 can silence the voices of people with a
limiting condition, explore who has the right to value the lives of people with disabilities, and
address the problems with creating universal systems of classification and valuation.
In the conclusion, I discuss whether QOL has actually benefited people living with dystonia
by creating a discursive space for the discussion of health in non-clinical terms and a
language to make claims for resources and the acknowledgement of their experiences.
Structure of the thesis
Abstract
Contents
Preface
Chapter 1: Introduction
Describes my personal engagement with QOL measurement and disability. Situates research
in a theoretical context by reviewing literature on the anthropologies of disability, audit,
medicine, the body, and science and technology. Introduces dystonia and my field sites and
briefly describes healthcare provision in the UK (including the role of the National Institute
of Clinical Evidence).
Section 1: Experiences of people living with dystonia
Chapter 2 Living with dystonia
Briefly reviews anthropological and sociological literature on living with a chronic illness,
before focusing on the themes that characterise the experience of dystonia (understanding and
representing changes in the body, obtaining a diagnosis and maintaining relations of trust
with doctors, communicating dystonia to others, responding to dystonia, and external
responses to dystonia).
Chapter 3 Stories from people living with dystonia
Explores the themes identified in chapter 2, using six stories to give a sense of how dystonia
is integrated into people's lives. Looks at how people use narrative to make sense of illness
and give it personal meaning and explores methodological problems with using narrative.
3The expressed aim of the designers ofa disease-specific measure of QOL, described in chapter 8.
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Section 2: Encounters with bureaucracy
Chapter 4 Encounters with medicine: Derek's story
Examines individual encounters with medical bureaucracy through the story of Derek, an
intelligent and articulate man with generalised dystonia. His story is contextualised by other
interviews and accounts from people living with dystonia, and sociological and
anthropological literature on "doctor-patient relations".
Chapter 5 Professional or bureaucratic?: The dilemma of the Dystonia Society
Examines the Dystonia Society (the main patient support organisation for people living with
dystonia), which is an influential actor in the networks explored in chapter 6. Describes its
history, culture, and relationship with members, and looks at how it constructs "the voice of
people living with dystonia" in fundraising and media campaigns.
Chapter 6 "Partnerships for progress"?
Explores the relationships between pharmaceutical companies, patient support organisations,
doctors, and the government, and their mediation through QOL, using ethnography from
national and international meetings of neurologists, neurological patient support
organisations, and QOL researchers. Treats QOL (and its related discourse on "the patients'
voice") as a "boundary object" around which diverse alliances can form and explores these
further in the context of submissions to the National Institute of Clinical Excellence.
Section 3: Quality of life
Chapter 7 Defining and measuring QOL
Examines how the discipline of QOL research has expanded and profcssionalised, and
constructs a "genealogy" of QOL to explore the links between its psychometric ancestry and
the expansion of statistics and eugenics in the nineteenth century. Looks at the implications of
definitions ofQOL and assumptions underlying different measures. Explores how they are
used in the health economic analyses that are increasingly guiding resource allocation in the
UK and addresses the ethical and methodological problems of asking "healthy" people and
health professionals to value the lives of people with disabilities.
Chapter 8 An ethnography ofQOL measurement
Describes how measures of QOL are created and used, using ethnography from fieldwork on
a multiple sclerosis-specific QOL measure and a European survey of the QOL of people
living with dystonia.
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Chapter 9 Realising the potential of QOL: The World Health Organisation
Uses the example of the WHO to demonstrate the double-edged nature ofQOL by examining
three projects: a multilingual, multidimensional QOL measure to be used internationally with
"healthy" and sick populations; a universal classification of health (the International
Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health); and the Global Burden of Disease
Project, which uses health economic analyses to set international priorities for health
spending using the Disability Adjusted Life Year.
Conclusion
Addresses key questions explored in the thesis, specifically how the rhetorics of QOL and the
"voice of the patient" are used as resources in the struggles of doctors, patient support
organisations, and pharmaceuticals; how QOL measures can represent "invisible" conditions
like dystonia and make them visible and accountable; whether QOL measurement is an
example of medicalisation and/or the extension of audit culture into health, and, finally,
whether the voices of patients are currently being heard and what can be done to facilitate
this.
10
Chapter 1: Introduction
In November 1996 I started work as a part-time researcher on an epidemiological study to
establish the prevalence of dystonia in Europe, which was based at the Institute of Neurology"
in central London. My role was to collect data on the number of people with dystonia in
London and co-ordinate data collection in the other eleven centres. The organiser was a
consultant neurologist specialising in "movement disorders" and medical advisor for the
Dystonia Society. They had supported his grant application because they realised the value of
numbers in establishing dystonia as a threat to public health and hoped that the new figures
would be closer to their estimates (which were considerably larger than previous studies).
This was the first time I had heard of dystonia. I was given leaflets on dystonia to prepare
myself and saw videos of people with dystonic movements made by neurologists. However, it
was only when I met people living with dystonia while preparing the first draft of the
epidemiological study's QOL questionnaire that I began to appreciate its impact. What
intrigued me was that while the condition did not seem disabling (in some cases the
movements were little more than a tic) its impact was extremely severe. There was often no
correlation between my perception of the intensity of the movements and the person's
assessment of their impact. Although my observations could be described as objective
because I was external to the situation and had no interest in a particular outcome, I wondered
how useful they were when they bore little relationship to the perception of the person living
with the condition. Neurologists also wanted to quickly assess their patients' well-being, but
if frequency and severity of movements were not a good guide, what was?
The discipline of health-related QOL measurement developed to answer this type of question.
Researchers experienced in psychological techniques for quantifying abstract qualities like
intelligence applied themselves to defining and measuring well-being, QOL, health-related
QOL, and health status, as the concept has variously been described. These measures are now
incorporated into trials of drugs and surgery and their scores are treated with as much respect
as clinical outcome measures like blood pressure. Funding bodies like the Medical Research
Council insist on the incorporation of QOL measures into grant proposals as they are thought
to represent the patient's perspective. But can these measures do what they promise, namely
4A research institute attached to the National Hospital of Neurology and Neurosurgery.
sThe role of statistics in creating "social problems" with social causes is described by Rose [1987].
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to simply and accurately represent a person's QOL in a manner that enables comparison
across conditions?
When I first encountered these measures, they seemed to bridge the gap between ernie and
etic perceptions of the severity of an illness. Although I frequently discovered examples of
ambiguous or incomplete measures ofQOL, I attributed this to "bad science". If measures
that could be used with everyone were unsuccessful in capturing experiences of illness, the
answer was obviously greater specificity. The exponential expansion of measures of QOL
suggested that others agreed with me. In 1999 I participated in a proposal to develop a QOL
measure specific to dystonia (proposed name "Dys-QoL"). Ironically, this wasn't funded
because it wasn't considered to be specific enough. We had decided to cover focal dystonia,
which includes dystonia of the eyes, limbs, hand, neck, jaw, and larynx. The referees of the
grant felt that we should focus on cervical dystonia (the most common focal dystonia) even
though this would make the measure applicable to less than 0.001% of the UK population.
The change was made and on reapplication a year later, the measure was funded.
During the intervening year I was involved in two QOL projects: the development and
administration of a postal questionnaire containing a "battery" of QOL measures to
investigate QOL in dystonia, and the creation of a multiple sclerosis-specific QOL measure,
both described in chapter 8. I also attended the International Society of QOL Research
conference and became more involved with the Dystonia Society. Meeting people living with
dystonia and hearing their stories made me doubt that their complex experiences could be
represented and understood through these measures, even if they (or the Society) were
consulted during the design process.
My thesis arose from this problematic - how can the experiences of people living with
dystonia be represented, and more importantly, why do researchers and clinicians try to do
so? In sections 1 and 2 I explore experiences of living with dystonia and individual and group
encounters with medical and social bureaucracy, and in section 3, I examine the political
economy of QOL measurement in dystonia. I bring the three sections together in the
conclusion where I argue that even though the phrase "quality of life" promises an
empowering and holistic vision of health, there are two main reasons why QOL measurement
cannot fulfil this promise. Firstly, it is primarily a tool for audit, and secondly, measures
reproduce the assumptions of existing measures or clinical models and exclude the elements
that people consider most important in maintaining quality of life. Paradoxically, the
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discourse can reduce people's QOL when it is used to justify rationing in the UK and
redirection of resources internationally.
My two main fieldwork sites were the Society's central office in London and the coordinating
centre for the questionnaire on QOL in dystonia. At the Society I worked predominantly with
the Development Officer6, but also visited members and spoke to distressed callers. The
projects I was involved in included drafting and analysing the membership survey (funded by
a pharmaceutical company), coordinating the annual awareness week, writing leaflets for GPs
and people living with dystonia, liasing with the 30 branches, and organising "living with
dystonia" days. I was also a participant observer at Society events (local and nationally),
analysed illness stories from a range of sources (the Society's Newsletter, collections of
"patients' experiences", and dystonia-related "bulletin boards"), and carried out in-depth
semi-structured interviews with people living with dystonia. I became involved with the
European Dystonia Federation through the QOL questionnaire and attended national and
international medical meetings on their behalf. I also presented a poster to neurologists at the
Movement Disorders 2000 conference, which summarised the initial results from the
questionnaire.
Doing "anthropology at home" involved melding personal and professional roles' (a "messy,
qualitative experience", according to Marcus and Fischer [1986:22]) and maintaining an
"incoherent" persona of partial and shifting identities [Caputo in Amit et al 2000]. In this
respect I resembled my subjects who were neurologists in one context and QOL experts in
another, or simultaneously trustees, Chairs of European advocacy organisations, and
dissatisfied patients. I could not sustain the illusion that my field was "out there" as I was
aware I was constructing it through my research interests and personal relationships'', while
experiencing moments of bizarre synchronicity" (for example, hearing both a WHO
neurologist and a Society branch organiser talk about "marketing" dystonia).
I found it difficult both to disconnect from my life to do fieldwork and maintain firm
boundaries after my return, sharing the experience of Amit that subjects (and their computer
problems) are "as likely to leave us when we don't want them to or follow us when we think
6Responsible for raising awareness through publications and the media, and communicating with the branches.
7c.f. Dyck's ethnography of children's sport which used his past involvement as a parent [in Amit et aI2000].
sc.f. Amit's role in the construction of the social group 'Cayman migrant workers' that she was studying [ibid].
9This also happened to Martin who, pursuing relationships between popular concepts of health and the "ideal
worker", "practically fainted with astonishment when I discovered that [corporate] trainers elect to use the
image of the immune system to convey the kind of flexible innovative change they desire" [1994:214).
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we have left for good" [in Amit et al 2000]. My position at the Society was important as it
gave me somewhere to "hang-out" (always a problem when the processes you are studying
produce common social statuses rather than "coterminous collectivities" [Amit in Amit et al
2000: 15]) and stopped me from "mystifying the commonplace" [Strathem 1987: 17] as my
colleagues were all too ready to provide a reality-check. Despite this base, however, my field
was characterised by "absences" which required me to use a mix of methods to construct my
ethnography, for example, reconstructing sequences of events using "grey literature" (like e-
mails and minutes). I also drew on notes made before I was officially in the field, which made
my research feel a little like "espionage" [Young 1991].
When I began looking at chronic illness and disability'", my history of good health was a
significant disadvantage. My last visit to hospital was when I was hit on the head by a
lacrosse ball, and I had escaped the usual childhood illnesses. However, my status as
"temporarily able bodied" was brought home to me when midway through my fieldwork I
was run over by a truck while cycling to work. Although I didn't know it at the time, the
truck broke most of the bones in my lower body (my hip, femur, pelvis, and ankle) and
knocked a chunk out of the base of my spine, fortunately missing the nerves that control
movement. I also had extensive scarring to my right leg after I was dragged for a few yards
by the truck!'.
When I came round after nine days in intensive care I was very weak and found my lack of
strength alarming. It took two nurses to roll me gently on to my side to change my bedding.
My partner had to spoon-feed me as I couldn't sit up while my pelvis was healing. I found it
difficult to concentrate so the long hours in bed were frustrating and I felt dependent on my
daily visitors to bring some interest into my life. While one leg felt stiff and numb, the other
was exquisitely painfully and I dreaded being touched. Would my body respond
appropriately? I was no longer confident that I knew what it would do.
Having gone through one rite of passage (getting married) a few days before the accident, I
felt I had reverted to an infantile state. Although I didn't talk about my fears, whether I could
still be a "real woman" occupied my dreams. Suddenly my body didn't feel like my body
anymore. Ifit didn't look like my body and didn't respond to my commands, in what sense
lOInthis thesis I use impairment to refer to loss of function, and disability to activity limitations related to the
impairment or society's reaction to it. My definition of disability also incorporates any disadvantage arising
from the activity limitations (what the WHO defines as "handicap").
IIThat I can describe the experience in this way shows the influence of the objectifying discourses of medicine!
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was it still mine? I had a sense that I'd been absent from my life while I was in intensive care,
like waking up after a particularly good party and having to ask your friends what you said
and did, and how you got those marks on your hands. I now had an insight into what the
onset of a disabling illness might feel like, and how it could affect your belief in a stable and
knowable reality'<.
Fortunately I was very fit before the accident and made a speedy recovery. My problems
started when I left hospital to stay with my parents in Cardiff. Outside the hospital it wasn't
normal to be in a wheelchair or unable to use an upstairs 100. At least on the ward everyone
was facing the same problems and were grimly humorous about them. At home I felt very
isolated. Even speaking to friends was difficult as it reminded me of how much I missed my
home in London and the life I'd had before the accident. Now all I did was read novels and
watch day-time TV which didn't give me a lot to talk about. I tried to feel proud of my
recovery and not feel guilty about the burden I was putting on my family and ashamed of how
little I could do to ease it. I even felt guilty about insisting on cycling in London and not
taking a honeymoon as these had "caused" the accident.
When the consultant told me my hip had healed and I could make plans to come back to
London and return to work, I felt as though my life had started again. Now I could make a
contribution to society, socially and financially, now I could feel tired in the evening because
I had actually done something, and now I could enjoy the pleasures that you only allow
yourself after a "hard day at work". Of course, here my story diverges from the pattern
because many people with chronic illnesses and late-onset disabilities never return to work.
Some find this satisfactory, even in our work obsessed society, but I suspect many feel
disenfranchised, as though they no longer have a right to the things healthy people take for
granted. National Health Service clerks are probably equally rude to the employed, and
doctors as careless of your time, but it's hard not to interpret these experiences as a response
to your inner worthlessness. Being labelled as a chronic rather than acute "case" impacts on
self-esteem and access to resources, as I discovered when my physiotherapy was discontinued
after x-rays revealed that part of my leg muscle had turned to bone. My range of movement
was the same (i.e. limited), but I had now become one of rthe chronics" that the
physiotherapists had confided to me they found so unsatisfying to treat.
I2While I don't pretend that I shared the experiences of my informants, my sensory knowledge was a shared
resource for comprehension [Okeley 1992] and helped me develop a sense of "ethnographic relevance"
[Scheper-Hughes 1988; Wikan 1990].
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The division between chronic and acute medicine maps onto existing medical hierarchies, for
example, general practice (which manages the majority of chronic illnesses) is less
prestigious than surgery. Neurology is anomalous as its association with the brain makes it
one of the most prestigious specialties (recommended to intellectual and research-oriented
medical students) but the practice of neurology involves routine management of chronic
illnesses, which requires a very different set of skills. Consequently, many people living with
dystonia have poor relationships with their neurologists, something I explore in chapter 4.
In the next section I look at how disability is defined by people with disabilities as this relates
to the debate among people living with dystonia about whether it is a chronic illness or a
disability. The separation between writers on chronic illness and disability has been one of
the most interesting aspects of reviewing the literature for this thesis, as this divide can seem
artificial and counter productive, particularly for a condition like dystonia, which lacks clear
boundaries.
Defining disability
Recent disability research has been dominated by the "social" model, which argues
"disability has nothing to do with the body and everything to do with society" [Oliver 1996].
This is encapsulated by the definition of the Union of the Physically Impaired Against
Segregation [1976], which distinguishes impairment (functional limitation) and disability
(loss of opportunity to participate in normal life on an equal basis due to physical and social
barriers), and regards the latter as something "imposed on the top" of the former by prejudice
against people with disabilities. The Union goes to the opposite extreme to the medical model
by downplaying the importance of "natural" or physically grounded aspects of disablement to
avoid these being used to justify inequality':', This makes disability indistinguishable from
the social constructs of gender or class and obscures the relationship between impairments
and disabilities". Health professionals have compared this model unfavourably with the
International Classification of Impairment, Disability and Handicap, arguing that the fusion
of disability and handicap makes it difficult to show how an aspect of the environment
constitutes a barrier, or suggests a person-level intervention. However, this misses the point
of the model, which is a tool for social action rather than research or management.
13Themedical sociologist Bury calls it the "oversocialised model" [1996].
14For example, under this model it is impossible to examine impairments that do not cause limitation, or are
disproportionately limiting.
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Contemporary disability theorists maintain a fine balance between insisting, "impairment is
not 'natural' but a historically changing category", and recognising its materiality [Abberley
1996, p.61]. To describe impairments as biological phenomena risks suggesting that
inequality is biologically inevitable, but viewing impairments as just another form of
oppression could collapse the politically important distinction between disability and
impairment. This is an example of the "dilemma of difference" [Goffman 1963] where
demands to end inequality require the identification of people who have been disadvantaged
by drawing attention to their difference. However, if difference is downplayed to support the
claim of equality, then people's different needs may be ignored. In the next section, I briefly
describe the "minority group" and "universalist" approaches as the latter influenced the latest
version of the WHO's International Classification tool (discussed in chapter 9).
Disability activists use two main political strategies, which have been characterised as the
"minority group" and "universalist" approaches [Bickenbach et al 1999]. The former arose
from the civil rights movement in North America and uses "identity politics" to develop pride
in "group identification". The main product of this is the Americans with Disabilities Act
1991, which borrows from the Civil Rights Act to justify its anti-discrimination measures.
However, this approach is based on an unsustainable analogy between racial minorities and
disabled people, for example, there is no unifying culture, language, or set of experiences for
people with disabilities (even between the movement's leaders'? and their members) and
many of the inequalities experienced by people with disabilities result from maldistribution of
power and resources rather than discrimination 16.
The universalist approach to disability was pioneered by Zola (an American sociologist with
physical disabilities) who described the "special needs" approach as short-termist'{ because
everyone is at risk of chronic illness and disability and suggested that people with disabilities
form alliances with the elderly [1989]. He maintained that "[b]y seeing people with a
disability as 'different' with 'special' needs, wants, and rights in this currently perceived
world of finite resources, they are pitted against the needs, wants, and rights of the rest of the
population" [ibid]. This perspective is echoed by Finkelstein (a disability researcher and
activist with physical disabilities) who notes that mobility aids for "people with abilities" (for
example, shoes) are seen as "attractive personal possessions or desirable environmental
15With the exception of organisations of deaf and blind people, the leaders tend to be highly educated, white
middleclass males with late onset disabilities and minimal medical needs (as in the Dystonia Society).
IOForexample, "economies of scale" mean that people with common impairments like myopia receive better
provision that those with greater needs.
171talso risks reinforcing the medical conception of disability by representing it as dichotomous and fixed.
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adaptations" [1999]. None are defined as "assistive devices", described as meeting special
needs, or prescribed by health professionals. A universal disability policy should expand the
range of human normality to include the variations caused by disability, in the same way that
"universal design" aims to produce environments and tools that can be used by everyone.
Although this is the aim of the broad definitions used by the WHO Intemational
Classification tool, they seem to have the opposite effect of medicalising even larger areas of
human life. This is not surprising since it was drafted by health and social care professionals
who would presumably be unlikely to define themselves out of a job.
In the following section I contrast the writings of disability activists and researchers with the
anthropology of disability, and also link the experiences of people living with dystonia to
relevant literature within general anthropology, and the anthropologies of audit, science and
technology, medicine, and the body/embodiment. The foregrounding of audit and
"govemmentality" is intentional as the thesis aims to combine this literature with medical
anthropology to enable a fuller analysis of people's experiences as they engage with
bureaucracy (and bureaucratic classification) in an attempt to make their experiences "count".
Anthropology of disability
The experience of impairment is rooted in a person's sense of having multiple past, present
and intended future selves. Having a disability can limit possibilities for self-realisation in the
future, and is particularly difficult in countries like the UK and USA which regard
disablement as "a punishment for a crime" and praise independence, control, and an upright
stature [Murphy 1987]. For example, the contemporary emphasis on appearance,
productivity, and bodily control and containment increases the disability experienced by
people living with dystonia who often feel they have to counter prejudice by demonstrating
their moral worth.
Some disability researchers emphasise the emancipatory potential of disability and illness
when bodies "escape their former social shackles" [Tumer 1992] and people are "left alone
with their bodies" to reflect upon them [Shilling 1997]. But developing a new body in
response to disability can be discouraged by the discourse of rehabilitation which invites
people to deny the reality of their bodies and manage them to be "socially acceptable'Y
[Oliver 1990; Albrecht 1992], for example, by not using a wheelchair [Zola 1982]. People
with late-onset disabilities often choose maintaining "social connectedness and biographical
IS"I think 1 was in denial [ ... J and wanted to conform and be normal" [Geoffrey: The Society Newsletter).
continuity" over remaking themselves [Savage 1998] and may present themselves more
conservatively to "compensate" for their disability!". They are aware that, "within a culture
that places a high value on power, control, productivity and mobility, disability is a failure to
meet social standards" [Duval 1984].
Anthropologists have examined the practice of medicine, including the subordination of
patients to the "voice of medicine" in consultations [Mishler 1981], the collective
construction of medical records [Berg 1996], and the transmission of medical culture through
medical education [Sinclair 1997] (I review this literature in chapter 4). But there are
relatively few anthropological accounts of illness experience or disability. Notable exceptions
include Ingstad and Whyte [1995] (edited collection of studies of disability internationally)
and Frank [2000] (life of a North American women born without limbs). This is partly due to
the difficulty of participant observation, although the North American anthropologists
Murphy (physical disabilities) [1987] and Greenhalgh (fibromyalgia) [2001] are exceptions.
Anthropologists researching disability have been criticised for focusing on specific
impairments, working within the biomedical model, concentrating on acquired impairments,
and conflating disability and illness [Davis and Corker 2001]20.
Nonetheless, general anthropology has much to offer disability researchers investigating the
fluid interdependency of cultural, structural and individual issues in the lives of people with
disabilities". For example, Davis, a disability researcher who works with children with
disabilities, attributes his anti-hegemonic approach to Clifford and Marcus [1990].
Anthropologists participated in extensive debate during the 1980s and 90s about doing and
writing-up research and were encouraged to consider how their academic and personal lives
affected the power relations of the research process [Callaway and Okeley 1992; Campbell
1995]. The subsequent attempt to create a paradigm that incorporates reflexivityii, sensitivity
to power, and a commitment to participation provides a point of connection with disability
research.
Ethnographers can make an important contribution to disability studies by breaking
down the 'them and us' characterisation of oppressors and oppressed. [... ] By
19"1make a point of appearing well groomed, particularly when I am speaking from a platform. This way I feel
that people see me first and my dystonia second" [Petra: The Society newsletter].
2°Their review only identified one major anthropological collection [Ingstad and Whyte 1995], which they
criticised for homogenising cultures, creating a construct of "Euro-American Disability" that ignored the "social
model" of disability, and representing the experiences of people with disabilities as fixed and static.
21The stories in chapter 3 give a sense of this interdependency.
22For example, acknowledging how one's "personal thought line" develops [Fernandez 1995] and the
interpretive consequences of one's "standpoint" [Haraway 1988].
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unpacking homogenised views of culture and recognising the fluid nature of identity,
ethnographers can help to stimulate dialogue and mutual recognition between disabled
people
[Davis 2000:203]
While few anthropological texts engage with disability directly, many deal with it
allegorically by examining the relationship between disabling processes and local, national,
and global issues. For example, Campbell explores the way different people in the Amazon
respond to disabling political and economic forces [1995]. Anthropologists have also
problematised the concept of identity in marginalized groups", which contributes to debates
within disability studies on self-identification versus labelling and the complexity and fluidity
of disabled identities. For example, some people living with dystonia describe themselves as
disabled in particular situations'" but are reluctant to be labelled as such, partly because of
prejudice, partly because they are reluctant to abandon the possibility of a cure.
Anthropological work on identity can help disability researchers take a "relational" view of
disability that focuses on interaction between the individual and their social location, rather
than their medical category [Bury 1996].
An anthropological approach also encourages attention to the way language shapes thought
and action. For example, how the reality ofliving with a chronic illness or disability is
obscured by euphemisms that "linguistically are brought in to replace the bed linen when a
particular word feels too raw, too near a disturbing experience" [Mittler and Sinason 1996]25,
or the way the language of policy works to silence some groups and conceal the workings of
power [Shore and Wright 1997]. Disability in particular can become "a metaphor for
something else rather than a mundane part of life" [Hevey 1992].
When we make [disabled] people 'Other', we group them together as the objects of
our experience instead of regarding them as subjects of experience with whom we
might identify, and we see them primarily as symbolic of something else - usually,
but not always, something we reject and fear and project onto them
[Wendell 1996:60]
People with disabilities are "socialised into the world of the 'normal' with all its values,
prejudices and vocabulary" [Zola 1982], which makes expressing a positive identity difficult.
23Okeley on gypsies [1997]; James [1993] on children.
24c.f. Parents describing their "dwarf' child as handicapped to access resources [Ablon 1990].
25Sinason "disdainfully" changed the name of an "educationally subnormal" workshop to "mental handicap"
only for this to be changed to "learning disability", each change reflecting the process of euphemism rather than'
a change in underlying assumptions. She observes that no other human group has been asked to change its name
so frequently ("the sick and the poor are always with us, in physical presence and verbal terms, but not the
handicapped") and suspects that the constant change of terms expresses a "manic desire to erase difference".
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Stating that you are more than a person with disabilities may come across as denial", but
once someone has been labelled "sick", all their activity and beliefs are related to and
explained in terms of their condition [Zola 1993]. "States" such as weakness and dependency
(traditionally linked with illness) become "traits" and the person is equated with their
condition. Longmore describes this as a "spoiling process" where the condition comes to
"obscure all other characteristics behind that one and swallow up the social identity of the
individual within that restrictive category" [1985]. This "spread" was the target of "I am not
dystonia", a song accompanying a Dystonia Medical Research Foundation video.
Positive descriptions of people with disabilities can be unrealistic or sanitised or imply that
the failure to integrate is an individual one27• The stereotype of the "supercrip" (for example,
the disabled mountaineer in a recent Schweppes advert) is equally damaging because it
defines disabled people in the terms of the able-bodied and excuses discrimination; "if
disabled people are viewed as 'normal' then there is little need of a society free from
disablism" [Barnes 1992]. While it may reduce the "otherness" of some people with
disabilities, it increases that of the majority by creating an impossible ideal.
Language realises its potential through metaphors, which are an essential part of "knowing
about knowing". For example, "open" and "closed" metaphors define the parameters of
discussion [Latour and Woolgar 1979]. Metaphors enable communication by providing "new
cultural forms" [Strathern 1992] and act as "conventionalising agents" by describing the
unfamiliar in terms of the familiar [Fiske 1987]. They also obscure their own origin and can
operate as "the 'sonar' of our minds, revealing deeply submerged but none-the-less
fundamental realities that we cannot or will not consciously acknowledge'?" [Hibbitts 1994].
The very specificity, familiarity and tangibility that may recommend a metaphor may
incidentally enable it to obscure and distort. Calling chess a battle distracts from the
cooperative aspects of the game
[ibid]
Consequently, metaphors merit careful study and this is an area where anthropology has
much to contribute (for example, Shore's study of the way metaphors are used to promote
different visions of the future of the European Union [2000]). We need to ask not only
"whose interests are served by metaphors", but to what extent they work as "instruments of
26Encouraged by a society where "I never think of you as handicapped" is "the supreme compliment" [ibid].
27Auslander and Gold describe an article about a woman with cerebral palsy who wanted to end her life which
omitted that her motivation was her inability to access support to live independently [1999].
28For example, Elkind studies the suppressed contradictions of the NHS using contrasting metaphors of religion,
machine, organism and marketplace [1998].
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power" and "give authority to particular concepts [... ] while implying silence and closure on
others" [Shore 1997].
Although metaphors operate by "subjectification" [ibid] and shaping the "meta-discourse" (or
"the argument about what the argument is about" [De Waal 1994]), we can disempower them
by "waking up sleeping metaphors" [Martin 1987] and exposing their "covert categories"
[Shore 1997]29. For example, Haraway argues that the "metaphorical structures" of science
determine what counts as an interesting question and an intelligent answer, something that is
also true of QOL measurement. She demonstrated this by examining the relationship between
primatology and theories of gender where primatologists anthropomorphised their objects of
study, then used their findings to support conservative theories of human behaviour'? [1989].
Her study of the organising metaphors of biology in the 1940s and 50s situated them in the
widest possible context, linking them not only to developments in operational research and
laboratory management, but also to the economic and cultural language of the self [1981-2].
Strathern similarly suggests that the "social and natural facts" studied by kinship theorists are
"cultural facts" of recent origin" [1992]. The disputes over kinship caused by "new
reproductive technologies" highlight the contingency of these "certainties" and demonstrate
that conceptual shifts affect social practice. This is also true of QOL where the development
of measures have changed peoples' ideas about what it consists of and transformed it from a
personal evaluation to a property that can be measured and compared. I return to the
anthropology of science later in this chapter when I explore the role of social context and
alliances in determining which technologies are successful.
Anthropology of Audit
QOL measurement, in the form of Quality and Disability Adjusted Life Years, is
fundamentally a tool for audit, a practice that has become increasingly common since the
1980s in response to political demands for accountability and control [Power 1994, 1997;
Strathern 2000]. Audit fits Habermas's definition of a science, as its goal is to expand the
29For example, Martin explores how menstruation and menopause are presented as pathological in North
American biomedicine but could be reclaimed through redescription [1989], Sontag describes how certain
illnesses are used as metaphors for unrelated fears and fantasies [1988], and Frankenberg suggests that the
emergence of AIDS as a new disease metaphor "reflects the feeling of the ruling class and associated elites that
they have lost the power of rationally controlling both policy and economy" [1986:612].
30This also applies to molecular biology where gendered metaphors and narratives of "male birthing" and
"second birthing" are used as strategies of legitimation [Keller 1990].
31For example, distinguishing between relatives by nature and by law post-dates Darwin who was the first to use
"genealogy" to describe life as organised through natural selection. When genealogy was "naturalised" his
"loan" was "r~ad back", creat.ing the "natural" family. The "biological" parent then became the "real" one,
contrary to Victorian conceptions of parenthood as "moral guardianship" rather than "physical connection".
human capacity to predict and control the world [1970]. It does this by creating common
measures of value, like QOL scores, which act as synedoches. According to Marx, common
measures of value require everything to be thrown into "the great social retort" which boils
out particular flavours and leaves only abstract qualities; a process that Martin observed with
the gene:
The ability for the gene to stand in for the whole of the organism, to instantiate pure
information, gives it a function much like other measures of value in highly
rationalised capitalistic societies [...] this standard of value, it appears can be
abstracted from its contingent and accidental form (persons) without loss of anything
significant
[2000:187]
The idea of audit is difficult to criticise as it promotes valued concepts like responsibility and
transparency and brings together economic efficiency and good practice. However, audit (in
the form of WHO Global Burden of Disease tables) can be part of the machinery of
"bureaucratic indifference", which enables organisations to evade responsibility'[ [Herzfeld
1992]. Strathem notes that in higher education (as in medicine) audits and league tables
proliferate alongside of the language of ethics and QOL [2000].
Audit indicators, like the Disability Adjusted Life Year, are examples of "managerial
rationality", which centres on the belief that institutional behaviour can be changed if the
right information is combined with the right reinforcement:
The assumption is that if those in charge know what's going on, they can manage a
social system better. 'To know' in this context means having information on the
variation of certain indicators that are thought to capture the essence of the
phenomenon at hand
[Tsoukas 1997:831]
The key assumption is that the indicators "capture the essence of the phenomenon" being
measured", however, I argue that Disability Adjusted Life Years do not capture the burden of
disability for either the individual or society. Although policy and audit appear to be opposite
ends of a process, this distance is illusory as policy makers build auditing within their
schema, while auditing provides policy with a basis for its claims of effectiveness. This
exposes the fallacy of the designers of the Disability Adjusted Life Year's belief that it could
be an impartial resource for health decision makers as policy and audit are already embedded
within the measure.
32Bureaucratic indifference occurs when the bureaucracy mobilizes values or practices beyond the competence
of any individual bureaucrat, prompting them to adopt a stance of indifference.
33S0 unexpected variations are attributed to individual rather than systemic failure.
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Audit is an example of "the view from nowhere" [Haraway 1997] as, like a ritual, it tries to
persuade participants of the way the world is without acknowledging its particular
perspective [Strathern 2000]. Harper uses the metaphor of ritual to describe the final meeting
of an audit conducted by the International Monetary Fund [2000]. When the Fund's figures
were accepted by the audited country, they underwent a "moral transformation" from "mere
numbers" to "resources for policy".
Audit practices like QOL measurement cause individuals and organizations not only to see
themselves through the eyes of the auditor, but to describe themselves and their activities in
ways that alter their self-perception (making themselves "auditable"). The transformation of
the progressive and socially democratic Open University during the late 1980s and early 90s
is a good example of this phenomenon. Stuart Hall claims that while they "believe what they
have always believed, what they do, how they write their mission statements, how they do
appraisal forms [... ] that's what they are interested in now", resulting in the transformation of
the institution [Hall 1993 in Strathern 2000].
Kleinman and Kleinman have also observed this in medicine where patients are using the
"language of efficiency and cost" (rather than the "language of caring") to describe their
problems, transforming illness from a "consequential moral experience into a merely
technical inexpediency" [1996: 15]. Statistics also operate as a strategy of "information and
control" by "determining classifications within which people must think ofthemselves34 and
of the actions that are open to them" [Hacking 1986]. Through enumeration and
classification, "memorable man" becomes "calculable man", making him/her easier to
"improve" and control [Armstrong 1983].
QOL measurement constitutes the individual as a set of norms and invites them to produce
truths about themselves using techniques of self-surveillance and confession that complement
the "clinical gaze" [Foucault 1994]. Shildrick and Price use Foucault to analyse applying for
Disability Living Allowance where the move to self-certification requires the subject "[to]
police her own body and report in intricate detail its failure to meet standards of normalcy;
that she should render herself, in effect, transparent" [1996:49]. The subject therefore
becomes responsible for obtaining the allowance as the reason for withholding it will be
attributed to a failure of reporting rather than a denying external agency. The form focuses on
34For example, Hacking argues that the reports of nineteenth century factory inspectors structured the class
system by creating categories in which people came to recognize themselves.
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individual behaviour and ignores social and environmental factors. It obliges people to place
themselves within its definition of disability, tum a critical gaze on their bodies, and
effectively produce themselves as disabled subjects: "it is in the very gestures of
differentiation and individuation, as exemplified by the numerous subdivisions of the
questions posed on the DLA form, that the claimant is inserted into patterns of normalization
which grossly restrict individuality" [ibid:51].
Foucault and Bourdieu
The ideas of Foucault and Bourdieu were particularly useful in exploring key themes of this
thesis, for example, how the voice of the patient is constructed and the effect of QOL
measurement on the self. The two theorists work well together since Foucault's emphasis on
contextualisation highlights the way Bourdieu's use of terms like "capital" and "linguistic
market" form part of the prevailing economic rationality critiqued by later Foucauldians.
Bourdieu's concept of "symbolic violence" illuminates how, because the language ofQOL
has become a dominant speech practice in the field of health/medicine, subjugated groups
need to use this language in order to be heard [1991]. Their strategy is not wholly successful,
however, as "authority comes to language from outside" so the capital of the speaker in other
"fields" (for example, educational, economic) determines whether/how they will be heard35•
QOL has become a tool in a continual struggle to push back the limits of "doxa" (the area of
thought "beyond question") and return to a state of "heterodoxy" which gives the experiences
of people with limiting conditions "the right to be spoken publicly". Bourdieu also recognises
that classification is a "question of force" as it determines and supports relations of
domination; for example, the WHO classifications of disability perpetuate the idea that
disability (and people with disabilities) are a burden, which justifies not addressing the
inequalities they experience.
The two concepts from Bourdieu I found most useful were "field" and "habitus" 36 as the
former illuminates the networks explored in chapter 6, and the latter contributes to
Foucauldian understandings of how discourses shift. Medicine in Britain can be seen as a
"field of struggle" because doctors are attempting to maintain their definition of the field and
defend/improve their position by drawing on different forms of vcapital" (for example,
35Bourdieu calls this the "law of price formation".
36Habitus was originally a phenomenological construct (experience and action are structured by sediments of
previous experiences and actions and leave sediments that structure future experiences and actions) but was
enlarged by Bourdieu to include the conditions that shape the agent's and the social distribution of perceptual
and linguistic schemes [1984].1t is therefore both a "structuring structure" and a "structured structure", but the
concept should not be used deterministically as under certain conditions an "oppositional habitus" (a
"disposition of resistance and change") can emerge.
educational and moral). Different symbols, concepts, and social strategies are used according
to their perceived instrumental value, for example: "the appeal of evidence based medicine
for the profession - and the administrative elite - is that it demonstrates unequivocally the
commitment to high standards of care thereby justifying professional autonomy" [Armstrong
2002].
The medical field is also affected by the socio-economic context (or "field of power"), for
example: the challenge to medical authority from new right ideology, new social movements,
patient support organisations, and professional advocates, who all claim to speak with the
voice of the patient; the long-term implications of demographic change and the growth of
chronic illnesses; the increasing power and competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry;
and cost-cutting in the health services. These struggles may enable an inversion of values,
which creates an opportunity for patients to speak and be heard. For example, if the doxa of
medical paternalism is being contested by NHS managers, then patients can contest it on
different grounds. The individual anger of people living with dystonia about their experiences
with doctors may also be "shaped and focused by collective schemas of critique" into an
"oppositional habitus" [Crossley and Crossley 200 I: 1485].
Crossley and Crossley also examine the construction of the "voice 0f the patient" by
comparing two anthologies of people with mental health problems (published 40 years apart)
that "illustrat[ ed] the historically and socially constructed nature of voice" [ibid: 1478]. For
example, credibility in the first anthology came from formal qualifications and professional
status, and in the second from personal experience and active membership of mental health
groups. The constraint on what could be expressed in the first anthology was not just one of
context but "an anticipation of context and the various assumptions and prejudgements which
structure that anticipation [... ] Agents have a pre-reflective sense or feel for what is
acceptable to say and this structures what they will say"[ibid: 1480]. Also, the therapeutic
narrative underlying contributions to the second anthology had only recently developed, for
example, "no contributor to the [first anthology] could have discovered a 'hole' in their 'aura'
because to do so presupposes specific schemas of perception, imagination and speech which
simply were not available at the time. The 'child within' is not a lost soul waiting to be found
but rather the function of a specific manner of constructing distress" [ibid: 1486]. Similarly,
QOL is not a natural property like height or weight that merely awaits measurement, as one
might imagine from using QOL measures.
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Crossley's analysis is supported by Armstrong's comparison of texts on medical history-
taking from the 1930s and 70s which demonstrate that the changes were "not simply the form
of the incitement to speech but the very structure of perception; it was not what the patient
said but what the doctor heard which established the reality (and accuracy) of the patient's
view" [1984:737]. Interestingly, the requirement for an extended case history in medicine
was paralleled by the growth in medical sociology and, later, QOL measurement, which used
psychometric techniques to provide information about a condition without the unreliable filter
of the patient.
Foucault analysed knowledge in so far as it furthered power relationships'", arguing that
science was not about "facts" but authority and legitimation through the process of "claims
making". I found this approach useful as it directed my attention to how claims about QOL
are made and the role of the "power-knowledge complex''"; and led me to link my analyses
to the growth of "surveillance medicine" (which extends the type, location and personnel of
possible medical interventions) [Armstrong 1995].
QOL measurement is one of the "intellectual technologies" described by Rose that make
aspects of life amenable to inscription, calculation, and ultimately regulation [Miller and
Rose 1990]. Inscription enables "the pertinent features of the domain [... ] to literally be
represented in the place where decisions are to be made about them" [ibid:7], for example,
medical records enable doctors to travel through their patient's body from behind their desks
[Berg 1996]. Like the statistics collected by the early Victorians (see chapter 7), this
information is "not the outcome of a neutral recording function" but "a way of acting upon
the real" [Miller and Rose 1990:7]. Latour characterises this process as "action at a distance"
[1987:219], using the example of 18th century French navigators who could only colonise the
East Pacific because it was "mobilised" through maps, drawings, tide-tables, etc. which could
be brought home to "centres of calculation". These "mobile traces" were stable enough to be
moved back and forth without distortion so could be accumulated, combined, and calculated
upon. Domination was thus enabled by the "intellectual mastery" of those at the centre who
manipulated information about persons and events distant from them (a contemporary
example of this is the WHO's Global Burden of Disease project).
37For example, epidemiology was interesting because it extended the "clinical gaze" into the community [1976].
38These are linked but separate; power is non-stratified, local, unstable and flexible, but knowledge is stratified,
stable and segmented, so power needs to avoid the forms of knowledge to operate [Foucault 1982].
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Another example of how statistics and a common language enable "problems" to be defined
and acted upon is the government of the UK economy in the 1960s and 70s [Miller and Rose
1990]. The first step was harmonising different actors' definitions of growth, a problem
common to QOL where everyone agrees that it is "a good thing" but has different ideas about
what it is, how to measure it, and how to achieve it. Next, calculation techniques were
recommended to nationalised and private industries and taught in business schools so "the
ideal of economic growth was rendered congruent with democratic freedom, social justice
and a fair standard ofliving" [ibid: 18].
The language of enterprise forms a kind of matrix for thought here, consumers being
considered as, in a sense, entrepreneurs of themselves, seeking to maximise their
'quality of life' through the artful assembly of a 'life-style' put together through the
world of goods. Within this politico-ethical environment, the expertise of market
research, of promotion and communication, provides the relays through which the
aspirations of ministers, the ambitions of business and the dreams of consumers
achieve mutual translatability
[Ibid:25, my italics]
A similar transformation is occurring with audit in anthropology [Strathem 2000], and QOL
measurement which employs the "language of care" to conceal its concern with "efficiency
and cost" [Kleinman and Kleinman 1996:15]. Finally, it was only possible to think about the
economy in this way because systems of national accounting had turned it into a calculable
and comparable entity, for example, the DEeD tabular comparisons of different countries'
growth rates enabled the identification of Britain's low growth rate and the development of
programmes/technologies to address it, in the same way that the WHO Global burden of
disease tables produce something called "the burden of disease" that can be compared
internationally.
The case study of the UK economy demonstrates how in modem liberal democracies
technologies "seek to act upon and instrumentalise the self-regulating propensities of
individuals in order to ally them with socio-political objectives" [ibid:28] while apparently
limiting the role of the state. The languages and techniques of "expertises of the enterprise"
provide "both the necessary distance between political authorities and organisational life, and
the translatability to establish an alliance between national economic health, increased
organisational effectiveness, and progressive and humanistic values" [ibid:27].
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QOL measurement can also been seen as an example of "pastoral power't'" which makes
people into both "objects" (of study) and "subjects" ("subject tied to his own identity by a
conscience of self-knowledge") [Foucault 1982]. This "subjectification" is accomplished in
three ways: by academic disciplines; by "dividing practices" where subjects are divided from
others, or within themselves (for example, self-assessment for benefits); and by making
someone tum themselfinto a subject (for example, by engaging in the reflexive self-
monitoring required by QOL measures or managing their "risk factors"). Filling in QOL
measures or responding to health economic questions about "preferences" helps develop
economic rationality, as did "new regimes of the intellect" like numeracy, literacy, and
calculation (first promulgated in the 19th century) which were designed "to install foresight,
prudence and a planful relationship to the future" [Rose 1996:313]. QOL measurement is also
connected to the injunction to "know yourself' which Foucault describes in the History of
Sexuality [1978].
Reading Foucault's writings on the archaeology and genealogy of knowledge [1972, 1973]
encouraged me to contextualise my analyses. For example, approaching health technologies
as emerging from (and creating) particular cultural conditions [Escobar 1994tO, which
reduces the tendency towards "technological determinism". Health technologies cannot be
treated as "given", nor can researchers "stay in the lab,,41 as changes occur in the context of
global health-care reform, new professional models, and new groups of experts (for example,
QOL researchers). Cultural assumptions are unconsciously embedded in new health
technologies'f; for example, QOL measures prioritise performing activities of daily living
and working and rarely take account of the effort involved [Hunt 1999].
Anthropology of science and technology
The anthropology of science provides a new model for anthropology, where anthropologists
work across sites and disciplines, incorporate multiple perspectives, and handle the
compression of space and time associated with post-modernity. Scientific work itself
destabilises the boundaries between "pure" and "applied" science and science and society
[Latour 1987]; for example, the hybrid nature of health technologies [Faulkner 1997], the
information flows between sites of knowledge creation and application [Elston 1997], and the
39Pastoral power "focuses on the development of knowledge of man around two roles: one globalising and
quantitative, concerning the population, the other, analytical, concerning the individual".
4°Escobar also argues that modernity caused a move from organic and mechanical models of life to ones linked
to production and maximisation, for example, health economic models that maximise aggregate QOL.
41AsKnorr Cetina advised on learning the multi-sited nature of Martin's study of the immune system [1994].
42For example, a database designed to empower people with migraines by giving them access to information
about their condition only included the information their doctors wanted them to have [Forsythe 1996].
complex, transnational networks of medicine regulation [Davis 1997; Abraham 1995]. The
culture of "Science" (characterised as detached, immutable, and dispassionate) has shifted to
one of "research" which is more open and enquiring. Science is expected to acknowledge and
increase the complexities of life rather than resolve them, so instead of subscribing to the
myth of objectivity, "the more connected a scientific discipline [to society], the better"
[Latour 1998t3• Contemporary studies of science explore this connection by examining the
"traffic between the establishing of knowledge and those cultural practices and formats which
philosophers of science have regarded as external to knowledge" [Rouse 1992]. For example,
acknowledging that disciplines are created and transformed by new instrurnents'" as well as
concepts, and that the former frequently precedes the latter. This is a useful approach to the
history of QOL measurement as it demonstrates that alliances rather than technological
superiority secure the adoption of a measure'". Once a measure has been used in a number of
studies it becomes an "obligatory point of passage" [CalIon 1986] and researchers are
expected to use it (even if it does not measure the aspects of health that they are interested in)
and validate their measures against it.
I explore the contribution of "actor network theory'r" [Law 1982; Latour 1987] to my thesis
in greater detail in chapter 7 when I examine how QOL researchers (an example of "scientific
entrepreneurs" [Latour 1987]) form complex networks to create measures of QOL. They also
participate in the "battle" between proponents of "evidence-based" and "patient-centred" or
"narrative" medicine as QOL measures claim to be simultaneously objective and patient-
centred. Of course, this battle is more rhetorical than actual since both discourses conceal the
usual government concern with efficiency and economy and power struggles within medicine
(c.f. Armstrong who explores how the discourses are used by differently positioned doctors to
achieve professional autonomy [2002]).
43The pressure on researchers to be connected to commerce can cause ?ias, as I explore in chapter 6.
44For example, the difference in instrument style between North Amencan and Japanese high-energy physics
laboratories affected both the types of questions asked and what counted as a "good result" [Traweek 1988].
45The military and government institutions who provided sophisticated equipment for Bjerkness's study of
atmospheric geophysics also ensured the international acceptance of common instruments and temporalities
[Friedman 1989]. Similarly, standardised mortality rates only became accepted forms for epidemiological data
after they had been used in particular public h.e~lth .controve.rsie,~[Bal:~leye~,al ~9;'7]:
46It also highlighted the vital role of the technician 111 resolvmg error and noise (tor example, interpreting
ambiguous responses to the dystonia QOL questionnaire; coding causes of death [Prior 1997]).
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Medical anthropology and the anthropology of the body
Young's review of medical anthropology [1982] usefully distinguishes between "clinically
applied anthropologists'r" like Kleinman who produce "anthropologies of illness", and
"critical medical anthropologists't" like Scheper-Hughes, Taussig, and Young himself, who
write "anthropologies of sickness". His main criticism of the former is that instead of
questioning the premises of biomedicine, they argue for its expansion into social dimensions
of illness. For example, the anthropologist Guarnaccia [in Spilker et al 1996] is an advocate
for QOL measurement, which could be regarded as an extension of the "clinical gaze".
One thing I do not hear from my colleagues in medical anthropology [... ] is an
invitation to reduce rather than expand the parameters of medical efficacy, a call for a
more humble model of doctoring as 'plumbing', simple 'body-work' that would leave
social ills and social healing to political activists, and psychological/spiritual ills and
other forms of existential malaise to ethnomedical healers
[Scheper-Hughes 1990:192]
Critical medical anthropology is the most useful theoretical approach for this thesis as it takes
a deconstructive approach to illness and situates it in its political and economic context,
exploring how every condition is a "culture bound syndrome'<'" because of the role of cultural
factors in the construction and expression of illness 50 [Hahn 1995]. For example, Hacking's
description of the "conditions of possibility" for new syndromes illuminates the diagnostic
process for all conditions [1998]51. According to Singer, the key themes for critical medical
anthropology are reification, privatisation, "healthism", displacement of social aetiologyr',
medical hegemony, medicalisation, medical social control, micropolitics of medicine and the
class structure of medicine, somatisation, and the struggle for health; many of which are
47Scheper-Hughes describes clinically applied anthropologists as "content to tinker (endlessly it would seem)
with the doctor-patient relationship)" [1990: 189] and likens them to colonial anthropologists who attempted to
ameliorate the position of the indigenes without challenging the inevitability of colonial appropriation. She
believes that the incongruity between anthropological and biomedical knowledge practices has been resolved by
reducing anthropological knowledge to innocuous concepts like "lay explanatory models" (or the
"biopsychosocial" model described in chapter 9).
48Critical medical anthropology is more commonly used to describe writers who apply Marxist political
economy to the social relations of sickness and healthcare delivery (for example, Waitzkin [1978] on coronary
care units, Bates [1990] on coronary artery bypass grafts, and Navarro [1986] on the how distribution of
biomedical roles mirrors existing stratifications of capitalist society) rather than those who criticise biomedicine.
4~ervios [Low 1994], Koro [Cheng 1996] and Dhat [Bottero 1991] are classic examples of culture bound
syndromes, but they are also found in contemporary western societies and may represent the disappearance of
traditional cultural idioms for expressing distress so social problems are interpreted as symptoms (for example,
parasuicide, agoraphobia, exhibitionism, and domestic sieges [Littlewood and Lipsedge 1982]; stress and post-
traumatic stress disorder [Collins 1999; Young 1980, 1995]; hysteria [Showalter 1997]; mania [Martin 2000];
multiple personality disorder and fugue [Hacking 1995, 1998]).
50Scheper-Hughes [1979] and Littlewood and Lipsedge [1982] observed the tendency of Afro-Caribbean and
Irish psychiatric patients to structure their illnesses as religious experiences.
51Diagnosis requires "an ecological niche, with four principal vectors to be named medical taxonomy, cultural
golarity, observability, an~ re.lease",~Ha.c~ing 1998:80]. .
"For example, the redescription of del mum del forne" (madness from hunger) as psychosis [Scheper-Hughes
1988]; or the lack of medical interest in the "trigger events" for dystonia.
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important parts of the experience of dystonia. His rallying cry is "comforting the afflicted
while afflicting the comfortable" [1990: 185] which expresses the interest in political
engagement that characterises critical medical anthropology. Sickness becomes a focus for
ideological practice because it disrupts people's "uncritical acceptance of life", turning them
into "metaphysicians and philosophers" [Taussig 1980] and giving doctors "a powerful point
of entry into the patient's psyche". Medicine is also criticised for presenting social conditions
as natural and immutable "facts of life" and dismissing them from discussion as "not-
medicine" [ibid]53.
Where critical medical anthropology appears lacking is in its approach to the body, which
often focuses on its representation and manipulation'" rather than the experience of
embodimenrf (mirroring the privileging of object over subject in biomedicine). Etic accounts
of the "meanings" of illness take precedence over emic ones, for example, the "ordinary"
pains of the elderly are rarely examined, even though elderly people embed them in their
lives and give them a meaning that challenges their "ordinariness" [Becker 1999]. Studying
the body is difficult as it "tends to recede from our experience" [Leder 1990], only coming to
our attention when it "dys-appears" at moments of crisis and transition [Backett-Milbum and
Cunningham-Burley 1999]56. There are also "socially structured barriers" that prevent people
from speaking with the "voice of personal bodily experience" [Zola 1982] even though
narrating illness can lead to "re-embodiment" [Williams 1984]. As I explore in chapter 3,
representing experience is not a straightforward process, for example, temporal [Fabian 1983;
Geertz 1973] or emotional experiences [Freund 1990; Abu Lughod 1987] often cannot be
verbalised and there may be powerful taboos preventing their communication.
The multiplicity of bodies proposed as heuristic devices complicates things further".
Fracturing the body into numerous "topical" bodies (e.g. "medical", "consuming",
"labouring") disguises their linkage at the macro and micro levels and mirrors the
fragmentation that occurs within biomedicine. For some theorists the body is a more pliable
replacement for the subject, "a more or less passive object of disciplines and representations"
53Although Taussig's description of the reification of the patient is persuasive, he doesn't distinguish between
objectification and reification and assumes that his viewpoint is free of the mystification he identifies in others.
s4For example, Douglas treats it as an instrument of the rational mind and subordinates it to the semantic [1970].
sSFor example, until recently, studies of pain focused on cognitive mediation and interpretation, or the way
doctors made sense of it, rather than the experience which was left to neurophysiologists like Melzack [1973].
56The experience of illness and impairment is characterised by a continual awareness of the body, partly because
of the pervasive "disablism" which "makes the world alien to impaired bodies [ ... ] simultaneously produc[ing]
impairment as an experience" [Paterson and Hughes 1999].
57Leder suggested "ecstatic" (outfolding) and "recessive"(infolding) bodies [1990]; Douglas: social and physical
bodies [1970]; and Scheper-Hughes and Lock: three bodies with three complementary epistemological
approaches (individual- phenomenological, social- structural/symbolic, political- post structural) [1987].
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imbued with unrepresentable psychodynamic and sexual desires [Turner 1984]. But using the
body as a synonym for the self without a sense of its bodiliness objectifies it, missing the
opportunity to add sentience and sensibility to ideas of self and make history and culture
more material [Csordas 1994]. It fails to acknowledge that people experience themselves
simultaneously in and as their bodies, which also shape interrelationships, modes of
production, and reproduction [Turner 1984]58.As Haraway observed "neither our personal
bodies nor our social bodies may be seen as natural in the sense of existing outside the self-
creating process called human labour" [1988]. Foucault [1978, 1994] and Bourdieu [1977
1984, 1992] have also demonstrated that the body is an important site of social differentiation
and control. For example, Bourdieu's concept of "hex is" (the body as a "mnemonic device"
of cultural practice) suggested why the uncontrollability of the bodies of people living with
dystonia is experienced as threatening. This means oppression is "not simply an abstract
structure manifest, for example, in exclusion from the labour market - it is felt in the flesh
and the bones" [Paterson and Hughes 1999].
Marginalised groups resist bodily oppression through a "politics of proprioception" which
deconstructs aesthetic, political and economic tyrannies (for example, Black, gay, and
disability "Pride" movements) [Hughes and Paterson 1997]. The Pride movements'
representations of the body are an empowering contrast to some post-structuralist views as
they involve "an agent that produces discourses as well as receiving them" [Turner 1984].
Body image is pliable and social, demonstrating an "in-folding" and "out-folding"
relationship with culture [Kleinman 1978]. Modes of embodiment are linked to ideas about
personhood (for example, "individuality" and "dividuality" [Strathern 1988; Boddy 1998]),
which are rarely predictable. For example, individuation does not necessarily imply
individualism as it can be a way of becoming aware of our position within a larger whole
[Obsekere 1981].
The subject/object dualism is not confined to doctors as it enables people to describe their
experience in an "everyday" language that allows distanciation and control, precisely because
the representation is not coterminous with the experience. It is even evident in psychoanalysis
and psychosomatics where illnesses are treated as either organic or psychological: where
psychopathology is diagnosed, the organic aspects of the illness are immediately forgotten.
While the objectivist perspective on the body can be useful in the treatment of certain
conditions, it makes chronic pain incomprehensible as it is impossible to distinguish between
58This relationship is expressed by the German phenomenological concepts of "lieb" ("body-for-itself') and
"korper" ("body-in-itself').
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pain behaviour, experience of pain, and the accompanying emotional states [Good 1994;
Jackson 1994]. Medical activities - including QOL measurement - attempt to objectify the
pain59 to produce a gap between self and experience and transform it into a symbol, which
can support a healing narrative. This approach is rarely successful with chronic pain
syndrome, nor with dystonia whose symptoms also resist organisation (as its medical
definition suggests).
Dystonia
Dystonia is a "syndrome of multiple different disorders" involving "involuntary sustained
muscle contraction" [Fahn 1987], which is classified with neurological "movement disorders"
like Parkinson's Disease. People living with dystonia experience visible twitching and jerking
of the muscles (for example, involuntary closing of the eyes in blepharospasm), often
accompanied by pain.
This definition gives a sense of how difficult dystonia?" is to classify and position; it is
usually described as a neurological condition as the symptoms are caused by a chemical
imbalance in the area in the brain that controls movement. Similarly, it is chronic (or "long-
term") and is usually classified as an illness because the symptoms are potentially treatable
and many people living with dystonia hope ultimately for a cure. Some define themselves as
disabled (especially people with generalised dystonia), recognising that they may have more
in common with other wheel-chair users or people with sight problems, than people with
neurological illnesses. Others use the definitions pragmatically, for example, people with
writer's cramp (affecting the writing hand) in Canada petitioned for it be redefined as a
"repetitive strain injury" so they could successfully argue for compensation from employers.
This highlights not only the politics underlying medical classification but also the tactical use
of these classifications. The use of "syndrome" in the definition also arouses suspicion among
many GPs as it links dystonia to people with chronic fatigue and chronic pain syndromes who
are often perceived as discontented and demanding patients. Like "essential tremor", which is
significantly over-diagnosed [Schrag et al 2000], it can also be used as a "garbage" diagnosis
by neurologists who are uncertain about the cause of a set of symptoms, and often the
deciding factor is whether it responds to the main treatment for dystonia, botulinum toxin?'
(see Genevieve's account, chapter 2).
59For example, by quantifying it using a pain-specific measure.
6°Which literally means incorrect (dys-) muscle movements (tonia).
blThis is not infallible as it works by freezing the muscles, so is equally effective with psychiatric conditions.
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"Primary" dystonia is the most common form and is believed to be genetic in origin.
"Secondary" dystonia appears similar (and may also be genetic) but is secondary to a
precipitating event, for example, use of psychiatric medications, head injury, or another
movement disorder. Generalised dystonia was identified by Oppenheim in 1911 and the less
severe segmental and focal dystonias were included in the classification "dystonia" from
1944 [Oppenheim 1911; Herz 1944].
The most common type is focal dystonia, which affects one muscle group (for example,
cervical dystonia affects the neck muscles) and is usually neither progressive nor fatal. It
begins when people are in their mid-fifties'f and (with the exception of "writer's cramp") is
more prevalent in women than men by a ratio of3:2 [ESDE 1999]. Segmental dystonia
(affects adjacent muscle groups) and multi-focal dystonia (affects unrelated muscle groups)
are less common. Generalised dystonia, which onsets in childhood, is the rarest and most
disabling form as it affects a number of muscle groups, progresses rapidly, and can be fatal.
The main campaigning image of the Dystonia Society is a girl in a wheelchair who is literally
doubled up with generalised dystonia.
When someone with focal dystonia of the limbs begins walking, the basal ganglia (the part of
the brain which controls movement) brings more groups of muscles into action than is
necessary and these groups of muscles work against each other [Rothwell and Obeso 1983;
Calne and Lang 1988]. The struggle between the muscles is exacerbated by the tension of the
walker who has come to associate this movement with difficulty and is tensing their muscles
in anticipation. Bleton (a physiotherapist specialising in movement disorders) has
demonstrated this in writer's cramp by showing how the hand becomes so tense when
holding a pen that the person is unable to write. People can make writing movements with a
paintbrush, and even an inverted pen, but cannot do so when the pen is placed in the correct
position. Even where surgery is successful, they may not be able to function "normally" as
their bodies cannot approach certain movements "naively".
Although dystonia has been recognised by neurologists since the beginning of the last century
and dystonia advocates claim they can identify people living with dystonia in paintings by
Bruegel, it has only been generally recognised in the past twenty years. People diagnosed
more than ten years ago were often referred to a psychiatrist rather than a neurologist.
Treating dystonia as a psychiatric condition exacerbated their feelings of guilt and shame and
62There is variation between subtypes, for example, writer's cramp begins when people are in their late forties
and blepharospasm in the mid-sixties.
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meant that physical experiences of pain and fatigue were often ignored (see especially chapter
4).
Dystonia research
There have been few epidemiological studies of dystonia, due to its rarity and low mortality
rate'" [Ben-Shlomo et aI2000]. I coordinated an epidemiological survey in eight European
countries [ESDE 1999,2000] to provide current prevalence figures as previous estimates
were based on very small numbers". The study calculated a European prevalence rate of 152
per million for primary dystonia: 117 per million for focal dystonia, and 35 per million for
dystonia affecting more than one body part [ESDE 2000]. This compares poorly with UK
prevalence rates of 1,465 per million for multiple sclerosis and 2,067 per million for
Parkinson's disease. However, measuring the prevalence of rare diseases is difficult as it is
only possible to measure people who have been diagnosed. For a person to appear in the
study they needed first to see a sympathetic GP, then be referred to a neurologist rather than a
psychiatrist or specialist in the affected body part, and finally to have a type of dystonia that
responds to treatment with Botulinum toxin. Since the average wait for diagnosis for
participants from the London centre was eight years, we can assume that many eligible
participants were missed. In fact, genetic studies of dystonia have demonstrated that over
50% of people living with dystonia have affected family members who have not been
diagnosed. Although people living with dystonia frequently report a family history of
movement disorders, dystonia is difficult to diagnose without examination'". As the numbers
are so small, prevalence rates can also be biased by clerical errors at the collecting or
coordinating centre'".
Previous research in dystonia focused on its aetiology (the role of the basal ganglia and the
thalamus), and how messages are sent through neural pathways to the muscles. Genetics is a
prestigious and well-funded area, but although gene loci have been identified in at least six
forms of dystonia including focal, dopa-responsive'", PDC68 and two of the rare X-linked
63 Hospital mortality rates are an important source of epidemiological data.
64The most cited study [Nutt et a11988] reported a prevalence rate for generalised dystonia of 36 cases per
million population, but this was only based on three cases, two of which would now be classified as segmental.
05Another component of the ESDE study demonstrated that someone living with dystonia could diagnose
dystonia from a video as well as a neurologist and that confidence in diagnosis was inversely related to skill.
ObI later discovered that the French centre had 100 cases who were active at the time of the prevalence study but
were not recorded which would have doubled their prevalence rate.
07Dopa-responsive dystonia (DRD) onsets in childhood and responds dramatically to the drug Leva-dopa.
08PDC presents as a focal dystonia but its severity varies during the day.
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recessive syndromes, disease genes have only been identified in three6<J. The test for the
DYTI gene has been used to confirm diagnoses of generalised dystonia in the USA and UK
but the gene's predictive role is uncertain.
Health economic and QOL studies of dystonia are a new and expanding area of research
[Butler et a11998; Gudex et a11997; Camfield et a12000, 2002; Hilker et a12001; Ben-
Shlomo et al 2002], especially as centres develop dystonia-specific QOL measures" (Austria
CDQ-24 [Mueller et al 2000], UK DysQol). This is anthropologically interesting because it is
an example of both audit culture (linking efficiency and control to well-being) and the
inculcation of economic rationality as part of "govemmentality", Itmay also indicate more
general concems with the "taming of chance" [Hacking 1990] and "management of
uncertainty" [Giddens 1991], which form part of what some theorists call a "risk society"
[Beck 1992]. The psychological aspects of dystonia have been well researched [Jahanshahi
1991; Jahanshahi and Marsden 1990ab, 1998], partly because even in the mid-nineties
articles were being published in psychological joumals suggesting that focal dystonia was
psychogenic.
Representations of dystonia
Public understanding of dystonia is not aided by the Dystonia Society publicity campaigns
that represent it as a mysterious and horrible disorder, treated with a deadly poison. While
this gets attention and money, it also increases the fear and isolation of people living with
dystonia and reinforces popular prejudice ", The Society's position is contradictory because it
wants to empower people living with dystonia (as far as it serves its interests) but needs to
represent them as pitiable and in need of the Society's support in order to fundraise. In this
context QOL scores offer little more than clinical measures as while most people understand
the concept ofQOL, the scores need to be supported by vignettes to make them meaningful'f.
QOL studies and articles about people living with dystonia are analogous in the sense that
because dystonia is so little represented, even a partial or inaccurate representation is
generally perceived as beneficial.
690eneralised dystonia (DYTl), DRD (DYT5) and X-linked sensorineural deafness, dystonia and mental
retardation (DDP).
7°While there are many clinical scales for dystonia (for example, the TWSTRS for cervical dystonia [Conskey
and Lang 1994]), these cannot pick up small differences in the performance of different therapies, or give any
sense of what a "t O-degree improvement in angle of rotation" means to someone with cervical dystonia.
7Ic.f. Campaigns by the Neurofibromatosis [Ablon 1995] and MS Societies [DuvaI1984].
nc.f. the pharmaceutical company sponsoring the Society'S membership survey's request for "strong quotes" to
"drive" the publication, chapter 5.
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In addition to interviewing people living with dystonia, I examined representations of
dystonia in local and national media (analysing 36 articles published between 1997 and 2001)
to see if the language used would give a sense of the prejudice that they experience. The main
themes of the articles were the strange and horrible nature of dystonia, problems getting a
diagnosis, uncertain futures, and the exotic nature of the treatment. 25% of the articles were
about the same three people, all of who had made "miraculous" recoveries - an ex-dancer
who had written a book about her experiences, a photogenic woman with laryngeal dystonia,
and a girl with severe generalised dystonia. The articles about men (25%) were reported
differently, for example, focusing on career rather than inability to fulfil domestic
responsibilities, and not mentioning their families. The language used for people living with
dystonia was the same in all articles: sufferer" was most common, also victim, unfortunates,
patient, crippled, and iftheir mobility was affected, wheelchair-bound, bed-bound, and bed-
ridden. These descriptors have been criticised by people with disabilities as etic projections
that disempower the subject, present a sensationalist image of disability, and encourage pity
rather than respect'". For example, "patient" connotes passivity and refers to a specific role
that people living with dystonia occupy infrequently.
The articles usually begin with the person's struggle for diagnosis, involving either failure by
their GP75 to take their complaint seriously, or psychiatric referral when symptoms of
dystonia are attributed to stress, depression, nervous disposition, "wear and tear", postnatal
depression, or phobic notions. The experience of not being able to describe what was
happening to them was one of the most traumatic memories of the illness ("she knew that
something must definitely be wrong with her, but no-one seemed able to say what it was")
and caused many people to doubt their sanity ("at times I thought I was going mad and other
people think you are too"). Some were accused of imagining the condition or inventing it to
escape their responsibilities ("one consultant thinking it might all be in the mind told her
briskly 'this won't do Mrs Smith. You've got to get out of bed and go home to your
family'''). The articles emphasise their relief at the diagnosis of a "real" (i.e. organic)
condition ("believing it was a mental problem was worse because I blamed myself [...] when
the consultant told me it was physical, I cried") and show the stigma experienced by people
with psychiatric conditions (characterised by one person as "psychological freaks") and by
extension people living with dystonia whose condition appears psychiatric in origin. They
73Some people living with dystonia describe themselves as sufferers because they feel it represents their daily
reality, but may not want to be labelled as that.
74They also represent disability as individual tragedy rather than social responsibility [Oliver 1990].
75While the GP is a legitimate target for anti-medical feeling, the neurologist is the hero who can diagnose at a
glance ("he recognised what it was straight away").
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reiterate popular prejudices: that psychiatric illness is not genuine, can be controlled, and is a
legitimate cause of guilt.
Lack of public awareness is another factor that increases feelings of isolation. Dystonia is
characterised as "this forgotten disease" (referring also to resource allocation) and people
living with dystonia emphasise that before diagnosis "even [they] hadn't heard of it". After
diagnosis, many feel they should raise awareness and help diagnose others ("she has helped
two other sufferers by spotting their condition before their GPs").
Although the articles are written to evoke sympathy, the descriptions of dystonia ("rare nerve
condition", "mysterious disorder", "devastating brain disorder") cause the reader to step back,
not wanting to encounter this horror at close hand. Not surprising then that people living with
dystonia report feeling "like a total freak when it first started" and "[that] you are the only
person in the world that has this". It is described as "a horribly disfiguring, painful and
debilitating illness" which even close relatives need to be protected from ("I locked myself in
the bathroom when I got home so as not to frighten my wife"). The muscle spasms are
described graphically ("my arms were bent up like this, she says, contorting hideously in her
chair"), implying that people living with dystonia do not have any control over them ("my
arms and legs started to shake uncontrollably, my face began to twitch and the comers of my
mouth pulled downwards - I was terrified"). Dystonia is represented as a powerful and
merciless invader that strikes without warning and cannot be resisted ("the muscles seem to
have a will of their own [...] if you try and fight it, it only makes things worse"), appearing
closer to spirit possession than chronic illness.
The ordinariness of people living with dystonia is contrasted with the strangeness of dystonia
by looking at the person's life before the onset of dystonia ("she was a vivacious 23 year old
with a demanding job and a hectic social life") and their family relationships ("I was a normal
active mum"). Articles about women describe them in relation to their families (for example,
"Preston grandmother") while those about men focus on active and productive lives before
onset to counter the equation of disability with weakness ("I was once extremely active but
now my body can't quite keep up"). Their strength is emphasised by hyperbolic descriptions
of their pain ("seven years of pain and torment") and testaments to their fortitude ("[my
nerves] had become so sensitive that the mere touch of a bed sheet left me in agony").
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The articles construct an ideal person living with dystonia who is uncomplaining ("there was
no good getting depressed. I just got on with it"), fulfils their responsibilities ("as a single
mum I had to continue my job as a nurse despite the problems with my neck"), and may have
coped with similar experiences in the past ("after a male partner had let her fall to the ground
in a pas-de-deux she danced on with a fractured spine for seven months").
Dystonia affects participation in valued and self-preserving activities such as work,
socialising, and (in the case of women) domestic chores and many experience "existential
fatigue" and withdrawal [Toombs 1992] ("everything was a struggle - doing the washing up,
vacuuming or just putting on my makeup?"), Fear of attracting attention reduces
participation in social activities ("[he] now feels so ashamed of his shaking and twitching that
he stays at home rather than risk being mocked at the pub or in shops"), contributing to a
feeling oflosing one's humanity, which is exacerbated by the language used in these articles
("her balance was so bad she was led around like a dog"). Being dependent on others
apparently removes your qualification as a full member of society ("bed ridden at home
where she had to be dressed, washed and fed").
Stress on partner and family relationships is a theme that only appears in the women's
articles, which vividly express a fear of being a burden ("I was worried how my boyfriend
was going to feel [...] 'I'll understand if you don't want to marry me''') and highlight
"disturbing" role reversals ("she has become dependent on her two sons"), particularly when
the male partner is the carer. Their guilt extends to fears that they have "contaminated" their
children with dystonia, even though the role of inheritance is not clear ("the worst thing is I
know it is hereditary and I have passed it on").
The main focus for the articles I analysed was treatment by Botulinum toxin as the paradox of
a "lethal poison" being used therapeutically seems to have captured journalists' imaginations
(demonstrated by its appearance in the majority of headlines). Every article had a different
account of how Botulinum toxin works, respectively "cutting", "paralysing", and "killing off'
the nerve endings. The risks of the treatment were highlighted, underlining the "desperation"
of people who undergo it ("she became poisoned by the Botulinum toxin used to treat the
spasms and could no longer swallow"). This desperation was emphasised by two articles on
rationing in Preston, where being "denied" treatment was tantamount to an exclusion from
"normal life".
76This and other quotes tell a particular story about being female; obviously you are seriously ill when you no
longer have the energy to wash up or apply make-up.
40
Other articles mentioned new surgical techniques, emphasising their novel, experimental, and
risky nature ("radical new treatment [...] never before been performed on such a young
child"). However "radical treatments" lead to "miraculous recoveries" that not only relieve
people's dystonia but give them their life back, possibly even a life better than they had
before ("she can drive again, play tennis, sail, in fact do everything"). The only regret is for
"lost" time ("I wish I'd had this treatment years ago").
Where treatment was not effective, the articles implied a gloomy future that echoes negative
stereotypes of disabled people ("I knew I'd have to give up ideas of being a teacher"). For
people in this position, the articles advise using your experience to help others ("my
determination to fight my own disability helps me to fight on their [her pupils] behalf [...] the
motivation to help them progress is greater than my own pain") and being positive ("positive
thinking has helped her to get back behind the driving wheel again and give her the precious
privilege of being able to hold her granddaughter"). The "super-crip" [Barnes 1992] can then
reject the weakness associated with disability by rejecting the disabled "other" ("in the
Dystonia Society newsletter they have photographs of people who are in a much worse state
than me"). These narratives reflect the way that people living with dystonia "account"
[Stimson and Webb 1975] for themselves and demonstrate how their embedding in a politics
of representation obliges them to tell particular stories of overcoming and normalisation,
which perpetuate negative stereotypes of people with disabilities and the myth of the "super-
crip".
Causes of dystonia
There is little research on the causes of primary dystonia and how different causes affect its
aetiology. Even if the ultimate cause is genetic, there is usually a reason why a genetic
predisposition "expresses" itself at a particular time and discovering the "provoking factor"
[Hunt 1998] can enable the person to integrate it in their biography, experiment with
alternative treatments, or reinforce their sense of themselves as knowledgeable actors. The
interest in causation shown by people living with dystonia is reflected in the full responses to
questions about causation in the Society's membership survey [TDS 2001] and the pilot study
for the dystonia QOL questionnaire [Camfield 1998]. In the survey, 55% of respondents
thought their dystonia was triggered by an external factor" and 14% mentioned more than
77These can be broken down into stress (41%), injury (26')10), medication (19'%), surgery (9%), virus (6%), not
known/other (6%), repetitive strain (3%), stroke (2%), and exposure to chemicals (1 '%), which reflect
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one factor. Even where only one was specified, it was possible to read others beneath it; for
example, where "medication" was taken after the death of the respondent's husband, or
"accident" occurred after a lapse in concentration due to the repetitive nature of the
respondent's job. Despite the space restrictions respondents produced powerful and complex
narratives that embedded dystonia in their life histories. In fact, much of their power derived
from their terseness and omissions which let the events speak for themselves [Skultans 1998].
For example, one respondent simply recorded "blue baby/fractured skull/bombed out/injured
spine" and another noted the "year of stress and no laughter" that followed her parents' death
aged 16. The accounts used medical vocabulary ("retinal blood clot to the r eye", "myoclonal
from sunstroke as a baby") but wove in personal elements, often including a critique of the
treating doctor. The majority attributed the onset to external factors (stress, illness, family or
work problems, or childhood events) rather than personal weakness.
55% of respondents to the pilot study for the questionnaire also identified external triggers
and had sufficient space to produce detailed and dense narratives that functioned as moral
accounts, as they argued persuasively that the respondent had a right to have dystonia and
that if you had been through those experiences, you would have it too. For example, one man
recalled the death of his sister (aged 20), redundancy after "26 years of being in continuous
service", two car accidents, the lengthy illness and death of his father, and, as an afterthought
"repossession of my house in 1991". Another attributed his condition to his persecution by
his colleagues after he "broke ranks to report a senior police officer for malpractice and an
unhealthy association with a millionaire businessman", culminating in early retirement "due
to stress and injury" when he was "tripped deliberately in a running race".
In the absence of a comprehensive medical explanation, individuals weave together disparate
strands from personal experience to give coherence and meaning to their condition and
"claim the capacity for living uniquely - seizing the point of one's life - with illness" [Frank
1998:343]. I explore the role of causal narratives in greater detail in chapter 3.
Impact on people's lives78
During my fieldwork I organised a survey of Society members ["The true impact of
dystonia", 2001] to record dystonia's surprisingly severe impact on people's lives and
contemporary preoccupations with stress and environmental and medical risk. Since the organic nature of their
condition had already been established, they did not risk being labelled psychosomatic by their choice of cause.
78The impact recorded by the membership survey (28% employed, more than half either part-time or self-
employed) is more severe than that recorded by the QOL questionnaire [Camfield 1998] (38% employed, 25%
full time and 14% part time, at least 25% retired on medical grounds, and another 11%) "unemployed because of
my dystonia"). Note that there is an age-effect as most people living with dystonia are in their early-mid fifties.
implicitly justify the money spent on pharmaceutical treatments (I provide more detail in
chapter 5). The focus of the survey was its impact on employment which, even allowing for
the age of the respondents, was much lower than in the general population and comparable to
people with disabilities. There was also considerable "underemployment" as over a quarter of
respondents had reduced their hours or taken a less demanding job. This may be due to the
unsympathetic attitude of employers", for example, some people living with dystonia who
worked in customer-service positions were transferred in case their twitching disturbed the
custorners'" and one even experienced discrimination at a prominent centre for neurological
research and treatment. Mina told me she originally worked as a typist but her unit closed
when her typist's cramp started and the other departments wouldn't accept a 'one handed
typist'; "even though I was a member of staff and my neurologist recognised my problem as
dystonia, I was sent to a psychiatrist?", Although she found another job at a council Careers
Service, ironically she experienced discrimination there as well; "I was eventually transferred
to ajob that was impossible for someone who couldn't write fast and legibly - effectively
'constructive dismissal"'. While some people had more sympathetic employers, few escaped
the self-imposed pressure to "prove" yourself and not let "it" beat you. Like Anthonl2 "at
the end of every working day" they felt "it's a little victory that I have got through another
day".
Family and friends can be unsympathetic and may not appreciate how disabling dystonia can
be as it is very variable. Many people living with dystonia described feeling insecure in social
situations and having a poor body image. "Social life" was also listed as the most affected
area in the dystonia QOL questionnaire [Camfield 2000] but is poorly covered by QOL
measures, which can only measure it by reducing it to numbers of friends or activities
engaged in. This can affect other areas of life; one respondent described how "being excluded
from social events [...] especially where there are opportunities to meet the opposite sex to
form new friendships leads to poor social skills, ultimately leading to a very poor success rate
with job interviews which has a dramatic impact on one's ability to find paid work" [in
Camfield 1998].
Half the respondents to the QOL questionnaire thought their condition was very visible and
this appeared to correlate with their scores on the SF-36 QOL measure'", for example, people
7934% of employed people reported no or minimal support from their employers [Camfield 1998].
8°7% had taken a job involving less contact with the public [TDS 2001].
81When she copied her notes years later she found that he had "double circled 'fear of flying'",
82A man with cervical dystonia writing in the Society newsletter.
83Described in the first footnote of chapter 7.
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with oromandibular dystonia which affects eating and saliva retention had particularly low
scores. People's fear of being observed and judged affected every aspect of their lives (an
issue explored further in the next chapter). One informant described to me how "people think
I am strange when they see my head moving all the time and mickey taking is normal for
them". He had even been banned from his local supermarket and felt self-conscious
socialising as "girls in pubs jump a mile when they see my head moving" [in Camfield 1998].
Treatments
Part of dystonia's impact can be explained by the paucity of effective, non-invasive
treatments. Drug treatments'" are often ineffective and have considerable side effects. Focal
dystonia is treated using injections of Botulinum toxin85 [Jankovic 1994, Dressler 2000] that
last for up to six weeks, however injections can only be given quarterly due to shortage of
spaces in the clinics (and the possibility of developing resistance). Where these are
immediately and sustainedly effective, they can transform people's mental health, as another
informant explained to me:
I was depressed, crying a lot, feeling suicidal at times. I had my first Botulinum Toxin
injection [...] and there has been steady improvement and I am very pleased with the
way I am now [...] I don't pretend I can cope all the time and at times get rather down,
but don't let it get a hold now
[in Camfield 1998]
However, injections are not available nationwide (some health authorities will not fund them
and there is a shortage of places at clinics) and resistance is developing among long-term
users. Five other strains have been developed but only types A and B have been approved by
drugs agencies in the USA and UK86.
Until recently, surgery for dystonia was out of fashion, partially because Botulinum toxin had
become the main treatment for people with focal dystonia. Practices like cutting nerves in the
neck to relieve cervical dystonia (surgical peripheral denervation), and creating lesions with
electrodes in the area of the brain that controls movement were considered ineffective and
barbaric. Surgery was still done for hemifacial spasm and blepharospasm (particularly in the
USA) but UK neurologists only referred their patients as a last resort. The work of
neurosurgeons in Canada and France with people with cervical and generalised dystonia, the
success of neurosurgery in other neurological illnesses, and the development of resistance to
84 Anticholinergics, antispasmodics, dopaminergic agents, benzodiazapines (e.g. Valium), and anticonvulsants.
8S Botulinum toxin acts on the junctions between the nerves and the muscles reducing involuntary muscle
contractions (twitching and jerking) while maintaining normal muscle function.
86 Type B was launched in the UK during my fieldwork; I discuss the launch further in chapters 5 and 6.
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Botulinum toxin combined to cause a paradigm shift. Deep brain stimulation (surgically
inserting an electronic transmitter into the brain to stimulate the thalamus) and surgical
peripheral denervation are now presented as the therapies of the future, even though they
have only been tested on small numbers of people living with dystonia. For example, at the
Movement Disorders conference in 2000 there were 12 abstracts on surgery for dystonia,
admittedly only half the number for Botulinum toxin, but more than double those for all other
therapies.
People living with dystonia use "gestes antagonistes" to control their muscle movements (for
example, pulling the head down and to the left to prevent tremor), alternative therapies, and
monitor their diets. But although they are encouraged to develop routines to manage their
condition (especially where no treatment is available) they are not treated as knowledgeable
actors. For example, many of those interviewed as part of the pilot study for the dystonia
QOL questionnaire did not know what drugs they were taking and were not aware that the
majority were to manage the side effects of the dystonia drugs. After diagnosis, some people
are offered genetic counselling and testing at specialist neurogenetics clinics but this is
usually linked to participation in research.
The Dystonia Society mediates encounters with medical and social services, for example,
ensuring that people with severe dystonia claim Disability Living Allowance to employ
carers and make modifications to their homes. However, the rarity and variability of the
condition can be a problem with external assessors and consequently only 38% of
respondents to the Society's membership survey reported receiving one or more benefits'"
(ranging from 30% of people with blepharospasm to 73% of people with generalised
dystonia), a lower figure than for other neurological conditions. In chapter 6 I explore the
problems the Society had mediating medical encounters as doctors are more powerful, and
(according to the Society'S staff) more credible allies than the members.
'67Disability benefits received by anyone in the household No. 'Yc.oftot,,1
Disability Living Allowance 153 25!YJI
Incapacity Benefit Xl) 15%1
Attendance Allowance 39 ()'XI
Severe Disablement Allowance 3X hEX)
Income Support 33 s·x)
Housing Benefit 24 4%1
Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit 12 2(~;;1
Invalid Care Allowance 12 2°,{,
Disabled Person's Tax Credit I O'X.
Other I 0%
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Until 1999, the Society was the only UK organisation for people living with dystonia, until
the North East branch broke away to form Action for Dystonia Diagnosis, Epidemiology and
Research (ADDER88) in 1999 following a row over who had the right to fundraise. They have
both established websites and chat-rooms, and members also use ones provided by North
American dystonia patient support organisations.
The heaIthcare system in the UK
The majority of health care in the UK is provided by the NHS, which is free at the point of
delivery and financed from general taxation. Overall responsibility rests with the Secretary of
State for Health who chairs the NHS Policy Board, which sets out the framework within
which the NHS operates. Health Authorities were responsibility for commissioning
healthcare until2002 when they were replaced by Primary Care Trusts, which bring together
a number of local Primary Care Groupst", Although most decisions about purchasing are
made locally, the Department of Health has influenced the provision of specialist services and
issued guidelines for new medicines (for example, Beta interferon), and local prescribing is
monitored by regional health authority "prescribing advisers" who check that budgets are
being used cost-effectively. Information about the relative effectiveness of interventions is
disseminated through the NHS Research and Development strategy (established 1991), which
receives 1.5% of the NHS budget. This money funds two centres in Oxford and York that
conduct economic reviews and meta-analyses 90 and disseminate information through two
joumals and an on-line database.
Evidence-based medicine and the National Institute of Clinical Excellence
The current white paper on the NHS [1997] foregrounds evidence-based medicine, which
uses clinical guidelines to limit prescribing to treatments of demonstrable efficacy to increase
the efficiency and "customer-focus" of the health service (and control over medical staff).
The "gold standard" for evidence is the randomised controlled trial but QOL measures are
increasingly influential as they are thought to be an inexpensive way to include the "patient's
perspective". Only treatments and technologies judged efficacious by the Institute will be
included in clinical guidelines, and while doctors will not be prevented from prescribing
treatments that the Institute consider to be of marginal efficacy, they will have to argue
strongly for the resources to do S091. Two other bodies evaluate medical interventions (the
88ADDER, after the snake around Asclepius's (the god of medicine) staff
89Collectives of "fundholding" GPs who are both purchasers and providers as they manage their own budgets.
90Different studies are analysed together to increase the "power" of the numbers by increasing the sample size.
91The health economist Maynard believes "inefficient prescribing" should be a disciplinary offence.
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organisation for Health Technology Assessment and the Cochrane Collaboration Review),
however these focus on treatment efficacy rather than NHS resource implications.
The National Institute of Clinical Excellence was established in 1999 as a coordinating centre
for the evaluation of treatments, development of clinical guidelines for common conditions,
and clinical audit'", It investigates treatments of marginal effectiveness (for example,
Riluzole in motor neurone disease) or that represent a high proportion ofNHS expenditure,
either due to the individual cost (for example, combination therapies in HIV), or the volume
required (for example, hip replacements). The institute has a budget of £10.5 million,
employs 40 staff, and has a non-executive board of clinicians, economists, health service
researchers, politicians and patient representatives.
The test case for the Institute was the flu drug Relenza, which the NHS wanted "rapidly
appraised" before it advised health authorities to purchase it [NICE 2000]. The appraisal
concluded that the main benefit of the drug (that it delays the onset offlu by 24 hours) would
only be useful ifit was given to the working population where it would produce considerable
savings for industry. Since it would be primarily given to the elderly whose time was "less
valuable", it was not a worthwhile investment. This decision received considerable attention
(the Institute handled 400 press enquiries during that week) despite their promise that the
drug would be given a fuller appraisal later in the year'", Glaxo Well come (Relenza's
manufacturers) were distressed by the adverse publicity and the Institute found it difficult to
communicate that they were not rejecting the drug outright or suggesting it was harmful, just
that it was not the best use ofNHS funds. The need for them to balance efficacy and resource
implications has proved the hardest aspect of its work for outsiders to grasp, largely because
the move to evidence-based medicine was presented as a means to ensure that patients get the
best treatment as quickly as possible. HIV patient support organisations in the US have
successfully lobbied the Food and Drugs Agency for the early release of drugs and it will be
interesting to see if UK organisations have the same success with the Institute where the main
consideration is cost to the health service rather than product safety. I explore this further in
chapters 6 and 7 when I look at submissions from the Alzheimer's and Motor Neurone
Disease societies and the case for Beta interferon.
92 In 2002 its website (www.nice.org.uk) recorded 39 treatment evaluations ongoing, 33 completed, 7 audits in
progress, 8 completed, and 32 guidelines being developed and 5 completed. However, I noticed some double-
counting as procedures were listed as ongoing and completed once they had been through their first appraisal.
93Relenza can now be prescribed to "at-risk adults" if they start treatment within 48 hours of onset of symptoms.
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increase the NHS's interest; for example, the efficacy of existing drug treatments is being
reviewed by the Cochrane Collaboration.
Conclusion
Within the context of wider anthropological debates, this thesis sets out to answer three
questions which can be usefully approached using the insights of Foucault and his interpreters
(e.g. Rose [1990, 1996, 1997], Armstrong [1984, 1995,2002]), anthropological writers on
"audit culture", Bourdieu [1977, 1992], and Latour [1987, 1992]:
1. If the disabling impact of dystonia cannot be fully represented by clinical measures, can it
be captured by a measure of QOL?
2. Do measures ofQOL give a voice to people with chronic conditions (as has often been
claimed)? If so, ''why can't these natives speak for themselves?"
3. IfQOL measures cannot represent complex conditions like dystonia or give a voice to
people living with dystonia, why are they still so successful?
In addressing these the thesis explores a number of related questions, including:
• How does the Society represent people living with dystonia? How might its interests as a
self-sustaining bureaucracy conflict with those of its members?
• What are the origins ofQOL and how do we explain its rapid expansion? How do the
actors described in this thesis (especially the pharmaceuticals and patient support
organisations) use QOL to enrol each other into networks?
• Can people without disabilities understand the experiences of people with limiting
conditions and give them a value? Why it is currently necessary for them to do so?
• Why is the relationship between people living with dystonia and their doctors both
important, and often unsatisfying?
• How do people use narratives to embed dystonia in their lives and give it a meaning that
enables the construction of a new "self-story"? And how does the personal and holistic
representation of dystonia in these narratives compare with the fragmentation,
objectification, and aggregation performed by measures of QOL?
I begin to address the last question in the next section by exploring the experiences of people
living with dystonia.
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Section 1: Experiences of people living with dystonia
Chapter 2: Living with dystonia
This section consists of two chapters where I explore people's experiences ofliving with
dystonia (set in the context of other chronic illnesses) and the stories they tell about them.
The second chapter develops the themes raised in the first using- six stories from people living
with dystonia, while acknowledging the problems inherent in such narratives.
The experience ofliving with chronic illness has been widely studied by sociologists and
anthropologists [Cornwell 1984; Blaxter 1976; Conrad 1990; Bury 1991; Strauss et aI1994],
many focusing on a particular condition [Scambler 1989, Jacoby 1994: Epilepsy; Robinson
1988: Multiple sclerosis]. But starting from medical categories rather than people's
experiences can ignore diversity within conditions and similarities between them. This is
apparent in dystonia where someone whose eyes close compulsively (blepharospasm) may
have little in common with someone who is inaudible due to muscle spasms in their voice
box (laryngeal dystonia) or whose hand seizes up when they write (writer's cramp). What
they share are problems representing and communicating their experiences, due to the
diversity and variability of dystonia and the inadequacy of existing forms of representation.
The problems of representation that are fundamental to the experience of dystonia are not
captured by medical categories or measures of QOL based on these. This means that the
experiences of people living with dystonia are not validated or responded to by "gatekeepers"
of medical and social care and they are often not believed or taken seriously, which accounts
for much of dystonia's impact on welbeing'". In the next section, I briefly review literature on
living with a chronic illness, before focusing on the themes that distinguish living with
dystonia.
Illness can cause "biographical disruption" [Bury 1982] as it reverses the cultural logics that
people use to define themselves [Murphy 1987], putting personal meanings "at risk" and
potentially causing "loss of self,95 [Charmaz 1987]. Liminality has been used to describe how
chronic illness disrupts the routine and structure of life IJ6 [Frankenberg 1986; Kleinman 1988]
94This is common to other syndromes like chronic fatigue and pain, which I describe later in this chapter.
95The neuropsychologist Sacks described how his image of the "ship of life" with himself as captain was
disrupted by illness. This changed his status from "all-knowing specialist" to "know-nothing patient" [1984], an
experience shared by Rabin, a neurologist with ALS (Motor Neurone Disease) [1982].
96And to characterise people with disabilities [Murphy 1987], and cancer [Frank 1995, Little et al 1998].
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and reduces people's "sense of coherence" and "potential" [Antonovsky 1979], entailing a
cycle of adaption and re-adaption 97.
However, much of the literature on chronic illness ignores sick people's "multiple
positionings" (gender"; age, class", sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, and citizenship) and
treats illness as a "master status" (hence the reluctance of patient support organisations to
explore internal power differentials). Characterising illness as "biographical disruption"
ignores the role of age and social class [Pound et al 1998; Williams 2000], as in certain
contexts illness can also represent a "biographical continuation" or "reinforcement".
The term "stigma" [Goffman 1963] has been used to describe the social anxiety experienced
by people with visibly different appearances or behaviour patterns (due to illness or
disability). However, its utility is debatable as it implies deviancy and conflates identification
and labelling. Stigma can be externally or "internally referential'tl'" [Scambler and Hopkins
1990] and "spread" to intimates of the affected person'?' ("courtesy stigma" [Goffman
1963]). It is managed through concealment, avoidance, "appearance checking", "reassurance
seeking", compensation and pre-emptive disclosure [Facial injury: Clarke 1999 and Kent
2000; Diabetes: Ryan and Coates 1998; Rheumatoid arthritis: Weiner 1975; Ileostomies:
Kelly 1991]. But these public strategies require considerable energy and can damage close
relationships if the person privately "dumps" on their partner or family.
Chronic illness often has a transformative effect on close relationships 102 [Corbin and Strauss
1988; Parker 1993; Kuyper and Wester 1998], especially where partners are carers [Orona
1990]. However, its impact on single people can be greater as future relationships may be
inhibited by social isolation (exacerbated by the financial implications of chronic illness) or
low self-esteem. Illness can also change people's relationship to time and space [Garro in
Delvecchio-Good et al 1994a; Little et al 1998; Kleinman 1994; Lawton 2000; Davidson
2000]. For example, severe deterioration or disability can cause "existential fatigue" and
"withdrawal" [Toombs 1992] and so dominate consciousness that it becomes difficult to
97Adjustment to chronic illness [Golembieski 1976; Antonovsky 1979] was studied by psychologists focusing
on coping [Felton and Revenson 1994], sense of coherence [Antonovsky 1993] and mastery [Pearlin 1989].
98Women with disabilities are regarded as more disabled than men [Moss 1997; Fine and Asch 1988; Morris
1991] but studies of individual conditions present a more complex picture [neurofibromatosis: Ablon 1996].
"Different class positions can produce different health beliefs [Blaxter 1983; D'Houtard and Field 1984].
)()()Manysuffer more from "felt" than "enacted" stigma [Jacoby 1994], for example, parents can act as "stigma
coaches", limiting their children's activities and life expectations to protect them from discrimination.
1!1IWhoalso engage in impression management to protect their own identities [Alzheimer'S: MacRae 1999].
102Notalways negative, see [Radley 1989] (supported by Bella's story, chapter 3).
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attend to the everyday, undermining the idea that we live in the same world as those around
us [Garro in Delvecchio-Good et a11994; Kugelmann 1999].
While these themes are also relevant to people living with dystonia (as the stories in chapter 3
suggest), their accounts tend to focus more on the following: firstly, on the onset of dystonia
(understanding and representing changes in the body); secondly, on obtaining a diagnosis and
maintaining relations of trust with doctors'i"; thirdly, on communicating dystonia to others;
fourthly, on responding to dystonia" (by integrating it or fighting it); and finally, on external
responses to dystonia'i". These are the themes I have chosen to explore in the next section,
using extracts from interviews and accounts from the Dystonia Society's newsletters'",
collections of "patients' experiences", and dystonia-related "bulletin boards".
1: Understanding and representing changes in the body
I could not describe what was happening to me, and 110 matter how much I tried could
not help myself
The onset of dystonia can trigger an epistemological crisis if people cannot understand or
describe what is happening to them. They may feel isolated because their experience feels
uniquely horrible and their family or friends either cannot or will not share it. They may also
feel frustrated that an apparently trivial problem can have such severe consequences. Tim107
recounts how finding the winter sun "troublesome" and "blinking more than usual" soon
progressed to his eyelids "closing firmly" ifhe walked more than a hundred yards, watched
television, or went into a building with strip lighting. He was only able to read by holding his
eyelid up with his fingers. Tim became "housebound" and has vivid memories of "feeling my
way around my own house". But far worse than the "isolation" was the "frustration" at
knowing that "everything else about my body was functioning as before and yet I could do
virtually nothing".
Tim's first step was to present his symptoms to a GP in the hope that they could "organise"
them into a condition [Balint 1968] and create a narrative about them that suggests a future
to31 explore this further in chapter 4.
1041 look at people's ways of making sense of dystonia in chapter 3.
I05Thehostility they experience may be explained by dystonia's contravention of social ideals like self-control
and containment and the equation of health with moral personhood [Crawford 1980].
loorhe Society newsletter (published four times per year) is an important source as each issue has at least three
pages of letters from members and another five pages of articles discussing their experiences in a more general
manner. Although the editors prefer inspiring accounts, submissions are rarely edited and surprisingly frank,
possibly because the newsletter has delegated the role of "public face" to Dystonia News, which is directed at
donors (see chapter 5). Despite the gap between newsletters, there are often lively exchanges (for example, on
whether positive accounts of living with dystonia are inspiring or demoralising).
I070ne of the founder members of the Society, writing in its Newsletter.
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direction ("therapeutic emplotment" [Mattingley 1998]). In his case this strategy was
successful'l", however, many people find it difficult to describe their symptoms or convey
their impact (even to a partner). Catherine'?" movingly describes her embarrassment at the
way her head was jerking, which she managed to conceal "using certain muscles in my neck".
Not only could she "not describe what was happening to me" but "no matter how much I tried
I could not help myself'. She recalls how she "even talked about separating" from her
husband as (after the collapse of his business) she "knew he couldn't bear to look at me".
2: Obtaining a diagnosis and maintaining relations of trust with doctors
I asked whether I have got dystonia. He did not answer and neither did the hospital
that diagnosed me when I telephoned them. I am now left ill midair
The moment of diagnosis is a pivotal part of accounts of illness as it combines internal
understanding and epistemological validation, with external recognition, and access to
resources. But it can be one of mixed emotions. Annello describes experiencing not only
'joy" on diagnosis as "it was a physical illness and I didn't have to hide any more", but
"anger" because she "had lost so many of what should have been the happiest times of my
life" and suspected that "had I not found out about my condition, my children may not have
had a mother as they were growing up".
People living with dystonia often have difficulty negotiating a diagnosis as many GPs believe
it is psychosomatic III despite recent physiological studies that have established its organic
causation. The persistence of this belief among doctors may be partly due to lack of
knowledge or feelings of powerlessness, but its effect is to increase people's feelings of guilt
and isolation. Sontag observes "theories that diseases are caused by mental states and can be
cured by will power are always an index of how much is not understood about the physical
terrain of a disease" [1988]. This uncertainty increases disability, as do disagreements
between people living with dystonia and their doctors (see also chronic pain [Greenhalgh
2001]).
Once its organic nature has been established (synonymous with its reality), people can
explore psychological contributions (for example, the role of stress), but before diagnosis
these are seen as competing with the physical, distracting doctors from the "real" cause, and
108Hiscondition was alleviated by surgery in the 1980s and has not recurred.
109A woman with cervical dystonia writing in the Society's Newsletter.
IloA woman with torticollis writing in the Society's Newsletter.
IIIThis also true of chronic fatigue [Cooper 1997], irritable bowel [Adamson 1997], and chronic pain syndromes
[Kugelmann 1999], all of which occur mainly in women.
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allowing them to conceal their lack of knowledge behind "it's all in the mind". After
diagnosis, they can be used to shift responsibility back onto the person with the condition'V,
what Crawford describes as "victim blaming" [1980]. Harrietl13 vividly recalls how "so many
of us have suffered through doctors thinking the condition was psychosomatic - one person
even told me she was told for ten years that she was avoiding her marital problems by
'looking away'!" She emphasises "how important it is that people don't feel they are in any
way responsible for their own illness - that if only they were 'better', happier, and more
relaxed people, they wouldn't be so disabled!"
People with conditions like dystonia that appear psychosomatic are vulnerable to doctors'
expectations that they will be "good patients" (for example, people with chronic fatigue
advise each other to conceal independent research, interest in alternative therapies, or
membership of a support society in order to receive good treatment'{"), Garro describes this
process in Temporomandibular Joint disorder (TMJ) as "becoming a real sophisticated TMJ
patient" [in Delvecchio-Good et al 1994]. People with these conditions tend to "idealise"
and/or "demonise" their doctors [Greenhalgh 2001], but have not relinquished hope in
conventional medicine and continue to search for a "good doctor" to validate their
experiences. Their search for diagnosis is a search for a name with the power to control the
pain, which is also the goal of treatment among the Dinka [Lienhardt 1961] as naming the
spirit that causes sickness enables one to symbolically free oneself from the condition.
According to Good, people with TMJ also look for "an image that will name its source and
allow it to be separated off from the self, an image that will provide the symbolic structure for
a remaking of the world" [in Delvecchio-Good et al 1994].
Dystonia has most in common with chronic pain, which is also diverse, difficult to represent,
and could be described a "classificatory anomaly,,115 [Douglas 1970]. Consequently, the
approach to the experiences of people with chronic pain recommended by Kleinman [in
Delvecchio-Good et a11994] of situating them in their "local moral worlds" and life courses
and recognising that pain narratives arise from interactions with positioned researchers, is just
l12"Accounts that give a key role to 'stress' in the causation of IBS involve accepting that 'psychological' and
'social' factors are implicated in one's illness. Such a position, though to varying degrees, raises the spectre of
the assignation of some degree of responsibility to the patient for their illness" [Stenner et al 2000]
113A woman with cervical dystonia writing in the Society's Newsletter.
114Thiscaution is understandable when at one meeting a specialist in chronic fatigue spoke about "saving" his
patients from the "charlatans" and criticised the "political" nature of their patient support organisations.
15Bydefinition pain is an acute signal of bodily dysfunction so if it is not acute and does not represent anything
beyond itself, can it even be described as pain?
53
as applicable to dystonia where impairment can seem slight but lead to considerable
disability.
Like dystonia, there are hierarchies within chronic pain according to the nature and source of
the pain 116 and its responsiveness to medical intervention. At onset chronic pain is diagnosed
as "real" but when treatment fails there is "emergence of doubt" and it is downgraded to
"chronic pain syndrome", forcing the person to tum to lay theories of causation and seek help
in the chronic pain "subculture" [Kotarba 1983]. Genevieve!" provides a dystonic example
of this as she recounts how her diagnosis was "taken away from her" when her spasms failed
to respond to Botulinum toxin; "it was suggested that I have an EMG to find out exactly what
muscles were affected. When I went for the next lot of Botulinum toxin injections in June, the
doctor told me that the EMG was normal [...] so he wouldn't give me any injections. His
words were 'it would be like smashing a walnut with a sledgehammer'. I asked whether I
have got dystonia. He did not answer and neither did the hospital that diagnosed me when I
telephoned them. I am now left in midair. My neck twists. I feel disfigured and discomforted,
and I can get no help from anyone".
The search for relief often becomes central to the lives of people with chronic pain,
something that can also be seen in dystonia; for example, Beatrice"8 manages her spasms by
creating a "controlled environment" with "no carpet, no wall paper, filtered air and water"
and no visitors (see chapter 3). Most people with chronic pain end up at pain management
clinics (or "dumping grounds" [Bendelow and Williams 1996]), which aim to reduce "pain
behaviour" rather than pain, despite the psychological damage caused when others do not
acknowledge your reality [Jackson in Delvecchio-Good et al 1994].
Sociological research on illness is still influenced by Parson's "sick role" [1951], which was
intended for acute rather than chronic (or asymptomatic) illness. This characterised illness as
undesirable, "deviant" and temporary and once the sick person's condition had been certified
by a doctor, they were allowed temporary relief from work 119 and social responsibilities. Sick
people were not responsible for getting well, but for seeking medical help, relinquishing their
independence to a doctor, and segregating themselves from the healthy'r'', The balance of
116Acute pain from a specific cause that can be visualised with medical technology or chronic pain with no
origin or from a past injury [Bendelow and Williams 1996; Jackson in Delvecchio-Good et al 1994].
117Awoman with dystonic spasms writing in the Society'S Newsletter.
118Awoman with oromandibular dystonia writing in the Society's Newsletter.
119Workcan also be a source of distraction and validation [Delvecchio-Good et al 1994; Fifield et al 1991].
12°And from other sick people in case they sapped their will to recover.
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power in the Parsonian relationship rests with the doctorl21 who controls what is labelled as
illness [Kelly and Field 1996], what is included within particular illnesses [Heijmans 1999],
and what counts as recovery [Bendz 2000]. This model is undermined by the way uncertainty
about diagnosis and prognosis, and limited therapeutic possibilities tum people with dystonia
into "lay clinicians" 122 [Robinson 1990]. For example, Beatrice hopes that now she is treating
her allergies she will experience "spontaneous remission". She wishes that "doctors would
listen to us more and help us to get to the bottom of the cause of our own individual case".
Beatrice believes that "like headaches" dystonia is "a symptom not a disease", the difference
being that "most doctors try to find out the cause of severe headaches" and "don't just call
them 'idiopathic"'. The process of becoming a lay clinician is currently being encouraged by
the government who sees the "expert patient" as a key figure in reducing the demands of
chronic illness on the NHS [Department of Health 2001].
3: Communicating dystonia to others
Neither my husband nor my family could understand why I could not open my eyes:
'such a simple thing to do'!
People with all-encompassing conditions like severe forms of dystonia often experience
"communicative alienation" due to the "unsharability" of their experience, which can cause
the "collapse of language',123 [Scarry 1985; Little et al 1998]. Hilary124 vividly describes her
fear after being diagnosed with laryngeal dystonia and her problems communicating with her
children; "I had to repeat things over and over and over as ifit wasn't hard enough the first
time. I sometimes would just stop talking. The kids would ask 'Mummy, Mummy, why aren't
you talking to me?' They couldn't understand what was happening to me". Hannahl25 reflects
ironically on the difficulty of conveying the reality of torticollis (muscle spasms in the neck)
to someone whose knowledge comes from text and two-dimensional images rather than
experience; "for a sufferer [ ... ] certain things are out of the question - being an astronaut, or a
trapeze artist, or being a steeplejack. It's obvious why these lifestyle options are unavailable.
Obvious to us sufferers. But not to doctors, it seems". Consequently, she has had to obtain a
letter from a consultant Otolaryngologist explaining why "a tracheostomy [slit in the
121Parsons responded that this was inevitable and desirable [1972] as they were situated in a hierarchical social
structure, and the doctor was also entrusted with the population's health [Maseide 1991].
122Similarly, one year after stroke most people realise that biomedicine has little to offer and the degree to which
they adopt medical understandings varies with their doctors' contribution to illness management [Becker and
Kaufmann 1995]. They tend to select useful elements and discard what doesn't help them make sense of their
condition and get on with their lives, what Early calls the "customisation of illness" [1984].
123The"strangeness" and "fuzziness" of dystonia is described by Alan in chapter 3.
124Awoman with laryngeal dystonia, contributing to an internet chat room for people living with dystonia.
125A woman with torticollis, writing in the Society newsletter.
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windpipe to aid breathing] and spasmodic torticollis would be a fatal combination" and offers
to send a copy to anyone who needs it!
Representing dystonia is difficult as it is a diverse and incoherent condition 126("a higgledy-
piggledy package" [Alan, chapter 3]) that resists classification. Mark127 describes "we
Dystonians" as "an odd lot" because of their refusal to "fit comfortably in any of the GP's
obligatory pigeonholes" (apart, of course from "one marked 'miscellaneous', being a non-
offensive word for 'all in the mind"'). Similarly Timl28 feels that Blepharospasm "makes us
'special'" because they exist in a liminal space between the categories of "sighted" and
"unsighted" - "we are not optically blind but for most of our day we cannot see".
Dystonia's variability makes it difficult to convey its impact to othersl29 (hence the problems
people living with dystonia have had obtaining disability benefits). The invisibility of
dystonias affecting writing and speech means that they must be "performed" to reveal the
person's suffering (even though to them it "is paradigmatic of what it is to have certainty"
[Scarry 1985]), undermining their credibility and contravening social rules about displaying
emotion or weakness 130. One of the reasons people living with dystonia are keen to embrace
QOL research is that they feel they have been a "muted group" [Ardener 1975] and their
experience is still not acknowledged in popular or medical discourses. Jane'sl31 story
provides an example of this as her "uncontrollable blinking" was misdiagnosed as "severe
depression", and after three years of anti-depressants, a year of therapy, and "constantly being
told 'no-one can help you except yourself" she "stopped seeking medical advice". The
clinicians' failure to respond to her experience had repercussions on the rest of her life as
"neither my husband nor my family could understand why I could not open my eyes" and her
friends avoided her "because they didn't know how to cope with me". She even missed out
on the first three years of life of her first grandchild as she couldn't see to take her out. Jane
concludes "I felt stupid, I looked stupid and I thought my life as I knew it was finished. I had
been reduced from a happy, confident, outgoing person to nothing".
126Theaccepted medical definition is hardly precise: "a syndrome of multiple disorders" involving "involuntary
sustained muscle contractions" [Falm et aI1987].
127A man with laryngeal dystonia, writing in the Society's newsletter.
128A man with blepharospasm, writing in the Society'S newsletter.
129"Oneday I could walk or get around fairly easily, another day I was struggling to get the leg down [... J the
doctors thought, 'this kid is just putting it on" [David, chapter 4])
13°Forexample, the discourse of positive thinking treats pain as weakness because it stems from a failure to
"master" one's emotions [Kugelmann 1999].
131Awoman with Blepharospasm, writing in the Society's newsletter.
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For Simonl32, it is the "lack of awareness and ignorance" from his employers that causes him
to feel "despair and a feeling of helplessness", rather than the "painful and disabling nature of
torticollis. Paradoxically, he is cheered by reading others' comments about the effect of
torticollis (like 'my head feels like a lead balloon' or 'I find social gatherings a nightmare due
to pain and embarrassment') as although "this all sounds very negative [... ] perhaps the
reality is just that!" This confirmation of his perceptions enables him to ignore comments like
'is your neck better?' or 'I heard that it was the draught from the car window' and confront
his employers' belief that he is "skiving".
In later chapters, I explore whether the discourse of QOL can give people a voice, either
through QOL measures or by creating a discursive space where different voices can be heard.
I also examine whether it can be used as an "oppositional habitus", even though its expansion
has been driven by QOL researchers, health economists, and pharmaceuticals, rather than
people with limiting conditions.
4: Responding to dystonia
The point is I have dystonia, not I am dystonia
Paul powerfully describes the anger experienced by many people with dystonia - against God,
society, our families, and "above all, against ourselves". The "fear and loathing of our own
bodies" fuses with "fear of helplessness and dependency" and of"leav[ing] the house because
you feel like a freak and you think everybody is going to stare at you". For him, and I suspect
many others, "the most difficult thing is learning to love and accept my body, which is so
often tense and helpless". While accepting disability is an internal and individual process,
accepting the label "disabled" can provide access to community support, resources [Ablon
1990] and opportunities to campaign. For example, Geoff133 was motivated to take an MA in
Disability Studies by his colleague's refusal to take his condition seriously and acknowledge
his identification as a disabled person:
I think I was in denial about my condition, and wanted to conform and be normal,
especially as a young person (this was before disability was cool). I negatively
internalised and absorbed the way I was told I should view myself, by others who did
not share my experience of dystonia and did not understand disability. [ ... ] I think the
tum around came ten years ago, when a work colleague of mine - an experienced,
qualified social worker (non disabled) - told me in no uncertain terms that I couldn't
define myself as a disabled person because I wasn't 'disabled enough' - i.e. I didn't
use a wheelchair. I was infuriated, because I felt strongly by then that I had the right
132A man with torticollis, writing in the Society's newsletter.
133A social worker and disabled activist with cervical dystonia, writing in the Dystonia Society's Newsletter.
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to acknowledge my impairment and ally myself with other disabled people. Imagine a
white person telling a black person that they couldn't call themselves black, because
their skin wasn't, in their view, a dark enough pigment! In some ways I am grateful to
my irksome ex-colleague, because his discriminatory comments really cut me to the
quick and forced me to think through my own views about disability and 'coming out'
as a disabled person. And I am definitely the stronger for it. [... ] In a strange way, I
am now quite proud to have dystonia. I have accepted myself as a disabled person and
everyone else can basically like it or lump it
However, this strategy has its costs as identification occurs through accepting a stigmatising
and externally imposed label (which may "spread" to other areas of the person's life) and
identifying with disvalued "others". Thomasl34 emphasises the importance of maintaining
that "I have dystonia, not I am dystonia" so that others understand that "we are much more
than the disorder that affects us" and "whilst it may limit us and confine us, it should not be
allowed to define us".
Many people living with dystonia even feel conspicuous among others with the condition,
which limits their ability to engage in collective action or support others. Jamesl35 describes
how "many people in this position do not have the emotional capacity to cope with their own
problems, and cannot be expected to help themselves, let alone others with the disease",
especially as "their instinct is to [... ] completely avoid others in a similar position, lest they
are forced to recognise their own degree of disability and how awkward they appear to
others". Positive identification as a person with a disability may also require
"demedicalisation", which involves rejecting fantasies of a return to "normality" through
successful treatment.
Many people make sense of illness by embedding it in their personal historiesl36 [Williams
2000]. For example, Maria137 uses her dystonia to order and explain past experiences and
guide the future; "I have grown accustomed to being laughed at for poor coordination, and
people treating me as stupid when I am tired and my thinking/talking process slows down.
[ ... ] I know that I should not, even vicariously, experience passionate discussions, emotional
scenes, aggression or violence. And I have lived with the fact that I simply cannot do
anything quickly, nor two things at once. But nobody could tell me why. So it was such a
relief to learn [... ] that this is all part of dystonia". After what she now realises was "a
lifetime of dystonia", she is able to "instinctively balance my life between the cerebral,
134Aman with cervical dystonia, writing in the Society's Newsletter.
135Partner of someone living with dystonia writing in the Society's Newsletter.
13blnchapter 3 Sarah links it to childhood clumsiness and migraines ("different pockets of things happen and fit
into place and I think 'I've been here before?') and Jane recalls her feet always turning inwards.
137Awoman with generalised dystonia, writing in the Society's newsletter.
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physical and social", and her new role as an "expert patient" was facilitated by her early
retirement last year.
Maria's story provides an example of how illness can provide a space for reflection and
legitimise self-expression and role change [Heurtin-Roberts 1993] 138. Blepharospasm
prompted Mikel39 to leave an "exhausting corporate job", start his own business, and increase
the amount of time he spent with his family ("this really changed my entire life and I'm so
grateful for it"). Belindal40 also redirected her finances from maintaining her "greedy" car to
"regularly investing money" in her body through complementary treatments, which recovered
her "sense of well-being and hope" and gave her an "increasing level of energy". Catherine141
started going to art classes and learnt to ask for what she wanted, realising that "if you go
about in life with the impression that it's all due to you and your physical disability, people
will let you". She now maintains that she "couldn't be any happier" without dystonia because
"I probably would never have fought quite as hard to do something with my life as I have"
and reckons she has "come out of this a better and more understanding person". However,
illness can also inhibit change by adding biological to social and financial constraints
(suggesting that some "progressive" or "healing" stories may be following narrative
conventions [Robinson 1990; Crossley 1999]) and can be ultimately limiting ifit
"naturalises" an intolerable situation".
5: External responses to dystonia
A healthy body [is] the mark of distinction that differentiates those who deserve to
succeed from those who fail
Dystonia can be described as a "social disability" [Nijhof 1995] as the problems associated
with it are often more acute in particular situations and locations, for example, when
acknowledging people in the street or ordering food in a restaurant. Martin 143describes his
uncomfortable awareness that "the twist of my head" can give the impression that he is either
"staring" or "looking away from people as though I didn't want to see them", making
negotiating public places an embarrassing experience. Similarly, Connie'sl44 problems
138ForAfro-American women in Heurtin-Roberts's study, hypertension became a "milestone" that signalled the
relaxation of external demands and acknowledgement of their needs.
139Aman with Blepharospasm, writing in a volume of "Patient's stories" [BEBF 2000].
14°Awoman with dystonia affecting the eyes and neck, writing in the Society's Newsletter.
141Awoman with cervical dystonia, writing in the Society's Newsletter.
142Forexample, in Kleinman's study of depression in Chinese intellectuals during the cultural revolution [1986]
and Brodwin's of a woman who communicated through chronic pain [in Delvecchio-Good 1994].
143A man with cervical dystonia, writing in the Society's Newsletter.
144Awoman with oromandibular dystonia, writing in the Society's Newsletter.
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chewing and swallowing can be circumvented with "baby food" at home, but this proves
difficult to explain "to the waiter at the 'Angus Steak House' or even the guy behind the
counter at McDonalds!" The role of environment makes it difficult to predict the level of
disability associated with dystonia'Y; in fact much of this disability is not caused by the
condition but by external reactions to it, as Nanettel46 explains:
I have had movement in my right hand and arm since I was about four years old [... ]
and (etiquette being so strict in 1920) I had to find ways of covering up my disability
in my right hand. Itwas impossible to hold a cup of liquid or use a spoon in my
mouth, and when I used my left hand, I was shouted at to use my right. I realised that
in asked for a glass of water instead of tea in a cup, I could get away with using my
left hand. So for years I pretended not to like tea, cocoa, etc., and only drank water
Of course, all disabilities are context dependent to some extent (for example, high
unemployment among people with disabilities has been linked to "Taylorisation" in
manufacturing), but this is especially true of dystonia as it encapsulates the cultural and
economic tension between "control" and "release" in contemporary society'VjCrawford
1984]. A condition involving visible and uncontrollable muscle spasms is obviously more
disabling in a society that emphasises appearance, bodily control and containment, and maps
social values onto the body [Duval 1984; Bordo 1993]. In fact, Crawford argues that in
modern Western society the pursuit of health has become the pursuit of moral personhood; "a
healthy body has become a sign of individual achievement [ ... ] the mark of distinction that
differentiates those who deserve to succeed from those who fail" [1980].
Self-control is embodied as "self-containment" and the "open" or "untamed body" is feared
in case it reverts to its pre-civilised naturel48 [Elias 1994; Bakhtin 1981]. Examples of this are
the preservation of "firm bodily margins" by dieters and athletes [Bordo 1993] and the
popular discomfort with "leaky bodies" [Grosz 1994; Lawton 2000], which extends to the
"unproductive" bodies of menopausal women [Martin 1997]. The dystonic body also
contrasts powerfully with the disciplined and productive bodies required by capitalism
[Foucault 1980:55-62].
Bodily deterioration is also culturally significant as the Western concept of the selfas unified,
unitary and self-contained (a construct that underlies QOL measures) is challenged by
145A disappointing conclusion for the creators of Disability Adjusted Life Years (discussed in chapter 9) who
assume that it is possible to assign universal weights to disabilities.
146A woman with dystonia affecting her right arm, writing in the Society's Newsletter.
147Capitalism needs both control in the workplace and release in the shopping mall in order to function.
148Kleinman attributes this to the secularisation of modern society, which changed the body from "a vehicle to
higher ends" to "the secularised, private domain of the individual person" [1988].
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processes like "intercorporation" (where prosthetic mobility devices become part of the self)
and "intersubjectivity" (when carers experience the recipient of care as an extension of
themselves because they have become the agent of their actions) [Savage 1998]. Bodily
control is important as it produces a sense of efficacy and coherence, which can be projected
into the future. Its loss "impairs the capacity to be counted as a competent adult"
[Featherstone and Hepworth 1991]. The need for control often leads to objectification and
fragmentation. Objectification has been observed in groups as diverse as young men [Watson
1998], the middle-aged [Backett-Milburn and Cunningham-Burley 1999], and people with
TMJI49 [Garro in Delvecchio-Good et a11994]. Fragmentation can be seen when dystonic
body parts are separated from the whole ("the wretched neck starts") and assume terrifying
agency ("my eyes can't keep me in now"). This mirrors the objectification and fragmentation
that occurs in biomedicine. The imperative of control is also extended to the emotions, which
should be experienced and displayed according to dominant models [Foucault 1978;
Hochschild 1983~Harre 1986].
The need for control often overstates people's agency, for example, according to Farmer150
recent models of patient compliance ignore the "radical differences in the ability of different
populations to comply with demanding therapies, whether they be admonitions to move to
'consumptive climes'. as in the past century, or exhortations to take a year's worth of several
drugs" [1997]. If treatment fails, the patient often takes responsibility for not following the
doctor's instructions (even if they were incompatible with their lives) or maintaining a
. . . d 151posinve attitu e .
The imperative to be positive is reinforced by "Courage" awards from organisations like the
Dystonia Medical Research Foundation (celebrating people who have "overcome" disability)
and "public accounts" [West 1990] like Leah's description of her daughter Nia who was "not
a disabled person and never would be". Nia's "incredible attitude" expressed itself in
adopting a gruelling fitness regime, changing her diet, continuing with her" full time job in
the bank", and even going on an "outward-bound" honeymoon. Her life choices justified
Leah's attack on "all of you out there who think 'Why me?' and who lie back and feel sorry
for yourselves" and the families who "sympathise" and fail to "push if necessary". Nia
resembles the "super crip" who has been criticised by disability activists for presenting an
149Whosebodies changed from "lived bodies" to "object bodies" (where body constrains or opposes selt).
150Atuberculosis physician and anthropologist working in Haiti.
ISIFor example, people with stroke are told that motivation is the most important factor in their recovery even
though neurological recovery is usually spontaneous and unpredictable [Becker and Kaufman 1995].
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unattainable ideal that justifies discrimination against those who fail to attain it. Leah's
account is an example of the way some people manage the threat of deterioration by creating
a series of "others" (for example, people with cancer who don't want to "fight" it [Diamond
1998] or people living with HIV who don't have a positive attitude [Crossley 1997]), but this
requires constant patrolling of boundaries, and can cause guilt, and self-hatred if the person's
condition deteriorates.
Conclusion
The experiences of "communicative alienation", invalidation and discrimination described
above are not captured by measures of QOL as these focus on the individual and are biased
towards aspects of physical and psychological function that can be improved by medical
intervention'<. Consequently they provoke more questions than they answer because while
the measures testify to the disabling impact of dystonia, they cannot explain its cause,
prompting some doctors to hypothesise that dystonia affects moaners and malingerers'<'. In
the next chapter, I explore why dystonia is so disabling using six stories that represent the
varied experiences of people living with dystonia. These embed dystonia in people's lives
and explore its effect on the self. I also examine potential problems with using narrative in
research.
152Themes generated by people living with MS like "public response", "financial strain", "doctor-related
statements", and "impact on significant others" were excluded from the measure described in chapter 8.
153Comments like "it can't be that bad, walking around with your head on one side" are not uncommon.
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Chapter 3: Stories from people living with dystonia
This chapter is an extended exploration of the themes raised in chapter 2, using six stories
from Jane, Sarah, Bella, Iris, Paul, and Alan154 to give a sense of how dystonia is integrated
into people's lives. It looks at how people use narrative to make sense of illness (by linking
past, present and future) and give it personal meaning. It explores the methodological
problems with using narrative and warns that their lability and complexity (what Bakhtin
calls their "cultural polyphony" [1981]) may be obscured if the research process emphasises
fixity and homogeneity.
I have attempted to avoid or acknowledge these problems in my use of illness stories; for
example, being aware that although the stories are personal, they are rarely individual as they
are embedded in the "institutional structures" of narrator and audience [Saris 1995]155.While
it could be said that the stories that follow were created by the circumstances and structures
of a research interview, I believe they came from genuine and relatively equal relationships,
which were strengthened by my local knowledge of significant events and instit~tions in the
lives of people living with dystonia. The stories have narrative qualities because they are free-
flowing, unconstrained, and "about those aspects of life that matter most" [Mathieson and
Stam 1995:284]. In some cases they convey more by what they leave out than what they say
[Skultans 1998], in the same way that the "silences" of QOL measures reveal most about
their culture. This supports Rosaldo's challenge to the assumption that the most important
things are most thickly described; for example, Ilongot head-hunters give only "rage borne
out of grief as the reason for their activities [1993:178].
Jane
If you have a short illness it's alright, but if you have a long one people get fed up
with it
The first story is from Jane, a calm and gentle woman in her forties who has generalised
dystonia and is partially sighted. She has had Bell's palsy for six months, which caused her to
miss two appointments for Botulinum ,toxin injections'i''' and left her weak on her right side.
Her narrative explored the lack of support and understanding for people with chronic
illnesses, and the shame attached to disability, which caused her parents to reject the
J54Allwere elicited during semi-structured interviews in the narrator's home; Bella, Iris and Paul spoke to me as
a researcher on the dystonia QOL questionnaire, Sarah, Jane and Alan while I was working for the Society's
Welfare Officer (which may account for these narratives' focus on benefits and social care).
J55E.g. a preference for "stories of hope" on the part of some newsletter editors.
J56Herneurologist won't inject until she recovers in case she becomes permanently paralysed.
educational support offered to her. It drew on epic themes of loss and retreat made more
poignant by the fact that most people take the small victories she described for granted (for
example, being able to use a knife and fork). She copes by humour, Christianity, and sharing
experiences through the Society newsletter and an informal network of people living with
dystonia.
Jane had to change her GP practice when her doctor died, as the practice manager threatened
to strike her off. At her new surgery "there's a few Christians in reception, it's much better-
you get 'hello"', but her new doctor won't visit her at home and "argues" with her. One
doctor at her last practice tried to send her to "a home", but her own doctor arranged
accommodation at a Christian hospital which she goes to once a month when there is
someone to take her. Her carers cover her meal times but she is worried about losing her
independence if she takes on more support. She would like a motorised scooter but can't
afford it.
There is no practical help for people with dystonia. If you have a short illness it's
alright, but if you have a long one people get fed up with it. I wish someone would
ring me up or come down, people don't look at your real needs
She recalls a carer's day run by her local church where even though she was "spasming on
the floor" people were still talking to her about their problems, "you can see I'm on the floor,
you can see I'm in spasm, but. .. " She checks her irritation by recalling that, "we're all special
to God".
Jane believes she was born with dystonia as her feet have always turned inwards and she had
problems with her eyes and writing hand. Her headmistress recommended a special school
but her parents didn't want to send her because they were ashamed and told her there weren't
any places, something she now resents, "I never really knew what was wrong with me".
Consequently, Jane "got into bad company" and got married "for the sake of it". She later left
her husband and went to a battered wives' home, "I thought, 'I'll never go out with anyone
again, never have a boyfriend"'. A few years ago she met a man with Parkinson's disease and
mental health problems who wanted to marry her and regularly sent her roses and "friendly"
Valentine's day cards.
I hadn't intended to become involved but found myself drawn in. He died in hospital
a few months ago on a machine that was breathing for him. My father died when I
was young so I hadn't seen anybody dead before, I thought he'd be blue but he was
white
Jane found it difficult to get paid work as employers wouldn't provide large print books and
lamps. When her three children got jobs she thought "I'll have nothing now" so went to an
occupational therapy centre for 10 days "to see what I could do". She enrolled in adult
education to improve her literacy and numeracy and wanted to go to a special college in
Yorkshire but was judged "too bright". Instead she studied in Birmingham for a year, gaining
a merit. Jane prayed for a fellow student who had applied for a teaching job and he got her a
position at the same college. She had the job for a year until her dystonia worsened, making it
difficult for her to walk or sit down. She was shaking so badly that she couldn't pick up a
fork and recalls her embarrassment at a friend's dinner party, "I didn't want anyone to know
what it was like. I wanted to curl up in a comer". Her friend tried to bathe her to help with the
spasms but it made them worse.
Jane was sent to hospital for investigations and was originally told she had Huntington's
disease (a progressive neurological illness that affects the personality).
I had nine or ten blood tests a day and my spasms were so bad they pulled the
curtains around me to avoid frightening the other patients. I overheard people
saying, 'she's really sick'. The pain in my neck and shoulder was awful and I had to
lie on my side to get relief. I couldn't sit on a seat or look in a mirror as this brought
the spasms on. I'd apologise but people would say to me 'oh, just spasm on'. I
watched people in the neurological ward and if the doctors couldn't find anything
wrong with them they were sent to the psychologist. I thought, 'blow, what do they
do to them?' But the psychologist only came to see me because he couldn't
understand why I was so cheerful
She spent three weeks in hospital after diagnosis; there were only two patients in the ward
and the nurses treated them well, "if! woke up at ten I had breakfast then". However, the
physiotherapy she was offered ("balancing on a 'Swiss ball"') was not appropriate for
someone with dystonia and she recalls that the physiotherapists used to get people to come an
hour early so they wouldn't have to wait for latecomers. Jane believes this insensitivity to the
problems of people living with dystonia is common, "I went on a holiday for disabled
Christians in Torquay and met this doctor who knew about dystonia as a condition, but still
parked halfway up a hill when he took me for a walk - he wasn't thinking".
She misses her "sea holidays" but now needs to sleep in the afternoon as she has insomnia, "I
can't even walk to the shops now although I want to do things on my own". She feels
"exhausted in her body" as her trunk muscles are pulling in opposite directions. On a recent
church retreat she found it exciting that her dystonia had improved enough to eat with a knife
and fork but is now back to a spoon. Her dystonia is variable, "today my legs are behaving
themselves a bit".
Jane was prescribed Diazepam (although she hadn't complained of depression) and now
describes herself as addicted, "there's no-one at home to support me if 1wanted to give them
up". She would like to discuss her medication with her new GP as she feels her neurologist
doesn't have time, "you're in, out, have your jab".
I've noticed a change in the service at the National over the past two years; 1 often
don't get back to south London until 9.30 pm as the transport is so bad. They used to
have regular guys who lived locally but now they use car hires with people from
Essex who don't know the area. I have to ask them to call out the signs to me so I
can direct them
Her injections cause choking and difficulty drinking but her spasms are so bad that she
perseveres. Before one injection she drank two glasses of water in succession, joking with the
neurologist that she might not be able to drink afterwards, "he said that he'd never met
anyone with my sense of humour".
She has been on Christian radio talking about her dystonia and has people praying for her
now her blepharospasm has worsened. She wanted to be a "life-liner" on their 24 hour help-
line but her balance is so bad that she couldn't travel to London for the training; "people say
to me 'you have a lovely voice' but I'm worried I wouldn't know what to say when people
call, although 1have helped other people with cervical dystonia - 1 talked to one person for
two hours". She recalled hearing Julie Shelton on the radio (a dancer with dystonia who
believes she was miraculously healed and wrote Danced off her feet [Sheldon 1998]) and was
able to trace her through the churches mentioned in her book. "When 1spoke to her 1heard
tears in her voice but she said there was nothing wrong, 'I often cry as it's healing"'.
Jane is currently having problems eating and drinking (she even chokes on the skin of baked
beans) and had an x-ray while eating yoghurt that showed that only halfhad been swallowed.
"I wrote an article for my local branch of the Dystonia Society about the advantages of the
'yellow top' over the 'orange top' Sunny Delight [still fruit drink] but now I can't even
swallow that. I can only drink water". She talked about a friend with generalised dystonia
whose mother was recently sectioned. She was worried that he wasn't coping but he assured
her that he was putting his meals in the microwave and walking to buy a newspaper from the
local shop, "I said to him 'you might be all over the place and everyone looking at you but
you are doing it"'.
Sarah
It all adds up, eventually your body says 'enough, I'm going to rebel'
Sarah is an ex-geriatric nurse in her thirties who was diagnosed with generalised dystonia in
1997. She has a flat in sheltered accommodation, which has been adapted to her wheelchair,
and receives the top rate of Disability Living Allowance to employ four carers. Her narrative
explores her fear of deterioration and its effect on self-preserving activities like her craftwork,
how her relationship with doctors is characterised by mutual distrust, and her problems with
applying for the Disability Living Allowance (for example, the intrusiveness of the
questions). She links her dystonia to her childhood and working life and attempts to capture
(and control) it through vivid and precise description.
Sarah feels that her fear of future deterioration isn't acknowledged by her doctors, as in the
last two months she has noticed a "change of direction", "I've got all these dilemmas running
through my mind, different things in different ways". Previously she had spasms, migraine
with "acid sickness" and dry retching, and problems with her jaw and right hand. The spasms
have now spread to the whole of her right side and her hand "balls", "spreads", and "claws".
How can I think of a sensible way of putting it without sounding really strange? It's
like something in a film where someone is trying to cling on to something while
being frozen in a block of ice. It's like someone getting an electric shock as my
fingers stiffen in different directions
Sarah showed me how her right foot rotates and inverts, shortening her Achilles tendon. Her
left leg only "spasms" up to the knee, "it pulls up and down, a bit like I was rowing". Before
she began using Baclofen (a common antispasmodic) her spasms were very violent, "I was
like an American jumping bean".
She describes her oromandibular dystonia as "a yawn" or "a tic", accompanied by blinking.
Last night she "tossed and turned" until2 am as the grinding of her jaw caused her other
muscles to go into spasm, "I tried to glue my jaw with a carrot rather than chomping at my
cheeks,,157. She said she didn't want a gum shield as she doesn't like things in her mouth or
near her face and recalled how during an asthma attack her ex-husband put pillow over her
face during for a 'joke". Her jaw sometimes locks when she speaks which she said made her
sound "like a scratched record"; "I have to wait until the needle has jumped over the scratch
before I can continue the sentence".
157Shehas ulcers as her jaw grinding "takes chunks" out of her mouth.
Sarah explains her dystonia by situating it in a history of personal and work-related stress, for
example, having dreadful migraines as a child ("I would come home from school, throw my
bag in a comer, flop out on the kitchen floor and my mother would put a blanket over me and
leave me there to sleep it off'). She also attributes her early clumsiness to her dystonia
("different pockets ofthings happen and fit into place and I think 'I've been here before"'),
which she uses as an explanatory device to make a coherent narrative from diverse and
traumatic memories158.
She is pleased that her GP is leaving the surgery in July as she has a good relationship with
his female replacement who "takes her time and doesn't make me feel like a pain in the
bottom". This contrasts with her other medical relationships ("I've not had it easy with
doctors or specialists"), which demonstrate paternalism rather than mutual respect;
"sometimes doctors are like 'be a good girl, run off and get some more tablets"'. Before
diagnosis she was frequently told, "it's all in your head" and during one assessment heard a
doctor say to the nurses that she should "get up. She could walk on hot coals if she wanted
to" ("I thought 'why would I want to walk on hot coals?' What a thing to say!") Her
neurologist often tells she could "do anything if you put your mind to it". "I feel like
whopping her one. If they [the doctors] can't find out anything, it's easier to say 'it's all
upstairs"'. She finds not being believed particularly painful as "when I was a child, no-one
would believe me".
Sarah was not told her diagnosis until she changed GP, she suspects because he didn't want to
admit that he had been wrong. She is taking antibiotics for her ulcers (and an infection of the
saliva glands caused by Benhexol) and tablets for the acid reflux that cancel some of the
antibiotics' effect; "I'm on so many tablets it's unreal - I'm like a baby's rattle". She was
surprised to find that the side effects did not improve after a few months and felt it was
"sinister" that her doctor hadn't told her; "Eventually he did have to admit it. I thought 'why
didn't you give me that ammunition and information in the beginning?' Do you put it down
to ignorance or the fact that they're not really interested and don't give a damn?" Sarah
doesn't want to challenge her neurologist in case she is labelled as a "troublemaker" and
imagines the doctors ''whispering behind my back", "when do you shout 'It's not good
enough'?" She continually experiments with her drugs to test their interactions but is
158Thissense of predestination is shared by people with Temporomandibular joint syndrome, "one person
described herself as 'a walking time bomb for TMJ'" [Garro 1994b:782).
reluctant to try Botulinum toxin as the Society welfare officer described it as "a funny road to
go down" and advised her to "hold off' as long as possible'?",
Sarah has a curvature in her spine and sciatica, which can trigger spasms, especially when
travelling long distances. She has to travel to central London for her injections on her back in
an ambulance; "last time the ambulance got lost and the journey took four hours which
cancelled out any benefit from the injections". She has stress-incontinence and uses pads
rather than self-catheterisation as "if I'm in spasm I'm going to end up sticking it up my nose
instead of the other place". Sarah also has problems with her eyes as blurred vision is a side
effect ofBenhexol ("it's like a fog over my eyes"). Consequently the "senior"
ophthalmologist needed her to visit five times to get her prescription right. She can still read
but finds writing difficult as it involves hand-to-eye coordination, which often brings on a
spasm; "I can only write a shopping list three lines at a time, taking regular breaks". She
worries about future deterioration in case it means the end of her "craftwork", which is a "life
saver" (c.f. Cassell's definition of "suffering" [1982]).
My normal spasms are familiar and I can accept them. I've never been a person to sit
and do nothing, even when watching the television I would be crocheting. I don't sit
back and dwell on it - I'm a pushy person to myself. I try to be too independent - I
say, 'sod it body, I want to this and I'm doing it'. I haven't got the time to be bitter.
I've been dealt that hand
[my emphasis]
She believes her dystonia was triggered by an injury to her back while working as a nurse for
elderly people with mental health problems.
The home was on four levels and there were no hoists, so if someone wanted to go
down for dinner, three people would carry them up and down the stairs in an
ambulance chair. People often wanted to return after the first course and they could
be obese or have psychological problems that made them struggle as they moved.
We were always short staffed. It all adds up, eventually your body says 'enough, I'm
going to rebel,16o
Sarah got high rate Disability Living Allowance after six years of "struggle" and moved to
adapted accommodation two years ago. She should have received it automatically when she
moved but was told that as an ex-nurse she was "sensible" enough not fall out of bed
retrieving her duvet so didn't need night cover. "You have forms and forms and forms to fill
159Untrained staff giving medical advice is a source of tension with neurologists, as I explore in chapter 6.
16°Here the body is represented as an independent agent with needs and goals of its own.
in161• I feel I'm having to apologise for my disability, to justify why I need the money". A
friend who was a social worker helped her fill them in as "it would have taken me months to
fill the forms in and make them legible". However, this increased her embarrassment at the
"inappropriate" questions, for example, "how many times do you go to the toilet?" "I asked
them about it but they said, 'it's just what's printed on the form' Ih2. I imagine someone
getting perverted pleasure putting my responses onto a computer".
Bella
No-one knows how I feel but me, there are days when I'm on top of the world and, like
anyone else, there are days when I wake in a bad mood
Bella is a forceful Irish woman in her forties who has segmental dystonia and lives with her
husband in North London. Her narrative explored her wish to be treated holistically while
insisting on physical causation", communication problems with her doctors who didn't
value her expertise as a patient, the role of technology in living with dystonia, adapting to and
trusting a changed body, the invisibility of some forms of dystonia, and being physically
confined by dystonia. She talked about receiving support from her partner when their roles
reversed and acceptance from the local community, but not from her friends who found it
difficult to adjust to the change in her.
When Bella's head started shaking her doctor told her it was "all in her head" and to "go
home". Six months later her condition had not improved so she returned and "begged" for
help. She was referred her to hospital but felt this was a dismissal: "it was as if they though
they could give you medicine and forget about the rest of you. No-one who knew me seemed
to want to help me". This was reinforced by her stay in hospital where she was treated as an
"interesting case" and "talked over" by her doctors.
She has had difficulty getting injections of Botulinum toxin since her diagnosis because of
the "laissez-faire" attitude of some neurologists who "miss clinics to go to foreign
conferences". While she and her husband know more about the effect of the injections than
her neurologist, she feels this expertise is not acknowledged, for example, she was told that
missing her last injection wouldn't affect her even though she knows that missing injections
IblThe form comprises about four books with 70-80 questions (see Shildrick and Price's Foucauldian analysis of
the specificity of social security forms [1997]).
1112An example of the "bureaucratic indifference" described by Herzfeld [1992]?
Ib3Shereferred to a history of "nerves" and repressing emotion that may have contributed to her dystonia.
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affects her voice. Bella doesn't think her neurologist is an experienced injector, as last time
she was injected the area was not anaesthetised properly.
Her husband notices the change after her injection as the tension in the injected areas
vanishes. "He's learned to look at my face and my eyes and not just listen to what I say - 'I'm
fine' [she mimes a forced smile]. Ijoke about it, that's how I get through, I laugh first and
everybody follows on, all the jokes are done then". She is diabetic and asthmatic which
affects her speech and breathing, particularly when she is upset. Her dystonia gets worse in
tense situations "because I can't let it out, scream and shout". For example, when she argues
with her husband, by the time she stops feeling distressed and starts feeling angry he is
"smiling again" so she never gets to speak about what upset her.
Bella has two adult daughters living in Ireland and is estranged from the eldest who won't let
her see her grandson. She believes her dystonia provoked the argument that caused the
estrangement. She can't see her other daughter at the moment as her brother-in-law is
decorating the house where she normally stays. Bella was adopted and has a poor relationship
with her birth mother. She described how helpful she found "relaxation therapies" as she
tends to "take on other people's feelings" and finds it difficult to distance herself from her
family. She used to go swimming every day and is now slowly learning it again, "there used
to be three things I could do - walk, swing my legs and breathe, but then my brain stopped.
I've had to learn again to do what I can do now". She is also controlling the spasms in her leg
with weight training.
Bella describes herself as forgetful (for example, leaving the oven on) but wants to take
responsibility for her mistakes, even though her husband treats her dystonia as a shared
enterprise. "The forgetfulness upsets me more than anything else because I feel it isn't me".
She enjoys baking diabetic cakes and calls her husband when it's time to take them out of the
oven; "we do it, the two of us". Her husband has asked her how she feels about the change in
her but she analogises it to his being bald, she has to accept him the way he is now; "I will
never be the person I was".
Her best friend (who used to go shopping for clothes and out to lunch with her) died recently,
followed by her friend's partner who "lost the will to live": "the cancer didn't kill him - he
just stopped, he didn't want to be here anymore", She says that the local people know her
well and accept her, but she becomes frustrated when they ask over her head "how is she?"
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"No-one knows how I feel but me, there are days when I'm on top of the world and, like
anyone else, there are days when I wake in a bad mood". Bella can't use her left hand (it
doesn't grip) but can type one-handedly on her computer. She uses the Internet and has pen
friends in Spain and Russia.
Her husband first noticed the shake in her hands but her GP thought she was imagining it as
she was on anti-depressants due to her husband's addiction to alcohol and painkillers. She has
experienced considerable pain, especially in her arm, which often wakes her up at night. Bella
says this has never been acknowledged by her doctors. She was given Benhexol to control the
spasms but had to stop it as she was becoming very confused; "I nearly walked under a bus!
They used to give it to Parkinson's patients but stopped because the side effects were so bad".
She says that she wasn't warned that she was taking a high dose and was prescribed other
anti-depressants to counter the side effect of confusion; "I always needed to ask questions. I
was never given any explanations by the doctors". Doctors have suggested her dystonia is
caused by stress and depression but she doesn't agree, although she acknowledges that she
represses emotion - "tell no-one nothing and no-one can hurt you". When she recalls painful
experiences in the past she remembers having the same shaking symptoms that characterise
her dystonia; "I was always told I was nervous".
She gets frustrated when she feels that people are not listening to her; "if! don't pick
anything up with my right hand, no-one knows I have a problem until I open my mouth".
Bella has lost touch with most of her old friends as she believes they found it hard to accept
the way she had changed and were pitying her and comparing her to how she was before. She
doesn't think that her dystonia is hereditary but still feels worried and guilty in case she has
given it to her daughters; "I would only have had one child had I known".
Her life feels confined as she doesn't go out alone or beyond the local shops and sports
centre; "before I used to love walking the dog for miles". Bella can't drive because of her
medication so feels very dependent on her husband who looks after her "24 hours a day". He
has become very sensitive to her moods and when he sees her "getting stuck" will help
without comment.
He gets very frustrated. He got the brunt of it when my younger daughter walked out
two years ago. My husband always said I was the strong one and suddenly his strong
woman was slumped at his feet. It's been hard for him
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Iris
If I fee/less attractive it is because of my age rather than my dystonia
Iris is an elegant woman in her seventies with laryngeal dystonia who lives in retirement flats
in South-east England. She described herself as an "old hand with dystonia" who was now
able to support others and act as an ambassador. Her narrative explored work-related
discrimination and flexible working, people's insensitivity and rudeness (giving examples of
"communicative alienation"), the "miracle" of Botulinum toxin injections (and being the first
person in the UK to receive them), poor communication by doctors (including problems
securing a diagnosis), managing her condition (for example, taking care over the scheduling
and location of social events), integrating dystonia-related changes into the experience of
aging, the invisibility oflaryngeal dystonia, and her rejection of psychological interpretations.
Iris decided to work from home after the start of her laryngeal dystonia as although she was
doing the same work on a lower salary, the extra time enabled her to travel. "I had an
epiphany on a beautiful day and converted my room into an office". She said she would have
continued working but her "funny boss [... ] felt disabled people should be put down".
Her first injections of Botulinum toxin were like "magic" and she can now speak "easily".
She is conscious of her voice "quavering" before and immediately after her injections but
doesn't let what others think bother her; "before the treatment I had no voice for five years".
Iris said this didn't bother her immediately but later she became determined to speak and
wouldn't give up, despite her "strangled and whispery voice". She tries to avoid places with
background noise (like restaurants) so she can be heard more easily and arranges outings
when her voice is at its best; "I manage it". However she sometimes has difficulties with deaf
friends, "I often get very funny answers to my questions!"
I needed great perseverance in the beginning as it was very difficult when I had no
voice and couldn't look after my grandchildren properly or read them a story - I feel
I missed out on their growing up
She recalls her bank manager shouting at her when he couldn't hear her, but believes that
people are generally sympathetic, if uncomprehending. A common reaction is "oh dear, have
you lost your voice?" Iris finds speaking on the telephone easier than talking face to face,
although people at the National Spasmodic Dysphonia Association!" conference said they
hated it.
She describes laryngeal dystonia as the "least mentioned dystonia" and maintains that "you
become invisible". Iris, however, has been very visible as she was the first person in the UK
to have Botulinum toxin injections; "when my neurologist presented my case at a conference
in Switzerland it turned it from being a killer into a healer". She worked for the Society for 12
years doing publicity with national media to facilitate diagnosis and was interviewed by Sky
and Radio 4's "Today" programme. She recalls going to her GP on the day of the programme
to give him information and a video but these were rejected as "we get so much stuff sent to
us". Iris thinks the public are becoming more aware ofthe problems of people living with
dystonia, particularly children. Twelve years ago she suggested a poster campaign using a
child with generalised dystonia but the then medical advisor rejected this as he said it would
be too upsetting for parents whose children had just been diagnosed. It is now one of the
Society'S most popular fundraising images.
Iris waited three years for a diagnosis and was seen by more than four neurologists and "no
end of ear, nose and throat consultants, some of whom were dreadful. I was sent from one to
another". One suggested a psychiatrist ''which really annoyed me. It's a physical thing that
happens over which I have no control". She asked the doctor who referred her "how do you
think that makes me feel?" and adds "people suffered dreadfully under that kind of treatment
that was totally wrong for them. Being told it is psychological is the most depressing thing of
all". After three years of inconclusive tests, she rang the hospital to tell them they were
wasting her time:
Another doctor came to the phone, almost pleading with me to come back in. He was
so nice I couldn't refuse. He was ninety percent sure it was dysphonia [laryngeal
dystonia] and would like me to see Professor Munday. The Professor said dysphonia
was a very mysterious thing and we didn't know what caused it so there wasn't a
cure. He asked me 'how do you feel?' Itwas an enormous relief to know what it was
Although Professor Munday mentioned a "pioneering" treatment available in North America,
he said it would be another two years before it reached Britain, so instead prescribed drugs
"which did nothing except give me dreadful side effects - confusion, weight loss, nausea,
bowel problems". She also developed a tremor in her arms and was "terrified" that she had
Parkinson's disease like her mother. The doctor told her that if she stopped taking the drugs
1
64The North American organisation for people with laryngeal dystonia.
the side effects would stop within 48 hours; "I was so angry that I hadn't been warned about
them beforehand". At the National Professor Munday and three other doctors discussed the
new treatment with her:
I decided to take a chance on the injections as I felt I had to, even though my family
said 'it's a dreadful thing, don't do it'. I had the treatment late one afternoon and the
next morning I could speak, it was amazing. When I found I could swallow a cup of
tea I thought, 'shall I ring my doctor? But it's six in the morning!' Itwas quite
emotional
The effect lasted a few weeks then Iris found she had problems saying words beginning with
vowels; "there was considerable experimentation to get the right site [for the injections] and
the right amount". Itwas also difficult to distinguish between the spasms and tremor caused
by her dystonia and those by the drugs. Now, four to five weeks after treatment her voice
becomes whispery and difficult to control and after 12 weeks the spasms restart in her larynx.
Her tongue and jaw are sometimes affected by the injections and she used to get stiffness
from her jaw to the top of her head and problems swallowing immediately after treatment.
Iris told me proudly that she lives in retirement flats without a warden. She has family living
locally but her son (initially very supportive) has moved away. Her dystonia hasn't made her
cut back on social activities as friends and family make allowances for her. When her voice
quavers she has seen people tum around and look, "but if I feel less attractive it is because of
my age rather than my dystonia".
The doctors refer newly diagnosed people to her and she has had "a lot of contact with them"
particularly reassuring people about the "throat injections". She notes the "anger" among
people living with dystonia when they are told things like "open your eyes" when they can't
physically do it. Iris also observed that people have very different approaches to illness:
Children enjoy being better and spring into health but older people hang on to
illness. You've got to be careful because there are advantages to being in the sick
role. Sometimes you need a break just to recharge during working life
Paul
I'm someone who has this. without it being my identifying feature
Paul is an open and friendly man in his thirties with cervical dystonia who works in north
London as a teacher of English as a foreign language among "supportive" colleagues. He
describes himself as someone who has integrated dystonia into his li fe and no longer finds it
disruptive or constraining. His narrative recounted his speedy integration of dystonia into his
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life (for example, he wasn't threatened by people's curiosity), his interest in its psychological
effects, the support he received from colleagues and friends, ideas about causation stimulated
by guilt, and how as a young person living with dystonia he didn't find the Society helpful.
IfI'd been in a tough comprehensive, having dystonia would have been a more
uncomfortable experience. Actually my pupils were very nice and seemed genuinely
concerned when my neck started to jerk. I don't have any pain and sleep well so I
can continue to work. If you have those, that's important
He finds walking difficult (particularly carrying shopping) and hopes the second course of
injections will improve this. He can now cycle and dance but feels slightly self-conscious.
Normally I'm not conscious that I'm not doing this or that. It's funny how quickly it
becomes part of you, supporting my neck has just become a mannerism. Strangers
come up and ask you if you're okay but you just explain it. It's difficult because it is
a strange condition and not very well known
Paul lived in Spain for five years and wonders ifhis dystonia was triggered by the stress of
his return, or by taking recreational drugs; "I think these theories probably came from my
shock and guilt when I was diagnosed. I now think things happen and you can't go back; I try
to put it to the side as much as possible".
The improvement since his injections has helped him keep his dystonia in perspective; "I'm
someone who has this, without it being my identifying feature". Before the injections his
dystonia was noticeable when eating (especially in restaurants) but Paul is glad he has
maintained his social life. He doesn't feel "too bad" (compared with other people living with
dystonia) as "when your friends know and are comfortable with it, you feel more comfortable
too". Paul found the Society useful for information but not meeting people as most of the
members were older than him and he was "wary of getting involved". He has also researched
dystonia through the medical database at the hospital
It took three months to get a diagnosis during which time he went from his GP to an
acupuncturist, then back to Spain, then back to the surgery (his condition was worsening)
where he saw another GP who referred him to a physiotherapist. The physiotherapist
suggested he might have "torticollis" and a friend's wife told him what it was. He then
obtained a referral to a neurologist and was diagnosed. He initially felt isolated and
uncomfortable with strangers but "once I had broached it with friends, it wasn't a big thing".
Paul believes that your personality mediates the effect of dystonia, but acknowledges that the
diagnosis takes a while to sink in and his attitude could change over time.
I was happy, angry, I've confronted all those things and come through - you have to
live with this. I find the psychological aspects of living with dystonia very
interesting, the gradual and long term effects, how you change in personality and
character, possibly in ways that you aren't aware ofl()S
Alan
I'm trying to cope, but it's everyone else not doing it. I'm left in the lurch
Alan is a middle-aged man with generalised dystonia and diabetes who lives with his mother
in his childhood home. His narrative explored his self-consciousness in public, life before the
start of his dystonia, problems getting support or acknowledgement (even from his social
worker), use of medications, and his determination not to be labelled as "mentally ill".
He told me his doctor had promised he would go into remission, but three years later there
has been no improvement. He is conscious of people looking at him when he goes out:
When I go to Tesco's I feel there's a whole load of trumpets around me, 'oh, he's
making a big arrival' they'll say. They stare at me all the time but I stare back, a cat
can look at a king I say. Why should I be worried what they think? Who's normal
these days?
Alan is also very aware of people's thoughtless or prejudiced reactions to his condition and
feels he is "always trying to educate people that are ignorant"; "someone once asked me
where my dystonia came from. I told her I was from the second planet next to Mars - ask me
a silly question and you'll get a silly answer. Dystonia's not where you come from. It's what
you've got".
His Disability Living Allowance was reduced from medium to low care last year with no
prior warning or explanation. The appeal process was tiring and took a whole year. His
mother helped him fill in the 200 pages of forms as his hands are affected by dystonia but she
didn't understand the wording; "before the hearing she said, 'If anyone's going to win it'll be
you because you've really worked on those forms'''. Although Alan was supported at the
tribunal by his social worker, he felt she had a different agenda as she was trying to establish
the minimum he would need to live:
I once saw her writing down 'he does very well on his wheel-walker'; well that's
what it's for. Then she wrote a silly thing like "he can get a cigarette and grip it",
what the hell's that got to do with being disabled I don't know. You have to keep
fighting those things. The social worker says, 'you can cope', I say, 'no, everything
165HerePaul appears to be treating himself as the subject of an experiment, making me wonder at what point
detachment and reflection become objectification.
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takes six times as long. You're trying to make me lose my benefits saying that I'm
capable. I'm coping, I'm not capable'
His brother also describes him as "independent" but Alan (interpreting this in relation to
benefit) argues, "even if I'm independent I can still get medium care allowance". Currently
he gets £ 161 per week in invalidity benefit, income support for his mortgage, and Disability
Living Allowance at medium rate for care and high rate for mobility, but these were hard
won; "at one point I wondered if the appeal office were shredding my f01111Sto cause
trouble".
Alan felt ill on the day of his appeal, which was exacerbated by waiting in the cold outside "a
Nissan hut with a falling down chimney". "It was no place for a disabled person" he recalled,
apparently without irony. His social worker complained about their treatment but the staff
were reluctant to let them in; he maintains "they hadn't heard of dystonia and didn't respect
me because I'm disabled". After the hearing he was so exhausted that "my knees went down
till they were almost touching the floor". Fortunately the tribunal ruled that the Department of
Social Security had acted illegally by not informing him before stopping the benefit.
His dystonia came on suddenly ("before I was able bodied but I've been rocking and rolling
ever since") and, as he tells the story, comically "the bedclothes were moving so vigorously
that my mother thought I had a woman under there". They called the GP who didn't come
until the following evening; on seeing him she said, "oh my God, why didn't you tell me?"
They had described his condition to the "grumpy" woman in the surgery reception but she
hadn't told the GP. He recalls how the same receptionist sent him upstairs to get a
prescription, despite protests from other people in the waiting room. "I was goose-stepping
down the stairs; I was nearly on the floor when I got down". The GP got him a specialist's
appointment the next day but the neurologist didn't tell him what was wrong for six months
saying, "I'll just see how you go". His mother would tell people who didn't know about his
dystonia that "he had come over all peculiar" but he would dryly correct her, "I haven't
changed my sex or anything".
Alan's writing is "erratic" as he can't control his hand or stop his eyes rolling ("it's large one
minute, small the next - you'd need a magnifying glass to read it) and he misses no longer
being able to write "normally". He is taking Co-cornadol for his "aches and pains" ("they
love to give me these ones, hundreds at a time") but worries that they will "lodge in his
kidneys" as his lifestyle is sedentary. Three fingers on his left hand are permanently bent over
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and the other two are extended which makes it difficult to test his blood sugar, although he
can use them to make rude gestures as people assume he can't help it!
He hasn't been to the local town for three years and gets deliveries from two supermarkets
and meals-on-wheels. On his last visit to the supermarket a woman hit him with her trolley
because she was trying not to look at him; "she apologised but it didn't make it better. I hate
it when people apologise". His social worker told him to "throw the wheel walker away - you
can walk" but she doesn't understand his fear of falling as he has a "pigeon-toed and Donald
Duck type walk". Alan is aggrieved that Social Services are "dumping" him next month as
they feel he would be better with the mental health team; "I'm physically disabled, not
mentally ill".He also wants a higher level of care so someone can check on him in the
morning and while showering.
Alan worries about his mother as she was sectioned eight weeks ago and is refusing to speak
to visitors saying she is "filthy, dirty". He told me "we've always been close; occasionally we
would share a bedroom to support each other". Alan is also paJ1 of a supportive telephone
network of people living with dystonia:
We try to back each other up, we're people with the same problem sharing it. A
friend called me who had built a wall that was wobbly. I said, 'you did it, that's the
main thing'. My brother complains about the high telephone bills but I can't
communicate with tom-toms
He feels dystonia is difficult to explain to people who don't have it as "you could sit there for
hours, days, telling people about your movements". For example, he experiences "episodes"
of rigidity where he lies on the floor or sits frozen "like a statue" in his chair. "People
originally thought it was a put onjob but then realised no one could continue simulating these
movements. The problem with dystonia is that different things happen and there's nothing I
can do about it,,)66.Alan describes how his speech goes "childish" and mimes putting a finger
to his lips and speaking in a babyish voice. He also jokes about forming a "Dystonia Society
orchestra" of members with speech disorders; "you've heard of the gay men's choir? I still do
a lot of quacking and I grunt sometimes". He even felt embarrassed by this in hospital and put
on a NHS questionnaire that there should be special units for people living with dystonia.
Last year he became depressed and took an overdose; "I had to drink seven pints of liquid
charcoal in casualty to absorb drugs; the charcoal gets all round your face and everything".
lo6The assimilation of diverse symptoms within one condition is also occurs in TMJ [Garro 1994b].
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He complained that even though he was admitted as suicidal the staff put his bed by the fifth
floor window. Alan was subsequently prescribed Prozac, which put him "on edge" ("I was
terrified of the postman pushing letters through the door") and then Seroxin'l", which he
stopped because of the side effects. Baclofen "revved" him up ("I used to hit my chest but
now I was pounding it. I had to put a cushion against my chest and there were clouds of dust
coming from it") and he was also given anti-epileptics to stop the spasms. He is now taking
Co-comadol, Zipofen and Glucophase for his diabetes and imagines "all the tablets looking at
me and saying, 'we're going to give you another side effect'", His neurologist recently told
him "there's nothing I can do for you. There isn't a magic bullet,,168. Consequently his next
appointment is in two years.
Alan was sent to a psychologist after diagnosis where he filled in a "thick" form and was
"interrogated", "they have you in there for one and a half hours and if they had the anglepoise
lamp in your face you'd think they were the Gestapo. I thought I was a secret agent". He
found their questions irrelevant and offensive ("what the hell has your sex life and your
sexuality got to do with dystonia?") and resented being asked about his childhood and
whether he was happy at school. His mother was present during the interview because he
couldn't fill the form in on his own but "she wasn't much help as she's deaf with tinnitis".
The psychologist took a break at the moment Alan wanted to walk out but when the
psychologist left the room, he was sure there was a hidden camera. He recalled "crying
because I couldn't do what they asked" and being "literally on my knees when I left" as the
stress brought on spasms in his legs. "[On the way home] I was below the axles on the taxi. I
thought I'd jump out on the M40". Alan didn't feel the psychologist understood his condition
although he reassured him it wasn't "all in his mind". He currently has "hallucinations" of
spiders and pink and blue clouds; "it's not in my mentality, it's real, I see it. You try telling
them and they think you're cuckoo".
Alan believes "doctors don't like me because I talk back to them".
They think, 'Ifhe can do that then he can fake all these movements'. They don't like
you to be one up on them. They think I've looked up what dystonia is and now I'm
playing it out. The doctors say, 'he's a very nice man'. They don't know nothing.
What I want is what I get
To support this forceful image of himself he tells me how he set up a radio station with no
prior experience; "I was disappointed when it was taken over but that was a sign that I'd
167An antidepressant that, like Prozac, increases serotonin levels.
168Rabinobserved that the absence of a "magic bullet" shouldn't make doctors impotent [1982).
on
developed an original and popular format. Middle of the road and modem contemporary
you'd call it, it hadn't been done in the UK before, people like Fox FM were frightened of
us".
Alan was a kitchen porter for 22 years. His mother used to nag him about getting ajob where
he could use his mind but he felt "if you're happy in your job, what's the point of moving?"
His favourite subject is history and he would like to do an Open University degree but can't
afford it. He went to boarding school, where he may have been sexually abused, but
maintains a "stiff upper lip" about the experience. "It was good, you got your rough with your
smooth, it does bring you out to grow up there because you can't go crying to mother".
He has cut his smoking from 120 to 60 cigarettes a day so says that scratch cards are now
"my only vice. Wine, women and song, they're all out. You've got to have one treat in your
life". He recently ate at Tesco's with a friend but could only have a sandwich as he was afraid
he would splash the food over the people nearby; "I mean me with baked beans, there were at
least two people in firing range". Alan describes his life as "just coping and filling forms in".
People say, 'why do I complain?' but I believe in rights. I'm trying to cope, but it's
everyone else not doing it. I'm left in the lurch. Having dystonia isn't clear-cut, it's a
higgledy-piggledy package. I wouldn't mind ifit was 'you've got this, you've got
that', but there are seven to eight versions and you might have two versions at once.
I'm still learning every day about my dystonia, I get another tic and wonder ifit's
part of it. Another thing with dystonia is I have trouble speaking and remembering
words but with a disability, if you can't do it one way, you find another. There are
different ways of coping, some people don't want to admit they've got it but I try to
have a sense of humour. I'm someone who's got something no one else has got; I
have to stick with society in general
Illness stories
Many illness stories from people living with dystonia use ideas about causation to account for
and master dystonia'J", The biomedical explanation of "a chemical imbalance in the basal
ganglia" may not provide satisfaction or resolution as it ignores the "why me?" "Why now?"
questions that are an important part of making sense of illness. For example, people with
diabetes in Mexico use "provoking factors" (which link biomedical and personal
understandings and enable the attribution of responsibility) to explain its onset [Hunt 1998].
These enable them to "bring meaning to the arbitrariness of illness" by "weaving the cause of
their diabetes into their own life history" and "making it part of the fabric of their life" [ibid].
169 For example, Sarah attributed it to a back injury while working as a nurse for exploitative employers.
01
Some theories fade into the background once a diagnosis is obtained, particularly if the
person obtains relief from conventional medicine. For example, Thomas 170advises
"selectivity in choosing help" as "it is of little help spending a fortune rummaging around
with such notions as the Oedipus complex to explain one's condition when true causation lies
in a chemical imbalance in the basal ganglia". But other theories remain to organise the
experience of illness and guide action. Beatrice'sl71 allergic response to 55 of the 58
substances she tested prompted her to create a "controlled [home] environment" with "no
carpet, no wall paper, filtered air and water and no cleaning chemicals". Regretfully, this
ideal of purity and control is occasionally disrupted by visitors "because of the chemicals that
are still hanging around their persons from the environment outside".
The interest in causation has been observed in other chronic conditions (for example, multiple
sclerosis) where medical uncertainty about cause or aetiology provides space for alternative
explanations. According to Robinson, "the problematic initial search for a diagnosis through
the formal health care system, the often contentious and transient relationships with medical
staff, and the frequently continuous experimentation with a wide range of medically
unorthodox therapies are a corollary of personal attempts to create or maintain a progressive
narrative oflife in the face of the disease" [1990:1185]172. For example, Paula173makes
discovering why she has dystonia central to a review of the effects of her life on her body,
deciding "if only I could discover why I had this disease I would be able to put it right". She
attributes her condition to three "sets of reasons": "physical defects or damage I have
collected in the course of my life" (for example, "a nervous tick in my right hand when I was
young" and "lower back pain after a pregnancy"), "mental, centring around stress", and
"age", and likens her body to "an aging house with a lot of weaknesses in its fabric" which
has experienced "collapse and major damage" after "a sudden shock or continuous stress".
A similar process occurs among people with arthritis who reconstruct the past through
narrative to create an impression of continuity and purpose [Williams 1984], and people with
cancer (and their doctors) who "deny the arbitrariness of suffering by associating it with
antecedent events and thereby sustaining the idea that the world is essentially orderly and
controllable" [Hunt 1999]. Narratives often move from personal experience of suffering to
generalised reflections about illness [Monks and Frankenberg in Ingstad and Whyte 1995],
17°A man living with cervical dystonia, writing in the Society newsletter.
I7IA woman with oromandibular dystonia, writing in the Society newsletter.
172C.f. People with motor neurone disease's desire to take Riluzole so they weren't just waiting to die (chapter 6).
173A woman with cervical dystonia, writing in the Society newsletter.
An illness narrative is a new "map" (or guide to living) that counters the "biographical
disruption" of illness, which may have turned the person into a "narrative wreck". By
constructing a narrative they become the editor of their life and assume responsibility for it
[Kierkegaard 1941]; an almost political act ifthe alternatives are to write or be written upon
[Charmaz 1987; Spivak 1996]. Although Frank [1998] fears that encouraging "confessions"
of illness may be "panopticism in benign disguise"!", I believe that the problem for most
people living with dystonia is not that their stories are recorded and used against them, but
(aside from the Society newsletter) there is no discursive space in which those stories could
be heard. Frank later notes the irony that "first-person stories are told to express what cannot
be expressed in the clinic where people ostensibly go to talk about illness" as "the point of
medical history taking is not to provide the person with a hearing of his or her suffering"
[1998:340]. Stories can be a "technology of the self,178 because relating them becomes a
"moral imperative" and "involves a profound assumption of personal responsibility",
including a willingness to "re-shape that self story if the wrong selfis being shaped"!"
[Crossley 1999]. But they can also be "care of the self' if they involve "reclaiming a voice
that bodily trauma and institutional treatment have caused to be silenced" [Frank 1998]. Self-
actualisation thus becomes a balance between opportunity (care of self) and risk (truth games
and power).
motivated by a desire to help others understand and accept the condition. They have a moral
tone (drawing on local constructs about "what constitutes a virtuous life,,174),attribute
responsibility and blame175, and are a way of positioning yourself and becoming
accountable'I",
"Narrative medicine" [Greenhalgh 1999] has been suggested as an epistemological corrective
to evidence-based medicine and a new way of relating to patients [Brody 1994; Frank 1991].
However, anthropologists have identified a number of problems with narratives, not least that
what people say is a poor guide to what they actually do [Malinowski 1925]. Informants'
intentions can be subverted by "narrative slippage" and intertextuality; large areas of culture
cannot be expressed in "discursive statements" [Fabian 1983]; there is a discrepancy between
174SeeEarly 1982 on childhood illnesses in Cairo; Good 1994b; Price 1987 illness narratives in Ecuador.
175SeeBaruch 1981 and Comaroff and Maguire 1981 on how parents establishing "moral adequacy"; Brock and
Kleiber 1994 on career-ending athletic injuries; Garro 1995 on diabetes in Obijway Indians.
176Radleyand Billig 1996; Blaxter and Paterson 1982.
I770r "pastoral power" [Armstrong 1995].
178Wherepower operates by convincing people to transform themselves using practices like diet and therapy
~~oucault 1?78]. . " ." . .
Crossley s analysis of healing stones from sexual abuse survivors and Hlv-positive men [1997] questioned
whether they were "empowering" as they could lead to "narcissistic withdrawal" [Lasch 1978].
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the "richness" of experience and the "paucity" of language [Bruner 1986]; and many
informants cannot produce linear monologues [Okeley 1992] or do not want to share
knowledge in this way [Holding 1999]. The experience of pain and suffering can also
"derange" people's lives so that they become unnarratable [Scarry 1985]. For example, the
"chaos narratives" produced by people with chronic pain lack coherence, completeness, or
any element of reflexivity, but are an accurate representation of suffering where sensation is
too intense and immediate to enable reflection. Like all accounts of chronic illness, they
remain ambiguous and negotiable as there is no ending to give them meaning [Good 1994b].
Chronic pain also "shatters" language and shapes the experiencer's world to itself [Bendelow
and Williams 1995]. Consequently it becomes a dimension of perception rather than an
experience and can only be represented through metaphor. For example, the cliche "seeing
stars" captures the consciousness-altering aspect of pain'f" [Jackson in Delvecchio Good
1994].
Although narratives are personal, they are rarely individual as they are "products of complex
interactive social processes [that] constitute powerful and dynamic means of communication"
[Steffen 1997: 110] 181.They are embedded in the "institutional structures" of narrator and
audience [Saris 1995], which "filter [their] discursive potentials" [Lyotard 1984:17]182. For
example, Mathieson and Starn acknowledged that their "narratives" from people with cancer
[1995] were actually forms of "joint action" as they were created by the circumstances and
structures of a research interview. They argued, however, that the conversations recorded in
the article had narrative qualities as they were "about those aspects of life that matter most"
[284] like "the quest for personal identity" 183.
Researchers can also affect narratives by creating homogeneity (emphasising theme over
variation), assuming fixed meanings, and imposing concepts like stigma [Faircloth 1999;
Nijhof 1998]. This conceals their "cultural polyphony" [Bakhtin 1981] where neither we, nor
the informant, know which story we will hear due to "narrative slippage" and the subversion
of intended stories by "master narratives't". For example, narratives of multiple sclerosis use
18°Sarah also uses vivid metaphors to describe her dystonia ("like something in a film where someone is trying
to cling on to something while being frozen in a block of ice").
18IC.f. the "collectivisation" of experiences of HIV-positive men [Carricabu and Pierret 1995], Ojibway Indians
with diabetes [Hunt 1998] and North American Indians [Spicer 1998].
182Having to learn a "cancer vocabulary" [Mathieson and Starn 1995:298] to articulate your experiences is an
example of what Bourdieu calls "symbolic violence".
183Theconcept of "radical empiricism" [James 1958] is a useful way to conceptualise research interactions as it
acknowledges that we are continually changing and being changed by the experience of others.
184Forexample, illness narratives draw on older narrative genres like stories of religious conversions
("pathographies") where spiritual experiences stimulate reflection and rebirth [Hawkins 1990].
contrasting perspectives to represent it as both an intrusive problem and an integral quality of
personal relationships [Monks and Frankenberg in Ingstad and Whyte 1995]. People with
traumatic brain injury also manage multiple self-narratives to redescribe themselves as intact
"in spite of' their injury or worthwhile "because of' [Nochi 2000].
Conclusion
In this chapter I suggest that a qualitative approach to illness is worthwhile, not only because
telling stories can be therapeutic and enhance doctor-patient relationships, but because they
are a useful research tool, if handled carefully (for example, acknowledging that stories are
creative interpretations rather than transcriptions of experience and are highly context
dependent). Illness stories offer more than other forms of representation because they "claim
a unique way of being ill" against the "standardisation of disease", refer to and develop "we"
relationships (in contrast to the individualisation ofQOL measures), and depend on and
extend a "shared horizon of moral significance" [Frank 1998]. The division between
"narrative medicine" and evidence-based medicine is an artificial one, however, as it fails to
acknowledge that these fascinating and fallible stories also form the basis and justification for
QOL measures. In chapter eight I demonstrate how these stories are selected and
reinterpreted in particular ways, with particular consequences, during the creation of
measures of QOL.
O(
Section 2: Encounters with bureaucracy
Chapter 4: Encounters with medicine: Derek's story
He turned to me and said 'do you want to do the operation as well, then?' then he
turned to the anaesthetist and said, 'Put him out'
This is the first chapter in a section that explores individual and group encounters with
medical and social bureaucracy and their mediation by patient support organisations. The
organisations use the discourse of QOL in their negotiations with doctors, pharmaceuticals,
and the government (described in chapters 5 and 6) to strengthen their claim to speak in the
"patient's voice". This chapter examines individual encounters with medical bureaucracy
through the story of Derek, an intelligent and articulate man with generalised dystonia whom
I interviewed on a number of occasions at his parent's home in north London. The extracts
describe his relationship with health professionals from the start of his symptoms as a child
and are contextualised with other stories from people living with dystonia, and sociological
and anthropological literature on "doctor-patient relations". His story examines important
themes neglected by the literature, much of which investigates problems defined by doctors.
For example, the rivalry between psychiatry and neurology and the difficulty of convincing
psychiatrists you don't have a psychiatric problem once you have been referred to them; the
effect of age on doctor-patient relationships; and participation in research. Through his story,
Derek creates a comprehensive critique of modern medicine that most people living with
dystonia (or any chronic condition) would recognise. Although he acknowledges that there
are doctors with a "human touch", many appear arrogant, defensive, paternalistic,
exaggeratedly respectful of authority and expertise (though not of their patients'), and unable
to admit the limits of their knowledge, or communicate concern for their patients.
Derek's story begins as child in the 1960s when he entered Great Ormond Street for
assessment because he was having difficulty walking:
I went into Great Ormond Street when I was 7 and was seen by various doctors there,
I was there for 10 days, came out with my feet in plaster because there was a lot of
tension in my feet so they thought the thing to do was hold then down, in and round,
get the feet straight, put them into plaster, and leave them for a couple of weeks. So
that's how I was discharged and I had a night of hell with those things because the
feet were fighting, the tension was so bad, it was just hell for a few days.
They hadn't come across anything like this before and they had a suspicion that it may
be psychological and attention seeking and so on. And they did certain things, which
in retrospect I think were totally out of order, and these days' accusations of child
abuse would be hurled. I was very anxious, anxious about having visits and seeing my
parents, and visiting hours were a bit strange and because 1was also in a ward with
just young babies there was no one to talk to so they did things around the visiting
times. They would arrange for me to have x-rays, the times of which coincided with
visiting hours so 1was down in the x-ray department knowing that my mother was
sitting upstairs waiting and they made sure that 1had to hang around for ages, eating
up the whole visiting time and didn't return to the ward until the end to see how 1
reacted. And that was the least of their little stunts. Which 1thought was kind of cruel
when 1heard about it afterwards [... ] That was Great Ormond Street - great place.
His problems persisted ("one day 1could walk or get around fairly easily, another day 1was
struggling to get the leg down") so his parents arranged a referral to a prestigious
neurological hospital where he was seen by "a long list" of "world names" in the field.
The majority decision, I'm not sure if it was six to four or something like that, was
that it was psychological. That was at a time when 1think if neurology says this
condition doesn't exist you straight away go into the psychiatric bag. I was good
material for the psychiatrists because of the nightmares and because I was a bit too
bright for my own good. This I'm sure upset the doctors. At the best of times they
don't like answering questions from patients [... J and they definitely don't like
questions from children.
[... ] Three of the things that bothered them was that - first of all, one evening my
parents came to visit and I said to them, 'I feel a lot more relaxed' and I got off the
bed and walked perfectly normally all around the ward and this was something that I
hadn't done or been able to do for several days and 1was saying 'oh look at me, isn't
this great'. Now the doctors got to hear of this and they were pretty pissed off and
they thought, 'this kid is just putting it on'. As far as 1was concerned I was just
pleased that I could do it. They were very disturbed that 1 seemed curiously
unconcerned about what was happening to me, the tension was progressing upwards
yet I wasn't panic stricken and constantly in tears and asking 'what's happening to
me?' and all the rest of it. And this added to their 'it's got to be psychological,
attention seeking'. Now as I recall it I tended to have a very practical approach to
things. If something happened to me I tried to deal with it. And okay these things
were happening to me, I didn't know why but as each thing happened I had to adapt
very quickly- if the leg wouldn't go down I had to press on the knee to keep it down
if this didn't work, I had to try something else. Itwas like there were new problems
happening and each time 1had to quickly adapt to it. I didn't just sit back and think,
'Oh what's happening, am I going to die'? Ijust didn't feel like that. And they saw
this as a curious unconcern.
In an attempt to test the genuineness of his condition (or the firmness of his resolve) he was
given extensive physiotherapy under observation.
I call it physio but it was more like torture therapy. They gave you treatments which
I've since found out weren't designed to do anything at all except inflict pain to see
how I reacted because they still weren't getting anywhere. The test results had all
shown nothing, nothing wrong with anything they could find and there had to be
something wrong and if it is psychiatric then perhaps they can make it so unpleasant
for me that I'll stop. I found out years later that I was being watched the whole time in
this ward; either by nurses or by doctors when they came in, to see if I secretly walked
around or how I behaved. I didn't know any of this at the time. So I had these physio
sessions, walking, running. There were two things they did: they attached electrodes
to my toes and sent unpleasant shocks to see if I would twitch [... ] Very painful, it
reduced me to tears, had no therapeutic value whatsoever. The other thing they did
regularly was they had this gadget which emitted mauve sparks that ran up and down
the calves of my legs, I don't think it had any purpose at all [... ] in terms of the
condition, the sole idea I gather was to give me a very painful time.
There was still doubt as to whether his condition was neurological so over the next ten years
he was sent to a psychologist who characterised him as a 'classic case' and was very reluctant
to surrender him to a rival discipline when his diagnosis was confirmed 185.
She was sincere, not a charlatan, but if you turned up with your ann in two pieces she
would say it was psychological [... ] While I was in hospital [for surgery on his foot],
the surgeon recommended I see a GP friend who was interested in neurology. The GP
convinced the surgeon that it wasn't psychological. When my psychologist heard
about this she went crazy with anger, even though doctors don't usually slag each
other off. Her final verdict on me was 'it's quite clear that you've decided to stay like
this'. In every version they win. I was reassessed in the seventies as by then
psychology had gone out of fashion and was diagnosed with dystonia. When I had a
definite diagnosis I told the psychologist and she said 'oh well, if that's what you
want to believe'.
Despite his earlier experiences Derek found a later referral to a psychiatrist "very helpful", so
long as it was "just to talk about problems at home and my personal life and not with a view
to analysing dreams and all that stuff'. However he had a couple of bad experiences, first,
when he was referred for a second opinion, and second, on his psychiatrist's retirement.
On one occasion Prof. Munday'f" said 'I just want you to see someone upstairs who
was a Freudian psychiatrist with Winnicott'. I think I saw him once - I heard he's
written a book with Dr Smith and was highly regarded - weirdo! [...] I saw this guy
and I don't think he said a single word or maybe one sentence throughout the whole
time. Dr Lang said, 'these Freudians have an easy time of it, their excuse is that they
don't say anything because they don't want to miss anything'. They just sit back and
don't say a word. I saw this guy and he confirmed Dr Lang's view that there was
nothing psychiatrically wrong, nothing that he could help more than Dr Lang was
doing, I thought 'thank god for that!'
One bad experience I had was when Dr Lang was retiring and he said 'look there's
somebody I can refer you to, go and see this chap' and he'd heard that he was okay. I
went along to this chap, again with a view just to discuss problems now and then. I
got into the room there, there was no couch that I could lie down on comfortably, and
all he had was two wooden chairs together to lie down on. I couldn't stay in a chair
like now in a relaxed way, I needed to lie down. So I got these two chairs together and
I was moving around because it wasn't comfortable. He had a woman sitting in,
another psychiatrist, he asked 'do you mind if she sits in?' but he gave me the
185Collette recounted a similar experience in the Society newsletter when she was told by a psychiatrist that "if I
took the "right" anti-depressant, the dystonia would go away".
186Prof.Munday was his neurologist and Dr Lang was his psychiatrist.
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impression I didn't have much choice. So instead of saying 'what's your view of what
we want to do?' or 'why have you come to see me?' and being friendly, his opening
gambit was, he was looking me up and down and I can tell when someone gives me
that kind oflook as if you're some kind of mutated object, and he was doing that and
then said 'how does it feel to know that people are looking at you thinking that you
are physically deformed?' or 'it's difficult for people to look at you', some really
unpleasant thing, a real bastard. I thought anything I say to him he's going to throw it
back to me, tum it into paranoia, I was completely thrown. I was trying to think up all
these devastating replies and he said, 'Well how do you think I can help you? What
would you want me to do?' This guy is not just a bastard, I think he's a sadistic loony
and I feel sorry for anyone that he treats. He's probably still there. That the place has
got such a reputation indicates there's something severely wrong with psychiatry
Derek also recounted bad experiences "participating" in medical research, which seemed to
exemplify the worse aspects of the therapeutic encounter - typification ("I've seen hundreds
of dystonics"), bad faith ("In the morning did he [the surgeon] come? Did he hell"), lack of
reciprocity ("researchers tell you you'll receive the results but it's a pack of lies"), and misuse
of power ("He [the surgeon] didn't like it. So I had six sleepless nights with pain from the
stitches").
[Medical] researchers tell you you'll receive the results but it's a pack oflies. You do
your part of the deal and then you never hear from them again. I'd agreed to have a
muscle biopsy for a research project but when I was trying to discuss my particular
problems with the surgeon he said, 'I've worked with Dr Johnson and I've seen
hundreds of dystonics, I know all about it'. I thought 'do you hell, you've never seen
me'. I'd offered to give them a sample from my left arm which was most affected,
even though this would be more painful, so he said 'look, I'll come and see you in the
morning and we'll decide which arm to do. I'll ask the staff to shave both arms but I'll
come and see you and we'll discuss it'. 'Fine'. In the morning did he come? Did he
hell and when I asked to see him it was 'oh he's busy, he's a very busy man'. There
was no way he was going to come and see me. And then someone said, 'he's already
decided'. I nearly went ballistic. I thought, 'okay, I can discharge myself. I tried
unsuccessfully to get hold of Prof. Munday to complain bitterly about the consultant
and his cronies and his surgeon. I didn't manage to get hold of him but I thought 'for
the greater good of medical science' and all that, I'll go ahead with it. But I am going
to stay conscious until I get to the operating theatre, which is not the best thing to do.
So they gave me this pre-med and I thought 'okay, stay awake, stay awake' and I got
wheeled down, struggling with this and there was the surgeon so I gave him a telling
off in front of everyone, just before I was put under - 'why didn't you come and see
me and discuss this, I want to know exactly where you're going to do this incision,
how many stitches, how you're going to do it, and so on'. I made it very clear that I
was very angry with him, not the wisest thing to do when you're just going to be put
under. He didn't like it. So I had six sleepless nights with pain from the stitches.
Gina describes a similar experience in the Society newsletter where her doctor's initial
enthusiasm ("[he] asked ifhe could come and see me which he did the very same day")
disappears after he has solved the riddle of her diagnosis and failed to get a photo to
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accompany her "case history" for publication ("I was so upset at the though of anyone seeing
my screwed up face and eyes that I refused point blank. He never came to see me after that").
Derek's story provokes the question "how are these "weirdos", "sadistic loonies" and de facto
child abusers created? In the next part of the chapter I will suggest some answers by looking
at medical training, language, practices and environment, and weaving together literature and
accounts from people living with dystonia. The goal of medical training appears to be the
production of the "socially neutral physician". For example, studies of medical education in
the late eighties suggest students' values become homogenous and conservative (regardless of
their background) as isolation and lack oftime reduce their commitment to external activities
[Shapiro 1987; Beagan 2000]. But although difference is thought to reside in the "other" (the
patient), it persists in the gendered and racialised bodies of students and may affect them in
ways they cannot control. For example, sick doctors report a sense of failure, inadequacy and
guilt ("illness doesn't belong to us. It belongs to them, the patients" [McKevitt and Morgan
1997aD, exacerbated by the responses of colleagues and patients who collude in their denial
of illness. Doctors delay seeking help, informally consult colleagues, self-treat and self-refer
to specialists. Their attitude to their bodies may reflect the competitiveness and machismo
inculcated during training, which Derek illustrates by describing his cousin (a surgeon) who
"made the decision about when he should go back to work [after a varicose vein operation]
by finding out how long nurses took and taking half that, regardless of whether he's in agony
or not, just to show them".
Doctors' initial reluctance to enter the role of patient means that they often receive poor care
as they are expected to be their own doctor [Ingelfinger 1980]. However, their subsequent
desire to be treated as an "ordinary patient" reveals a lack of understanding of what patients
experience; "[it is] a desire to receive the best routinised care [... ] but probably not to be
subjected to hospital waiting lists, lengthy waiting in the GP's surgery or the routinised
rudeness of health care workers" [McKevitt and Morgan 1997b]. "Doctor-patients" are
"classificatory anomalies" [Douglas 1970] that challenge the biomedical paradigm of
separation between subject and object ("being both doctor and patient threatens the integrity
of the club" [Rabin 1982]). Consequently, they are circumscribed with a powerful taboo,
which affected both Rabin (a neurologist with motor neurone disease) who noted that
"becoming ill is tantamount to treachery", and Ingelfinger (a doctor with stomach cancer)
who described his frustration with colleagues who expected him to be a medical authority to
the end [1980].
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Medical language has penetrated popular culture to an extraordinary degree (what Habermas
calls "technocratic consciousness" [1970]). However, there can be confusion between terms
with popular and medical meanings (for example, hypertension and "hyper-tension"
[Blumhagen 1980]). This occurred when Derek's neurologist told his parents he had dystonia;
"once they heard the brain was affected, they didn't hear anything else; he instantly became
the villain of the piece and they didn't want to hear what he had to say". Doctors use "lay"
models to explain conditions because they are a shared cultural resource, undermining
Mishler's distinction between the "voice of medicine" ("affectively neutral, functionally
specific, context stripping questions and responses by doctors") and that of the "life-world"
[1984]. The distinction also ignores the plurality of voices within medicine [Kleinman 1995]
as the voice used depends on the doctor's position in the hierarchy. For example, "the voice
of science" is most frequently used by younger doctors [Aronsson et al 1994] who cannot use
personal experience as a "warrant for action" [Freidson 1971].
The voice of medicine is also accessible to patients, for example, Aronsson et al [1994]
describes how a woman with obesity fights to keep the problem within the voice of medicine
to protect her life-world from the "clinical gaze" [Armstrong 1984]. Similarly, narrative is not
to confined to patients' accounts of illness as the presence of "history", "episodes" and
"presentation" in medical vocabularies indicates [Atkinson 1995]. Hunter maintains that
medicine is primarily an interpretive activity as knowledge is constructed and transmitted
through narrative [1991]. The "diagnostic circle" is analogous to the "hermeneutic circle",
effectively making doctors into literary critics. Occupational therapists also use "clinical story
telling" to examine social relations, emotions, cultural difference and morality (areas
traditionally excluded from medical discourse) and collectively think through a course of
action [Mattingley 1998].
Conceptualising medicine as an art rather than a science redirects attention to the "therapeutic
relationship", which is often neglected by medical training that focuses on "the centrality of
diseases and medical science, learned decision-making, automatic behaviours, and rules of
thumb" [Cassell 1997]. This implies "that the physician is secondary in care of patients: same
science, different physician, same care" [ibid]. It also directs our attention to the language
used in case presentations'Y, which may reveal how doctors think about their patients. For
example, the use of devices like "depersonalisation't'", "omission of the agent", "making
187Theseoccur during weekly ward rounds and are opportunities for junior presenters to exhibit
"roundsmanship" (bluffing through hostile questions) rather than share information [Anspach 1988].
1RRCallinga baby the "product of gestation" implies it was produced by the gestation rather than the parents.
technology the agent", and "account markers't'" [Anspach 1988]. Anspach claims "many of
the values and assumptions of case presentation contradict the explicit tenets of medical
education" (for example, devaluing patients' accounts). Using this language inculcates "a
scale of values which emphasise science, technology, teaching and learning at the expense of
interaction with patients".
Ironically, literary representations tend to focus on the scientific and technological aspects of
medicine, for example, in Martin Arrowsmith the hero abandons medical practice to follow
"the religion of a scientist", praying "the prayer of the scientist" [Lewis 1925]. However,
scientific medicine was attacked 50 years later in The House of God [Shem 1978] where
doctors at a New York hospital "do everything always for everyone forever to keep the
patient alive", even where this results in lives without dignity and painfully prolonged
deathsl90• More recent scepticism is linked to a growing awareness of the role science plays
in creating risk [Beck 1992]. For example, the enthusiasm for neuroleptics (one of the
therapeutic "advances" of the last century) was reduced when their dystonic side effects
became public knowledge!" [Brown and Funk 1986].
Scientific medicine only became possible when the location for treatment moved from the
bedside to the hospital or clinic and the main source of clinical data changed from the person
with the condition to the doctor's observations (what Armstrong calls "hospital medicine"
[1995]). An increased reliance on diagnostic technology ("laboratory medicine" [ibid]),
caused even more damage to the doctor-patient relationship as while a positive test result can
create a "collegiate feeling" between doctor and patient, a negative one forces them either to
deny their experience or reject medicine [Rhodes et al 1999] 192. This is because tests offer
"more than a relief from pain - they promise an escape from a stigmatising logic of causation
that makes what is not clearly 'body' into only 'mind'" [Rhodes et al 1999]. They also
require a suspension of disbelief as the discourse of testing assumes firstly, that the inside of
the body corresponds to visual images of it, and secondly, that variation can be measured
against norms (producing guilt when the body fails even to conform to the norm of
deviance!). The allure of these images have made actual bodies elusive, replaced by "multiple
images and codings" where the body is doubled and redoubled" and risks disappearing in a
189Usedto emphasise the subjectivity of accounts from patients or other health care workers (indicating the
"ecology of knowledge" within the hospital) [Atkinson 1995].
190Thedoctor-hero is only able to save himself by leaving internal medicine and going into psychiatry!
191Theslow recognition of drug-induced dystonia and dyskinesia was attributed to differences in the way doctors
and patients define effective medications.
192Thiscan be postponed by arguing that insufficient or inappropriate tests have been done.
chain of simulacra [Frank 1995]. Consequently, the modem hospital has become an alien
environment, pervaded by "screens" which exteriorise the body's interior, display bodily
processes, and entertain patients and visitors.
Everyday management in medical environments occurs through "methods of typification"
[Douglas 1986] and "practices of division" [Foucault 1979] that classify people within a
moral framework. On the ward the dual identities of "person" and "patient" are kept in play,
each informing the other, and providing a means of deciding whether the person has a moral
claim on the staffs attention [Latimer 1997]. People's problems are made "doable" in the
consultation where the type of questions the doctor asks, the manner of asking (for example,
leading questions), and the way the answer is interpreted limits the possible responses [Berg
1992]. However, diagnosis may not be "a passport to helpful forms of treatment't'" and may
close doctors' minds to symptoms that fall outside the classification or within other
disciplines. This happened to Fred who was told that the sudden deterioration in his sight was
'''all in the mind" because "people with dystonia aren't supposed to lose their sight". The
problem (optic atrophy) was finally rectified "after a tour of teaching hospitals in London"
when he was re-diagnosed with Leigh's disease. His story is an example of how "the
organisational routines of doctors transmute the unique, biographically constituted troubles of
the person into the appropriate classes of diagnosis and management", fixing the individual in
"a domain of typified actors, actions, and outcomes" [Atkinson 1995]. The notion of "typified
actors" (or "ideal types") underlies the allocation of universal disability weights'", which
assume that everyone with a particular condition experiences the same level of disability
(regardless of their personal or social context) and will be treated in a similar way, producing
predictable, measurable outcomes.
The medical anthropologist Greenhalgh provides a detailed description of the mechanisms
that tum people into patients, drawing on her experience of being wrongly diagnosed with
fibromyalgia [2001]. First people are medicalised and tumed into a "doable" problem for that
speciality by stripping away their social context [Berg 1996]. Lily (the partner of someone
living with dystonia) would endorse this as she maintains that doctors are "not really aware"
of people's problems" because they do not see them "trying to cut up food, shave, walk etc".
Consequently they deal with the "physical symptoms" but neglect the less visible problems,
which "only those who suffer or care know about".
193As Bob, a man with cervical dystonia, explained in the Society newsletter.
194Described in the section on Disability Adjusted Life Years in chapter 9.
Secondly, the clinical data is woven into a story about what is wrong and how to cure it,
which even manages to incorporate epistemologically damaging treatment failures. For
example, Edith 195 recalls how because the doctors "could find nothing wrong with me" she
was admitted to a "mental hospital" to be treated for psychological problems including
"attention seeking" (jealousy of her two elder brothers), "resentment", "selfishness", "over-
confidence" and "a guilt complex". As she ironically observes, "most 17 year olds would fit
into this description", although "perhaps not the guilt complex!" She wasn't allowed to have
a stick or any other walking aids ("this would have been giving in to me, and would only
make me worse") but her continual falls were dismissed as attention seeking by the hospital
staff. This resonates with Derek's account of the child psychiatrists who "were always
searching for the 'real' reason for my dystonia [... ] every time a reason was disproved they
were convinced the real reason was just out of reach".
Finally, any conflicting evidence is overcome by rhetorical devices like "domination",
"biomedical infallibility" (supported by the "white coat"), and "patient benefit", which
persuade the person of the truth of "their" story. This rarely worked with Derek as his
description of meeting the 'pioneer of stereotactic surgery' on a rare visit to England
demonstrates. The guru began with fake friendliness ("hello Derek, I think I can do a lot for
you [... ] get rid of90% of your symptoms") but when Derek challenged him ("can I just ask
you why it is that in your book these figures ... etc") there was "a terrible silence" and his
attitude "instantly changed from initially being friendly [ ... ] to 'well I don't think I can help'
he got up, everyone looked acutely embarrassed, and he walked out".
Greenhalgh characterises the four discourses used to turn people into patients as
objectification (splitting mind and body and focusing on the body), quantification (turning
symptoms into numbers and treating these as the most important measures), pathologisation
(making the disease the object of interest), and amelioration (bracketing the question of cause
and focusing on treatment). This transformation also takes place through the medical record,
which conceals its provisional and human origin through self-reification, in the same way that
QOL measures do [Berg 1996]. Berg reminds us that historical and examination data are not
"givens which unidirectionally lead a doctor towards a disposal" but are mutually
constitutive; "the data [... ] are selected, interpreted, remoulded and, when necessary modified
in view of other data and social factors such as time and the image of the person" [Berg
1992]. For example, a doctor who has decided not to operate on a 70-year-old man with
195An elderly woman with generalised dystonia, writing in the Society newsletter.
stomach cancer orders new procedures to suggest the presence of metastases, which would
support his decision.
Data underwent a similar transformation in two pain clinics in Puerto Rico and New England
[Bates et al 1997] where the North American centre chose to focus on providing assistive
devices as these both reflected their mechanical view of biomedicine and generated income.
The care provided to people living with dystonia is also influenced more by what the system
can offer than what the person needs, and many described brief and unsatisfying encounters.
For example, Anne sees a neurologist" maybe once a year - and then only as long as it takes
to receive an injection [... ] there is no time for chitchat, and there is no one else to talk to.
And that's it till I ask for another appointment".
The impersonality of clinics could be balanced by a more intimate and long-term relationship
with a GP or "family doctor", however GPs received the harshest criticism from people living
with dystonia (c.f. the "public accounts" given in chapter 1) who endorsed their
characterisation by hospital doctors as "superficial"!", Derek's GP appears egotistical,
authoritarian, and reluctant to accept that Derek wasn't 'just wasting his time" with
"insignificant" problems. On one occasion he had a severe knee infection, caused by crawling
around with bare legs when he wasn't able to walk; "it was infected and I knew it but he
thought I was just wasting his time [... ] as he looked at it I could see his face fall, he
prescribed 2g of antibiotic a day, anti-inflammatories, stuff like that. Then I made the mistake
of saying to him 'how will quickly should these begin to work?' and he started shouting 'I
don't know' and quoting things from the Bible [... ] I thought 'he's nuts"'. Less dramatically,
Henry recounts how his GP "convinced me there was nothing wrong" although "deep down I
knew that there was" and at one stage even syringed his ears in case the reason for his neck
twisting was that he was going deaf in one ear and turning his head to compensate for it.
GPs' low status may come from their symbolic role as the bridge between "pure" and "folk"
medicine, or the fact that they work primarily with women, children and the elderly. This has
enabled them to extend the "clinical gaze" into the personal, reducing the person's ability to
control its penetration. For example, the "patient-centred" techniques advocated in the 1970s
(arguably the forerunners of QOL measurement) were a way of accessing information that
would not otherwise have been available, particularly as the social worlds of doctors and
196Thistension is reflected in consultants' reluctance to release patients back to their GP and the brevity ofGPs'
letters of referral and follow-up [Somerset et al 1999]. Many GPs complain that their patients will not accept a
diagnosis without "the laying on of hands by a consultant"!
patients became more separate. However, as with QOL 'seeing through the patient's eyes'
actually meant "adopting a new official language, which sought professionally to redefine
what it was that patients were supposed to be seeing" [Gothill and Armstrong 1999].
Understandings of the doctor-patient relationship were enriched by the surprising results of a
recent study that found the greatest degree of paternalism among newly qualified doctors as
they didn't have sufficient confidence to debate treatment options'" [Falkum and Forde
2000]. Their reluctance to share information justified the power imbalance by sustaining the
"competence gap" between doctor and patient [Maseide 1991] I98. Attempts to sustain this gap
have not escaped the critical notice of people living with dystonia; Bea recalled "the word
'dystonia' has never been spoken to me by anyone in the medical profession". The first time
she heard it was from another patient who also told her about the Dystonia Society. Similarly,
David thought for twenty years he had 'non-essential tremor' ("the doctor who diagnosed it
said just that, then added, as an afterthought 'it's not life threatening''') until he was offered
injections of Botulinum toxin, "but still with no mention of dystonia".
Although people resented not being given information about their condition, many preferred
to delegate responsibility for their health or pursue both "consumerist" and "passive"
strategies [Maseide 1991; Lupton 1997]. For this reason Lupton questions the applicability of
consumerist models)99 in health care as the patient-consumer often has insufficient
information and their "consumer rationality" may be impaired by their condition. There is a
link between QOL and consumerist discourses as the latter encourages people to think in
terms of rights and entitlements, for example, the right to a treatment that claims to enhance
QOL. The "right to QOL" has been used to challenge the rationing of treatments under the
European Human Rights act, and was cited in the Alzheimer's and motor neurone disease
societies' submissions to NICE (partly because the presumed poor QOL of people with motor
neurone disease had been used as an ethical justification for withholding treatment).
Surprisingly, this discursive shift can have a positive effect on the therapeutic alliance if
doctors see patients as a valuable resource or ally in their "field of struggle". For example,
patients can support demands for independent prescribing, as happened in examples from the
Alzheimer's disease society [2000:38] and the Neurological Alliance conference in chapter 6.
197Withthis notable exception, the three attitudes to patient care identified by the study (paternalistic,
autonomistic, and deliberative) were distributed according to age, gender and specialism [ibid].
1985omeargue that it is necessary because the doctor needs to balance the needs of the individual and the
community and ensure their behaviour is institutionally defendable [ibid; Parson 1972].
199Assuming health care can be treated as a commodity, a rational choice model may not be appropriate as all
consuming takes place at subconscious and unconscious levels and involves emotional investment.
Medical abuses of power are challenged through "atrocity stories", which also establish the
author's moral adequacy [Baruch 1981; Stimson and Webb 1975]. Their ''thick description"
contrasts richly with sociological studies that focus on disputes resulting in formal complaints
and ignore their emotional impact [Annandale and Hunt 1998]. For example, Derek recounts
his humiliation by a sadistic junior doctor as an 8-year-old child; "Ihad to strip off in front of
the students, which had no purpose whatsoever [and] was forced to walk the length of the
ward naked". This left such a powerful impression that "I actually swore that one day I'd
come back and blow up the hospital and all the doctors in it and Iwould get my revenge",
although he is careful to emphasise that "I wasn't the kind of kid who had violent fantasies,
far from it, and yet this was the effect the treatment had on me".
Having explored the factors within the field of medicine that influence medical encounters, I
will now look more widely to the contemporary preoccupation with surveillance and risk
management (expressed through medicalisation and bureaucratisation) and the reaction to this
in the form of doubt and scepticism. The emergence of what Foucault called the "clinical
gaze" at the end of the eighteenth century should be seen as part of a ''panoptic system of
surveillance" (incorporating schools, asylums and prisons) to create a labour force of "docile
bodies" [1994]. By the twentieth century, medical institutions were less important as the gaze
had been internalised and controlled behaviour [Armstrong 1984] and the focus of medicine
had moved to the community [Armstrong 1995.]. For example, people with diabetes are
encouraged to cultivate an "ideal self' whose techniques of self-care mimic the capitalist
logic that links self-discipline, productivity and health200 [Ferzacca 2000]. Similarly, North
American patients at a pain clinic are made responsible for "eliminat[ing] 'deviant
behaviours'" and adopting "Anglo-American middleclass values related to the importance of
'working on a problem', taking responsibility for one's actions and problems, and remaining
stoic and non expressive in the face of pain" [Bates et aI1997]. The gaze has even been
turned on doctors through techniques like "encounter groups" [Balint 1968] that encourage
them to express emotion, but exclude feelings that prevent them from being rational and
altruistic, threatening the integrity of their personalities.
"Surveillance medicine" [Armstrong 1995] maybe an example of the "medicalisation" of
contemporary life [Freidson 1970; Zola 1972] as it replaces the binary separation of health
and illness with a classification of bodies on a continuum that enables healthy and sick people
200The treatment attempts to generate a "habitus" [Bourdieu 1977, 19921 that mimics the rhytluns of capitalist
production (for example, eating three meals a day).
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to be studied simultaneously':". But it could also be related to the concept of "risk" which
forms the basis of many analyses of modernitl02 as the "symptoms" and "signs" focused on
by the predecessors to surveillance medicine have been replaced by "risk factors" inhabiting
extra-corporeal spaces like lifestyles. Contemporary theories about risk suggest an alternative
to the concept of "medicalisation", which has been comprehensively critiqued'" as they
suggest that people have become more sceptical about the expert systems on which they
increasingly depend [Elston 1991; Lowenberg and Davis 1994]. This was illustrated by
another of Derek's anecdotes about being offered deep brain stimulation by his doctor; "he
said it gets rid of 90% of symptoms and is particularly good for children. I then asked what
happens with people who have had the condition longer. He appeared not to understand and
turned to me and said, 'what do you mean?' [Derek imitates an imperious drawl]. I had to
repeat the thing and after a couple of attempts he admitted that for adults the success rate goes
down to 50%".
Doubt has become characteristic of high modernity through the pluralisation of knowledge
claims and systems of expertise. Trust needs to be "won" and "retained" ("active trust") in a
context of "lay reskilling" and the adoption of "life-political agendas" [Giddens 1991]. The
Internet, patient support organisations and the media have increased the flow of information
and shaped its reception by playing a "mystificatory" and "dernystificatory" role [Karpf
1988; Fox 2001]. They have helped dissolve boundaries between orthodox and
complementary medicine, and provide space for people to share experiences and compare
treatments [Hardey 1999]. But scepticism is not a new phenomenon as medicalisation did not
affect everyone in the same way. For example, older working-class people who could not
form a "biomedical alliance" with their doctors by "playing the authority game" (playing the
role of "ideal patient" in the ritual of the consultation) were more likely to be sceptical and
oppositional [Cornwell 1984; Balshem 1991]. Paradoxically, disillusionment with medicine
is accompanied by an increasing dependence on it to solve social problems [Lupton 1997].
Although the growth of conditions like multiple personality disorder is said to demonstrate a
decline in the authority of doctors'?', the "fringe of physician advocates" who promote them
have considerable power [Hacking 1995; Greenhalgh 2001]. Similarly, the popularity of
complementary therapies has not decreased dependence on biomedicine [Cant and Sharma
1998] and may support it by expanding the pathological sphere and encouraging people to
20lFor example, the WHO's International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (see chapter 9).
202Beck [1992]; Giddens [1991] ("manufactured uncertainty").
203Foxdescribed it as "overdrawn" [1977] and Williams and Calnan attributed it to "empire building" by
medical sociologists [1996].
204From a time when the "ritual of the consultation was therapeutic in itself' [Shorter 1995].
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accept their diagnoses [Williams and Calnan 1996]. There may not even be that much
difference between the two since some complementary therapies also overstate individual
contribution to illness (ignoring structural causes), focus on treatment, perpetuate the mind-
body dualism [Sontag 1988; Greenhalgh 2001], and lose their distinctiveness when they are
delivered in a busy NHS clinic [Bendelow and Williams 1996].
Conclusion
In this chapter I have looked at the way medical training attempts to produce "socially neutral
physicians", and linked this to the turning of patients into "typified actors" by making their
problems "doable" and encouraging them to become "ideal patients". I also examined how
processes of classification (which have a moral and allocative role) are used in hospitals to
manage medical work. I explore these further in section 3 on quality of life, which supports
my contention that we are not experiencing the medicalisation but the "bureaucratisation" of
human existence, using sickness and health as its entry point. To combat any determinism I
have used the experiences of Derek to show how people become real "expert patients" as they
strategise and play "the game" to get what they want from medical encounters and protect
themselves from "bureaucratic indifference" (far more common than abuses of power).
Paradoxically, the voice of medicine can be a useful tool in this (for example, Kleinman and
Kleinman describe the way patients have shifted from a language of caring to one of
efficiency and cost to remain audible to their doctors [1996]) and in the following chapters I
will investigate whether QOL can be used in the same way. I have also tried to deconstruct
the homogenised picture of doctors presented in the accounts from people living with
dystonia; for example, by looking at the way different positions and specialities provide
access to different voices of medicine. Ironically, the dissatisfaction with scientific medicine
expressed by people living with dystonia is shared by doctors like Cassell who recognise that
dependence on technology may undermine doctors' claims to particular expertise rather than
support them.
In the first chapter of this section I have looked at individual encounters with medical and
social bureaucracy; in the next two I look at group encounters, and their mediation by the
Dystonia Society and other organisations that claim to speak with the "patient's voice".
o
Chapter 5: Professional or Bureaucratic?: The dilemma of
the Dystonia Society
The Dystonia Society is fractured by fundamental tensions - firstly, it knows there is no
common experience of dystonia but needs to create one so that it can gain strength through
numbers. Secondly, its symbiotic relationship with doctors stops it working effectively for its
members but the only thing that holds its membership together is a label given by the medical
profession. Thirdly, it wants to simultaneously represent dystonia as a viable way oflife and a
disabling condition that deserves compensation. Finally, it feels the need to professionalise in
order to work (and compete) with other voluntary organisations, while recognising that the
consequent increase in bureaucracy distances it from its members. At the same time concepts
like "empowerment", "regionalisation" and "expert patient" are appearing in its policy
documents (as in the NHS's) and it is using the discourse of marketing to strengthen its
relationship with the private sector.
This chapter is the story of the Society's attempt to work out what its purpose is and whom it
represents. It is drawn from a year's fieldwork in the Society's central office, embedded in a
much longer relationship. In this chapter, I outline the history of the Society and explore its
relationship with local branches and members using ethnography from the branch organisers'
conference and the membership survey. I describe the culture of the central office and the
way the "professional" and voluntary management structures interact. Finally, I look at its
future as it moves towards regionalisation.
The history of the Society exemplifies many of the changes in the health and voluntary
sectors during the past two decades. Formed as a "self-help Charity" in 1982, it then became
a "medical charity" (under the influence of its influential medical advisory panel), underwent
professionalisation, and is now reinventing itself as a "self-help group ,,205 and using the
Internet to engage directly with its members=". The Society's original focus was
blepharospasm (using the template of the Benign Essential Blepharospasm Foundation in the
USA) but Professor Munday207 persuaded the founders to include all dystonias, more because
of the small number of people living with dystonia than any similarities in experience. Goldie
Benjamin (the wife of one of the founders) recalls the Society's first meeting, which was
205Hevey describes the difference in approach between conservative and top-down medical charities and more
radical grass-roots organisations [1992].
206A recent survey of UK neurological patient support organisations found that 71 '% had a website and also used
the net for research, advertising, fundraising, and hosting discussion forums [Fox 2001].
207A prominent specialist in movement disorders who introduced the founders.
chaired by "Lord Young of Dartington" (greatly enhancing its prestige, in her view) in the
"now famous 'front parlour'" of another of the founders. She decided not to attend because
she felt "sufferers might be embarrassed by the presence of strangers who were not similarly
afflicted" (my italics), but noted that when her husband returned "he positively bubbled with
enthusiasm" and was "greatly encouraged" by meeting others with focal dystonia who
wanted "to build a self-help Charity and call it THE DYSTONIA SOCIETY" [the Society
newsletter 1993]. This was facilitated by a donation of £500 from the Parkinson's Disease
Society (solicited by Professor Munday), which enabled them to form a management
committee and register as a charity. To establish their credibility, they held a public meeting
in the House of Lords with Professor Munday as the main speaker, which "was attended by
many eminent medical people" [ibid]. They also received support from the North American
Dystonia Medical Research Foundation who funded their first mailing to neurologists,
psychiatrists and ophthalmologists in the UK208• Raising medical awareness of dystonia
increased the rate of diagnosis, which also increased the membership and profile of the
society.
During the first four years many of the founder members were replaced by members elected
at the annual general meetings, but the Society still lacked an administrative base so they
"borrowed" a manager from an insurance company for one year209. She developed local
branches, organised a "travelling publicity stand" at shopping centres, produced literature,
coordinated approaches to the media, and rented the Society'S first office. After her
departure, the Society decided to appoint a full-time director (on the advice of the medical
panel) who "tirelessly travelled all over the country, meeting members, consolidating existing
groups, encouraging new groups, organising speakers and fundraising far and wide" [ibid].
Funding medical research was a priority because members still believed that a cure would be
found and the Society needed to reward the doctors who had supported it and attract new
medical supporters.
Ten years later, the first director was replaced by a "charity professional" who had not
previously worked on health or disability. He outlined his priorities for the Society in
their newsletter [1993]: "building awareness, not least within the medical profession,
improving information support and welfare services which the Society can offer, and
stimulating and funding more research into dystonia, so that more effective treatments - and a
208Thefact that two of the founders had Blepharospasm clearly influenced their choice of specialist.
209Shewas allocated space in Harringay council's Social Services offices - perhaps an early sign of the
importance of the "administrative model" of support [Oliver 1996].
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possible cure - can be found". These continue, although finding a cure has been downplayed,
except in appeals to the public'!" and the Society spends more time fending off applications
for research funding than "stimulating" them. But his omissions may be more significant than
his inclusions: support to people living with dystonia is placed within a welfare model'!",
there is no mention of moving towards sustainability by developing branches or branch
officers, and the discrimination experienced by people living with dystonia is attributed to
lack of information.
Only one of the original founders remains as a contrary voice on what is now called the
"Management Committee of Trustees" indicating its distance fr0111the professional executive.
This distance is reflected in the fact that the staff do not have dystonia while trustees and
volunteers generally do. Although one of the Society's goals is to increase the employment of
people living with dystonia, when they have applied for posts staff members have expressed
doubt as to whether they could cope physically or present a "professional" image212• This
attitude extends to trustees, for example, the request from the Yorkshire-based Treasurer to
standardise the financial software (enabling work to be carried out bye-mail rather than
through gruellingjoumeys to London) was described as "making trouble". While staff
complained that members did not understand their work or appreciate the limits to resources,
they were often dismissive of the work of'branchesi':'. In the next section I shift into the first
person to more fully evoke the branch organisers' conference, which illustrates the ongoing
tensions between the Society's ambitions and resources, and the rhetoric of empowerment
and reality of control.
"We're talking to ourselves here" (but who are "we"?)
The conference took place over a weekend at a York hotel that had recently started providing
conference facilities and only had a vague idea of what was required. The main room was set
out for 40 delegates but there were nearly 70 so the conference started slowly while the
organisers negotiated another 30 chairs and attempted to fit them in. Would-be speakers had
to struggle to the front of the room (with the staff and the majority of the trustees) or shout
from their seats. The spatial segregation of staff and members became an issue214 and was
210Hence resistance to changing "fighting dystonia" to "supporting people with dystonia", even though the
warlike overtones of the former reinforce the common confusion between Estonia and Dystonia.
2IIOne of their first acts was to establish a "Welfare Service" run by a committee of neurologists and "retired
social workers".
212Forexample, they expressed surprise that the newsletter used to be edited by "dystonia sufferers" even though
in most groups it would be more surprising for it to be edited by people who weren't disabled.
2i3For example, a new staff member was told that there was "nothing going on" in London outside the Office.
214When staff spoke among themselves there were cries of "are you having a meeting on your own down there?"
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echoed in the language people used: "you're doing a good job down there"; "come up and
speak". Although delegates were often told, "this is your conference" the programme did not
offer many opportunities for active participation. There were sessions for delegate feedback,
but these were cut back when the speakers (mainly staff) overran. There were also a couple of
working groups, which were facilitated by staff. The Director and Development Officer set
the agenda at the beginning of the conference, summarised the discussions, and outlined the
plan for the future at the end.
The Development Officer introduced the conference by explaining that her focus was on our
communication strategy and how we could work together. Her role involved "representing
the society to outsiders" (members were included in this designation), "liaison and
encouragement", and "development and promotion". A senior trustee then reviewed the
history of the Society and concluded with an optimistic picture of its current position: income
of "£400,000+" per annum (actually £313,000) and "3,500 members" (2,900). He emphasised
that the Society only worked because of input from people living with dystonia; "like you, I
am a member and I have dystonia".
Delegates then discussed the need to "sell" dystonia to doctors, preferably using the tactics of
the pharmaceuticals ("we've got a product - it's a problem"). One delegate identified
dystonia's lack of "focus" as a problem in raising awareness. In comparison the brand "MS"
"immediately conveys a disability and evokes understanding and suppor!", even though most
people wouldn't recognize a person with multiple sclerosis. Another noted that 3,500
members out of a potential 38,000215 did not seem like a great success, especially as the
Dystonia Medical Research Foundation has 20,000216•
The relationship between staff and branches was addressed after some trustees criticised the
Director's use of "you" and "us" as "we're talking to ourselves here". Although the Chair of
the trustees described the staffs role as "doing what you, the members, want", other
delegates felt that "branch and central activities were very separate" and should be combined.
One delegate from a strong northern branch felt there should be more communication over
fundraising, "I'm not sure why we're raising money and sending it to the central office". He
added that that lack of communication had "nearly caused a split", a potent warning after the
secession of the North East group to form a rival organisation (ADDER). The Director
apologised for this, saying the communication problems resulted from the Society's focus on
21STheSociety's estimate of the number ofpeopJe living with dystonia in the UK.
2160ne of many references to "the American way of doing things".
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research and lobbying which he believed were the members' priorities. He justified funding
welfare and research (the Dystonia Medical Research Foundation concentrates on the latter)
in terms of having a good portfolio for fundraising. He also explained that the Society wasn't
necessarily about recruiting new members. In fact, the "loss" of 500 members each year from
the database was a "good sign" as we were "giving them what they want". Instead, the
Society aimed to "help people understand their condition, obtain the best treatment, and build
awareness of dystonia", which did not require an ongoing membership'!". He felt that
supporting people living with dystonia involved acknowledging that many people want to
deal with dystonia in isolation and "don't want to meet other people who look as bad as they
feel,,218.Not only do "some individuals need more support than others" (diverting the
Society's resources from the more glamorous activities of "research and lobbying"), but also
"it is difficult to see where support for dystonia ends and becomes support for individuals
with complex problems".
The Director described the "ideal" person living with dystonia as "someone who can support
and help others", which seemed a heavy burden for people who may only just be managing
their own condition. However, it was difficult to encourage people who have "gone through
the system" to remain with the Society, and there was a problem of burnout for long-term
members as the management structure is "dense" and volunteer dependent. He acknowledged
that the Society needs to develop "bottom-up as well as top-down" but said it still needed
centralised business planning and fundraising.
The first working groups discussed ideas for raising awareness and money, some of which
were becoming very familiar, for example, identifying celebrities with dystonia, and getting
articles into general medical journals (which I know from experience is not easy). The staff
member who was moderating emphasised that "we want your ideas" (reiterating the
branch/central office split) but when branches discussed what they would like to do he
seemed to think that they wanted the central office to do it for them. My group felt that that
there was a limit to what could be done centrally, and that we needed to develop the
capacities of branch officials and new ways of working together. One branch that had
recently organised a "living with dystonia" day complained that the fundraiser at the central
office had not asked them who he should approach for funding, suggesting that he didn't
value "local knowledge" and connections. A delegate from the same branch added "we want
217Theannual membership fees are only £10 waged, £5 unwaged so are unlikely to be a deterrent.
2181recalled one branch organiser who found it "frightening and depressing" when people in wheelchairs came
to her meetings.
1(\/1
to use money raised locally locally. Our money just seems to disappear to the central office
and we don't know anything about it". When the fundraiser pointed out that the money had
been used for their living with dystonia day, the delegate said dismissively "oh that's the
Development Officer's thing". This suggested that while organising the days centrally and
limiting the branches' involvement to hosting them might be more efficient, it did not
generate a sense of ownership.
One delegate observed that the East and West Midlands branches covered a huge area, "they
obviously don't know their geography in the central office" and another riposted, "down
south they think that the country stops at the Watford gap". A Welsh delegate was excited
about the Society's website as "it will enable us to take ownership of our regions", but his
suggestion that branches could contribute to it directly without going through the central
office appeared to unnerve the Director. Some delegates worried that the Society's
administrative structure was turning it into "a self-perpetuating bureaucracy" and wondered
how it could be sustained. There was also a tension between the internal and external goals of
the Society, for example, confining submissions to the newsletter to the "positive and upbeat"
removes a space for the voices of people living with dystonia.
The next session explored the relationship between the central office and the branches, which,
according to the Director, involved "swapping money" to make members "feel good about
contributing to a wider unit"219 and provide "local branch success stories" for the national
donors. A Scottish delegate added supportively, "Scottish members say 'We don't want to
send our money to London, it'll all disappear then'. I tell them 'No, it's going to the Society
nationally and that's all of us'", The fundraiser then dryly observed that we weren't
addressing the difficulty of raising mone~20, "the debate is all about who spends it". The
Development Officer added, "I know the desperation but we mustn't try to run before we can
walk. It's important to get the right message". This was poorly received by the delegates who
muttered about "negativity" and "poor attitudes" at the central office.
On a few occasions the staff drew back so the delegates could direct the discussion but some
delegates appear to resent this saying "I think it's the professionals who should tell us how to
do it [fundraising]". One trustee told me, "There's an expectation at this meeting that at some
point you're going to be told what to do". But I didn't think the situation was as simple as
219TheSociety's branches contribute less than five percent of its income.
22°Themain problem is the low profile of dystonia ("it's difficult when you need to explain what dystonia is and
why people should care" [Development Officer]).
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that. What the delegates resented was the central office's apparent lack of understanding of
the situation "in the field,,221(as the staff described it). One delegate said that the central
office must have a different conception of resources since they were offering "virtual"
resources like links with other organisations, rather than "concrete" resources like stationery.
When I reviewed my notes that evening I saw a number of overlapping tensions: between the
central office and the branches, north and south, London and the rest, staff and volunteers,
and people living with dystonia and those without. These were expressed through 'jokes"
about geography, identity, and who was sitting with whom. Each group resented the other's
high expectations and lack of empathy - "they don't know what it's like to be a person living
with dystonia" versus "they don't know what it's like to manage a voluntary organisation".
The discourses of "marketing" dystonia and being "professional" seemed oppressive and may
contribute to volunteer and staff"burnout". There was also an assumption of passivity among
the membership but no recognition that not getting involved is also a choice.
In fact, the central office has little contact with the bulk of its membership=", which
undermines its claim to be the voice of people living with dystonia. Last year it decided to
survey them to find out if this was a bad sign. I drafted the survey with the Director and a PR
firm representing the pharmaceutical that was funding it. The Society wanted to get basic
demographic information and explore members' relationship with the central office and the
branches, while the PR firm wanted quotes and statistics to support their company's entry
into the Botulinum toxin market. The partnership worked fairly well, although we were
alarmed when they withdrew their offer to fund a publication from the survey as they didn't
feel that it would add anything to the marketing strategy, and they didn't appreciate our
refusal to ask members to distinguish between the two existing brands of Botulinum toxin.
The publication (The true impact of dystonia [TDS 2001]) generated a large response from
members, many questioning the motives behind the way the lives of people living with
dystonia were represented. One advised the Society not to become "drawn into the scenario
of appealing to funders or potential allies through pity", despite the "financial pressures". He
warned "statements like 'since having dystonia it is like I have given up on life' send
profound messages to non-disabled people", including "medical professionals." He also
questioned the ethics of "exploiting" the author of that statement's "genuine distress" for
"tacit fundraising purposes". The Director's disingenuous response was that it would be
221e.g.They couldn't limit calls from members to 15 minutes as they were "a lifeline for some people in need".
222Members order publications, renew memberships, register for the AGM and other events, write to the
newsletter, and occasionally write to complain or phone for advice on problems with the NHS or DHSS.
wrong for the Society to "make its own judgement on what can and cannot be published" but
this was exactly what happened in production meetings when the Society helped the PR firm
select "strong quotes" and agreed that the quotes rather than the statistics should "drive" the
publication.
The survey also addressed the role of the branches: sixty three percent of members had had
contact with their local branch but only forty six percent had attended a branch meeting.
Although fifteen percent were regular attendees only three percent wanted to be involved in
running or supporting the society. This suggested that the image of the branches as "bands of
dedicated enthusiasts competing for the opportunity to serve the cause,,223bore little
resemblance to reality and it would be a mistake to depend on them to regenerate the Society.
One of the trustees drew a more realistic picture when he observed that most of the branches
are dependent "on the efforts of two or three people", and not only has the Society never
recruited any members from the branches but "many members of local branches are not, in
fact, paid up members of the Society,,224.
Survey respondents were positive about the services offered by the central office but few had
used them225• In fact the results suggested a warm but distant relationship between the Society
and its membersi'". At the end of the survey there was a question about satisfaction with the
Society, phrased in terms of ''value for money". People could indicate their level of
satisfaction and explain why they felt like this in an inch of "free text". Interestingly, the most
critical comments came from people who describe themselves as "satisfied" or "very
satisfied". They criticised the London bias, the proportions of income spent on research and
administration, the role of pharmaceuticals ("[the publications are] always about Botulinum
toxin"; "please do not get trapped by drug companies"), the bias against alternative therapies,
the demands placed on members to raise awareness and money ("I feel you need to be
looking at a celebrity to help this"), and lack of contact from the central office ("all we get is
four newsletters a year").
Ten percent of respondents had attended the annual patient's conference. however, in many
ways this event exemplifies the criticisms noted in the first part of this chapter as it was
223Extract from an open letter to the trustees from one of the founder members (sent in 2001).
224Additionally, some branch organisers have not been diagnosed, or diagnosed with other movement disorders.
22550%had read their publications but only 19% had phoned the office. 29'% had attended an event but only
10% attended an Annual General Meeting or Patient's Conference, key events in the Society's calendar.
22°The high response rate (60%) probably reflects their age and sense of duty, as did the polite but not
particularly informative responses to the questions.
dominated by medical representations of dystonia and didn't provide a space where people's
experiences could be heard and valued. I will move back into the first person to describe the
conference, as it was the first Society event I intended and made a powerful impression on
me. The conference was held at York university and although the venue was fully accessible,
the accommodation, restaurant, bar, and meeting rooms were situated some distance from
each other and linked by an open-air walkway. The main event took place in a large lecture
hall, which increased the feeling that we were being lectured at by the people who knew
about dystonia227• The presentations were oriented to a medical audience and participants
admitted they found it difficult to relate the diagrams of neural pathways to anything that was
occurring in their body. Although the conference was glossed as an opportunity to see "our"
researchers working towards a cure, the inscription of people's knowledge about their bodies
in biomedical language had an alienating and disempowering effect. While presenters
admitted gaps in their knowledge of treatment efficacy and long-term effects, the audience
were not invited to fill these with their experiences. The conference was chaired by the
Director who filtered the questions after each presentation, often "translating" them for the
speakers. Speakers were required to identify themselves (and implicitly justify their
intervention) and I observed that the majority of questions came from other neurologists and
the Society staff.
On the first day, there were presentations on surgical treatments, Botulinum toxin, and
physiotherapy, although the latter was treated as light relief with volunteers summoned from
the audience to make tai-chi like movements with their writing hands. The two surgical
presenters (on Surgical Peripheral Denervation for cervical dystonia and Deep Brain
Stimulation for generalised dystonia) were in competition to recruit trial participants and have
their technique accepted as the future for dystonia treatment. The first speaker acknowledged
that surgery had had a bad press in the past (due to the high morbidity and mortality rates) but
said the first trial participants had shown an improvement of 88 percent using clinical
measures (e.g. angle of neck rotation). However, the measures did not show an improvement
in disability, which he attributed to "slow psychological adaptation" after "successful [sic]
surgery" as the participants continued in their "bad habits". Cervical dystonia also recurred in
many patients, which he admitted was due to poor technique in the first phase of
operations228• The results appeared less impressive when he acknowledged that 30 of the 70
227Thepresentations were videoed for sale to members and were surprisingly popular, considering the cost (£30
for the set of 4).
228lnthe second phase he had reduced surgery time from 8.5 to 2.5 hours, hospital stay from 10 to 3 days, and
reduced scarring, a warning to anyone who would be first in the queue for a new treatment.
applicants for surgery had been excluded as unsuitable. The second presenter had more
impressive statistics but a much less imposing manner. Instead of striding about the stage
declaiming his results, he appeared to be trying to hide behind his lectern. People's responses
to the two presentations suggested that the doctor's charisma is influential in treatment as
they were much more enthusiastic about the first procedure than the second, despite its
comparatively poor outcome.
This was followed by a presentation and video from the Chair and Director of the Dystonia
Medical Research Foundation. This was designed to impress - the professional video, the
prestigious partnerships (including an "industry council" of pharmaceuticals), the range of
activities - and provoked debate over coffee about whether the American model of self-help
was superior to the British. There were also presentations on the classification, brain
mechanism, and genetics of dystonia, which were pitched at undergraduate level, causing
blank faces and notably fewer questions. One presentation provoked occasional snores!
Nonetheless, participants described them as "very impressive" (apparently in inverse
proportion to their comprehensibility) and were grateful that these important people had
given up their time to talk to them229.
The conference seemed like a relic from the age of the grand medical charities (and their
royal patrons). Not surprising then that this was its final year as it was put on hold due to
shortage of money and new research findings. A new way of making contact with the
members was through "living with dystonia" days230,which appeared to put them at the
centre of the event, enabling them to meet other people living with dystonia and learn (I
assumed from them) how to manage their conditionv". I attended the North West event, but
was disappointed to see that the programme resembled the conference with speakers from
medical and social services and no space for people to share their experiences.
This was the only day organised by the branch that hosted it and they were keen to
demonstrate their organisational skills and connections+" to guests from the central office
who were treated like visiting royalty. After a town crier opened the event, there was then a
welcome speech from the chair, and acknowledgements from the Development Officer to the
male organisers (although I only saw female faces behind the desks on the day). These were
229"While most of the terminology used by the speakers sailed gently over the head of this little old lady, it
seemed to be oflittle importance beyond the fact that there are people out there who care about us and are
fighting to overcome the problems of dystonia" [Society Newsletter 1997].
230An idea imported from Diabetes UK by the Development Officer.
231Agoal of the Government's "expert patient" project to reduce the burden of chronic illnesses on the NHS.
232There were letters of support from MPs on display and one MP attending (from a marginal constituency).
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followed by presentations from a representative of the benefits agenc/33, the Society's
medical advisor, and a nurse practitioner. After lunch, the delegates attended workshops in
the Alexander and Bowen techniques and reflexology. While these may have been an attempt
to address the biomedical dominance of the Society events, they were non-compulsory and
timetabled in the "recreation slot" in the aftemoon+". I attended the workshop on Bowen
technique, expecting a truly alternative approach, but although the workshop leader said ''we
treat you" not your diagnosis, she undermined this by referring to "my neurological clients".
She was visibly irritated by frequent references to the Society's medical advisor (who was
called by his first name) and seemed to retaliate by calling him "Mr Brown", rejecting any
claim to superior expertise by virtue of his training.
The early start and intense interaction exhausted me and I felt uncomfortable with exchanges
like "this is Laura, she's our new volunteer, doing research to help people with dystonia with
our Medical Advisor". "Oh that's so good of you. We're so grateful that you're helping us,
and as a volunteer too. You don't even have dystonia!" The paean to the benefits of medical
research that followed was not halted by my attempts to explain the nature of my research
and after a few exchanges I just smiled and took credit for everything from the discovery of
the dystonia gene to deep brain stimulation.
The Society's central office
Most of my fieldwork was done at the central office, which was on the second floor of a
smart street in Clerkenwellr". Itwas not accessible to people with disabilities as there was a
step up to the ground floor entrance and no lift. The Director and Welfare Officers' offices
were on the right as you entered through two sets of heavy and narrow double doors. The
remainder of the office was open plan with two screens separating the kitchen and the tables
where the volunteers prepared mailings from the rest of the staff. Despite the Clerkenwell
location, it felt as though we were running the society from someone's front room. The
computers were unreliable and infested with viruses (second-hand from an insurance
company upgrade), the e-mail server rarely functioned, and I spent much of my fieldwork
inside the ancient photocopier.
233Herauthority was undermined by her admission that she had not dealt with any applications from people
living with dystonia.
234Tosave the workshop leaders the inconvenience of changing rooms, the participants, complete with mobility
aids, had to slowly move to the next room while new participants attempted to push their way in. This took over
twenty minutes and many would-be participants gave up and sat outside.
235TheSociety had fixed the rent before the area became gentrified but it was due for review in June 2002 and
they had been warned that it could rise by 150%.
When I began my fieldwork the staff consisted of the Director, Development Officer, Welfare
Officer, an accountant, two fundraisers and a fundraising secretary, an office administrator
and two general secretaries. The Director prepared reports for the management committees,
liased with other organisations (including pharmaceuticals), edited the newsletter, read all the
incoming mail, and closely supervised the staff. He worked from home or attended meetings
outside the office on two or three days a week. The Director had a genial and paternal manner
but found it difficult to delegate or give staff freedom to innovate, as he liked to feel in
control. Consequently he was overworked (often working at weekends or late into the night)
and felt his time was absorbed in administrative trivia236.
The Development Officer was a new post that combined at least two jobs in one. The
incumbent was responsible for raising public and medical awareness, developing branches,
and organising many of the activities for members. She was in her second professional
position, keen to use what she had learnt at her last employers (a large medical charity) and
slow to recognise the difference between the two organisations, and between how the Society
wanted to be perceived and the reality. The Development Officer became increasingly
disheartened during my fieldwork as she attempted to reconcile the expectations of the
members (people with dystonia in Coronation Street) with what she could achieve without a
specific budget, and was frequently accused of "negativity".
Fundraisers accounted for a third of the staff; there were two full-time fundraisers (one of
whom was commencing her second period of maternity leave to ribald comment from the
trustees237) and a part-time fundraising secretary who worked from home. The main
fundraiser made applications to companies, trusts, foundations, and governmental
departments. These received standard appeal letters (see below), accompanied by a poster of
a person with dystonia, and a copy of Dystonia News238•
[Dystonia] can affect the whole body or, still debilitating and painful, can be a focal
dystonia attacking one particular part of the body: the jaw, tongue and mouth, head
and neck, arms and hands, or the muscles around the eye. Dystonia in children can be
particularly cruel, generally being progressive. It can leave the child with an able
mind in a seriously disabled and contorted body, sometimes even unable to
communicate. [... ] In some cases, patient 's bodies are severely twisted and they can
236Exacerbated by the elaborate reporting formats of the different committees.
237One of the reasons the trustees gave for making the male Fundraiser's contract permanent was that he was
unlikely to become pregnant.
238A quarterly newsletter for donors that showed proud donors ceremonially handing over cheques and grateful
(and photogenic) members receiving motorised wheelchairs. Headlines from the last issue included "pioneering
surgery for brave Louise!", "charter mark recognition for the Glasgow Nurse Practitioner", and "lottery gold for
the golden mile" (successful application to the National Lottery by the Blackpool branch).
remain prisoners in their own homes, refusing to step outside to face the cruel and
inquisitive stares of others [my italics]
Supplement for charities funding children's projects:
[... ] To meet the special needs of young people, the Society developed a family
support network known as 'Young Dystonia'. [... This] is particularly helpful for
children who use the support network to share their fears, anxieties and thoughts
with others. Their friends are finding out about life, as they face the complexities of
adolescence but children with dystonia have additional concerns: 'Will I be able to
walk when I get older? 'Will I be able to go to college?' 'Will I ever get a
boyfriend/girlfriend?' 'How bad will my dystonia get?' All these are questions that
may go through a youngster's head
In 2000 the main fundraiser sent 1,022 appeals and received donations from 13.2% of the
organisations contacted. He was also responsible for individual giving, coordinating flag days
and the distribution of collection boxes, although this represents a small proportion of the
Society's total income. The Society's amateur fundraising indicates the demographic of its
organisers as its focus is the "Great British tea party,,239and it relies heavily on Masonic,
Rotary club and church events.
During my fieldwork one of my tasks was to design posters for a "symptoms awareness"
campaign, similar to one carried out by Diabetes UK, which listed a series of symptoms
beneath a picture of a urinating cherub. Dystonia proved equally difficult to represent and I
resorted to images from a medical teaching aid that showed dull eyed subjects in neutral
environments with screwed up eyes (blepharospasm) or a bent neck (cervical dystonia).
These were in the worst tradition of charity advertising as the subjects were decontextualised,
medicalised, and not engaging with the camera/viewer [Hevey 1992]240.Nonetheless, the
fundraiser described them as insufficiently graphic and sympathetic, as the subjects were
middle aged (representing the usual age of onset). He continued to use his favourite poster of
a downwards shot of a doe-eyed girl in a wheelchair, despite the fact that dystonia is
comparatively rare in children and the "girl" was now 25 years old and had recently applied
for the post of Development Officer.
There were two other posters that were occasionally used: the first showed a cheerful looking
middle-aged man with his head bent to one side by torticollis. This was considered to have
less impact as the subject "looked drunk". The second showed a series of shots of an elderly
239An example of "the tea party route to the disability issue"? [Hevey 1992].
240Hevey compares the "marketing" strategies of charities with the "branding" of commercial organisations, for
example, using a stark image of disability in black and white on posters, which acts as "the visual flagship for
the myth of the tragedy of impairment". He likens it to pornography, which also focuses on a particular body
part (breast/impairment) to provoke a response (desire/fear).
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man with generalised dystonia in a wheelchair, demonstrating the continual and compulsive
nature of his movements. This was an effective representation of a movement disorder, but
the subject was staring into space rather than engaging with the viewer and the accompanying
text (quoted below) completed the process of alienation:
[Heading]: With most forms of paralysis you can't move. With dystonia you can't
stop. [Text]: Dystonia is a purely neurological disorder that causes its victims to
constantly twist and writhe involuntarily. The results, as you can see, are distressing
in the extreme. Yet despite affecting more than one in every two thousand, dystonia
receives precious little in way of research and support. Please help us to put matters
straight by sending a donation to the Dystonia Society
[my italics]
Perhaps understandably, fundraising activities were kept separate from welfare. The Welfare
Officer handled enquiries about medical or social support, liased with other disability
organisations, organised the "young dystonia" group (targeted at parents rather than children),
and provided support to individuals. This was the most time consuming part of her job as, in
addition to enquiries from members, four or five people with complex problems would
telephone her at least twice a week to talk about what was going on in their lives. Although
the Welfare Officer attempted to restrict these calls to dystonia-related problems, every
problem could be presented in this light (for example, whether the member should take a
lodger ifit might aggravate their dystoniar'". She felt a genuine responsibility to "my"
members and would encourage me to pursue pointless crusades 011 their behalr42, believing
(possibly because she had only worked with people living with dystonia) that dystonia was
the worst thing that could happen to anyone. The Welfare Officer was also responsible for
health and safety and "office cleanliness" which she extended to taking the tea towels home
every week and washing them.
There were three female volunteers, all white, middle class, and over 65 who would not have
looked out of place collecting for a cats' home or doing the flowers for their local church.
Although they tirelessly photocopied and stuffed envelopes, their main task was managing
the complex drinks rota that provided specified drinks and biscuits (e.g. "morning: white
coffee, afternoon: tea, two sugars") to every staff member at 8.30, 10.30, 1.00 and 3.30.
While it was possible to make yourself a drink when you wanted one, this was strongly
discouraged for reasons of efficiency! The volunteers' time was treated as though it had no
241Hersecretiveness about what she actually did may be due to an awareness that this would not be regarded as a
productive use of her time. For example, her reports listed "meetings attended" but gave no sense of their length
or importance - one was "meeting with Laura Camfield" which I recall as a chat over a cup of tea.
242Forexample, requesting a refund of travel expenses from a London hospital for a wealthy Scottish couple.
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financial value and they were frequently given tasks that were unnecessary or could be
performed more efficiently another way.
The office opening hours were from 8.30 to 4.30243,but the fundraiser and Development
Officer had negotiated a later start time and were rarely in the office before the Director's
arrival at 10.45. This caused resentment among the other staff44 as they were also allowed to
work more flexibly and paid considerably more. The new professional posts were part of the
Society's attempt to align itself with larger neurological charities, but this backfired because
the incumbents exposed the Society's ways of working to uncomfortable scrutiny. For
example, they both came from charities with a large administrative infrastructure and were
not used to writing their own press releases or using a photocopier. The divide between old
and new was also spatial as the fundraiser, accountant, and Development Officer were located
in the left hand comer of the office (enabling them to chat together and make subversive
comments sotto voce), while the Welfare Officer and Director were in separate rooms on the
right hand side. The Welfare Officer and Director's secretary was situated between the two
and complained bitterly that he found the "perpetual chatter" distractingi'". The other
secretary appeared to enjoy the office banter (despite its slightly sexist nature246) and said she
would otherwise have found working in an office of older people depressing. She wasn't
happy in her job, which was repetitive and poorly paid and left without warning halfway
through my fieldwork.
The Society's day began at 8.30 when the office administrator checked the answer phone,
made the first round of drinks, and collected the post. All post was opened (even if marked
"private and confidential") and although you would be told when mail had arrived for you,
you could not collect it until it had been read by the Director who would mark on the
correspondence who it should be circulated t0247.The strategy for circulation appeared to be
more about creating a "paper trail" than imparting information since many interesting letters
that were only addressed to the Director were never circulated on the grounds of "sensitivity".
Only the Director could throw incoming mail away, even if it was obviously junk mail. The
Society had e-mail but this was rarely used as the server was often down and staff rarely
243Designed for the convenience of the Welfare Officer and administrator (who were the longest serving staff
members and had recently married) rather than the members.
244Concealed behind a discourse of health and safety and security: keeping regular hours was "healthier".
245Hiseventual resignation (and breakdown) was partially attributed to a stressful working environment.
24bTheDirector once compared me favourably to the Development Officer because "Laura's got a nice figure
but you couldn't say she was skinny. There's plenty of meat on those bones".
247Themain problem with the system (designed so the Director could control the information flow in the office)
was that the Director was not in every day so letters needing immediate action were often delayed.
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checked their accounts. The trustees debated having a "mail-to" facility from the Society's
website but the Director was convinced that we would be "flooded" with enquiries as the
discipline of writing a letter and purchasing a stamp deterred less serious correspondents.
Memos (copied to the whole office) were the usual form of communication, even where a
less formal approach would have been preferable=". In other respects, the office was very
friendly, for example, people brought in food to share after holidays and cards were bought
from petty cash to say thank you and mark significant events. But although I appreciated the
warmth of my welcome as an "unpaid staff member" (a subtle yet important difference from
a volunteer), I found the family atmosphere of the office oppressive and felt the emphasis on
preserving good relations stifled debate249•
The volunteers and administrative staff answered the phone and logged all calls and the
action taken in a red notebook, later adding the information to the member's record.
Maintaining the membership database was time consuming, as information was stored in a
DOS-based application called "Logiscript" that the Director had brought with him from his
previous position. Despite my computer literacy I failed to master it and was irritated by its
incompatibility with external systems=". For example, information for the auditors had to be
surreptitiously retyped into an Excel spreadsheet as it would otherwise have required eight
sheets of A4 paper, sellotaped together. The "computer software issue" acquired symbolic
importance during a row with the trustees in 2001 where it represented outsiders with "lofty
consultancy hats on" attempting to impose their priorities without understanding how the
society worked.
The trustees play an important role in managing the Society and provide a tangible link to its
origins as a self-help group. They are elected at the annual general meeting but voting is a
formality as there is never more than one applicant per positionr". Currently there are ten
men and three women, 11 of whom regularly attend the quarterly meetings. The trustees
appoint a Chair, Vice-Chair, Treasurer and Secretary and elect two or three trustees to join
them on the "Finance and General Purposes" committee that administers and manages the
Society. The Director sets the agenda for trustees' meetings and takes minutes, which enables
him to retrospectively shape the meeting and present his perspective in a studiedly neutral
2481made a off-the-cuff remark in a tele-conference about the "hair raising" language used in fundraising letters
to describe the experience of people living with dystonia and received a formal memo rebuking me.
249Expressions of discontent, particularly from female staff, were interpreted as "depression" or "problems at
home" and the person was invited into the Welfare Officer's office for a "little chat".
250Porexample, it wasn't possible to e-mail the copious meeting papers to the trustees as attachments.
251Themanifestos give their marital status, number of children, profession, and previous "good works".
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manner252• There are three sub-committees, each containing five to six trustees and a member
of staff ("Staff and Management Structure", "Welfare", and "Research") and two working
groups ("Awareness" and "Regional Development"). Each of the six groups meet at least
quarterly, which imposes a considerable burden on the 11 active trustees, all of whom have
dystonia or support a partner with the condition (three also run local branches).
The quarterly trustees meetings were the main opportunity for staff to share concerns with the
trustees who rarely came to the office uninvited. Having a "good geographical spread" of
trustees also meant that most lived too far away to see each other outside meetings. The
female trustees were younger and less conservative than the men. They were all still working
(in health or social care) and aware of issues like equal opportunities and inclusive
language253• One female trustee wanted to introduce the others to the social model of
disability but strangely her presentation was always pushed to the next meeting. The female
trustees sat together at the trustees meeting and supported each other, but were less vocal in
subcommittee meetings where they were usually the only women.
I felt equally conspicuous (particularly after I had been introduced as a "medical expert") and
for the first few meetings was treated like the new in-law who can provide a fresh perspective
on family quarrels254• I attended a number of meetings to present items that I was working on
and (like most of the staff) found them a bit of a chore but recognised their importance. I
didn't agree that the trustees "disappeared" between meetings but did think their expectations
were unrealistically high. Purely by chance I was present at a pivotal meeting in March (or
"March 17th" as it has been grandiosely named) and record my impressions below.
Itwas my first trustees meeting after a serious accident in Autumn 2000 and I worried that I
would become tired or uncomfortable if! sat for a long period of time. Bizarrely (considering
I would be among other people with limiting conditions) I also worried about appearing
awkward because I had just come off crutches. I had arranged to arrive 40 minutes late to
make it a shorter day but was surprised to see that the meeting had already dispersed. Many
of the staff had disappeared (including the Director) and the trustees were milling round in an
agitated way. I checked my agenda nervously. All I should have missed was the Chair's
252At "March 17th" (described later in the chapter) they were redrafted three times before they were agreed.
253Thiswas a running joke among some of the male trustees who pretended not to understand why "girl" was
offensive and refused to call the male Chairman "Chair" ("He's not a piece of furniture").
2541was asked my opinion on the seating arrangements at the branch organisers' conference and cautiously said
that although there were divides, I didn't think the spatial one was important. This fuelled an argument about
whether the staff should have sat together on the first night because of a shortage of seating.
reconfirmation for another term after an unsuccessful challenge from a trustee who ran a
large branch in the North. I took my place as the others filtered back into the room, sure that I
would find out the reason for the interruption when we broke for lunch.
We slowly progressed through the agenda, giving information and postponing the majority of
items for discussion at some future date. There was a brief skirmish between the trustee who
stood as Chair and the fundraiser about whether a letter had been sent to acknowledge a
masonic donation of£1,500 that had been raised by his branch. The Director intervened to
support the fundraiser and the issue suddenly became the way in which the trustee asked the
question, and whether it was the Director's role to correct people's manners. We moved
swiftly on to regional fundraising while the two combatants were held in check by their
neighbours. Even this had the potential for conflict as two trustees questioned the central
office's use of funds restricted to their geographical area to fund the branch organisers'
conference. They asked why branches weren't told that this money was available and given
the chance to spend it on their own projects; "shouldn't branches be driving this?" The
Director assured them that branches were given a year to come up with a "feasible" project255
and only if they couldn't would the money be put into the general fund. Another observed
that while branches had to inform the central office of any fundraising they were undertaking
(and often ask permission), the reverse did not apply so regional and national fundraisers
continually trod on each other's toes.
The next item was the financial report, an eight-page document that could only be read with a
magnifying glass and great patience. The Treasurer described the current format as "largely
worthless" as once "restricted funds,,256were removed from the report, the Society's income
was only £257,708, against an anticipated £352,167. The Director felt he was being accused
of deceiving the committee and retaliated strongly. The issue of local versus central control
surfaced again after the Welfare Officer's presentation when some trustees said requests for
welfare grants should be made directly to the local branch who knew the member and their
needs rather than through the central office. Papers on "activity priories" and "regional
development" were discussed and it was agreed that a "Branch and Regional Development
working party" should be formed to discuss the issue of control in more detail257•
2551racked my brains to think of an occasion when a branch had proposed a project.
256Money that can only be used for research or specific projects.
257This is a common way of smothering a controversy and I confess I didn't expect to hear any more, but the
report was to shape the future of the society (examined in the section on regionalisation).
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The atmosphere remained tense as trustees discussed the Society's relationship with its
members. Some felt people living with dystonia weren't interested in "the medical side" as
their main problem was "social phobia". They argued that the Society needed to help people
empower themselves as it wasn't in the doctors' interests to do so. The concept of
empowerment is a slippery one (as I explore later); firstly because the point of empowerment
is that you can't do it for someone else. Secondly, because although the Society would like
people to be empowered to fundraise and run local branches, they don't want them to
campaign politically, alienate medical or pharmaceutical supporters, or argue with the central
office.
We then looked at how staff used their time; an item tabled by trustees that was resented by
staff who argued that writing reports about how little time they had was not a productive use
ofit258 (a common complaint of the audited). The reports did not support the Society's claim
to efficiency as they created a surreally trivial picture of its activities ("even after some weeks
no-one had been found who could put up a blind in [the Welfare Officer's] office, and trying
to resolve this issue had been very time consuming"). The action taken by the meeting was
naturally the reconstitution of another committee (the "Staff and Management Structure Sub-
Committee") to examine this in more detail.
As the meeting was about to conclude, the trustee who had challenged the Director earlier
asked whether the Section 64 application to the Department of Health had been circulated to
trustees. The Director replied that it hadn't but the trustee remembered being told that it had.
My notes give no sense of the drama of this moment. It was as though we were on the factory
floor watching the northern union rep confront the southern supervisor. In an angry voice the
trustee told him "I can't believe a word you say" and stormed out of the room. The Director
responded heatedly ("Never in my career have I been accused of being a liar [...J") and in a
later letter accused him of a "premeditated attack" in "conspiracy" with the Treasurer ("the
two individuals could be seen smiling broadly and plainly enjoying their 'triumph' during the
lunch break"). In the same letter he expressed his belief that trustees did not acknowledge the
stress on the staff; "do you really understand how much we are being called on to do each day
dealing with [my italics] and helping people with dystonia?" He also accused the Treasurer of
"adopting the role of a lofty consultant, imposing on us a culture which is alien to the Society
and demonstrating his own inability to recognise and work within the culture, which we have
258Theprofessional staff already submitted quarterly reports to the trustees, kept diaries, and filled out weekly
time sheets for the annual report to the Charity Commission.
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adopted and cherish". This meeting contributed to the Director and Chair's resignations and a
move towards regionalisation later that year259.
Debating regionalisation
Regionalisation was first discussed in the mid 1990s when the Glasgow nurse practitioner
was made a regional coordinator to bring together the geographically dispersed Scottish
groups after the formation of ADDER26o. The lack of regional organisation (and in some
areas local branches) contributed to the "generally apathetic attitude" among members
towards the Society's activities ["A blueprint for regional development" January 2001]. Local
activists created a regional structure for Eastern England to "bring the Society closer to its
members" and after a successful launch prepared a proposal for the whole of England, which
was submitted for Section 64 funding'?'. I describe the proposal below as an example of the
Society's attempt to reinvent itself using discourses of participation and empowerment.
The proposal was entitled "Independent living with dystonia" and aimed to fit with the
Department of Health priorities of "more information for patients" and "independent
living/self-management of illness". The four regional coordinators would be responsible for
raising general and medical awareness, increasing diagnosis rates, and creating "greater
independence of patients through understanding, involvement and empowerment". This
would be achieved through "improved dialogue and coordination of resources", including
liaison with GPs, social care agencies, local branches, and members. According to the
proposal "access to a local resource" providing "information and support" would "empower
people with dystonia and their carers" as "greater knowledge of their condition" would enable
them to "manage their dystonia and its impact on their lives, enabling them to live more
independently". Local volunteers would be involved in this, "facilitating the process of self-
help and voluntary involvement".
The proposal uses "patient" and "person with dystonia" interchangeably and seems linked to
medical priorities (for example, increasing diagnosis rates and improving the quality of
medical information). Having a regional coordinator who is also a nurse practitioner and part-
funded by her health authority is not seen as a problem, as the priorities of the two roles are
assumed to be the same. "Self-help or self-management" and "independence" are used
259As did the exclusion of all staff from subsequent trustees' meetings.
26°Itwas recently suggested that the organisations share functions with ADDER providing local support and the
Society information, education, and literature, but this was rejected as ADDER wanted to work nationally and
fundraise and the Society were reluctant to relinquish their few members in the North East.
26lUnsuccessfully, though it was finally funded in Apri12002, along with a similar one for Wales.
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frequently but never defined. For example, the introduction "encourages" people to "improve
their quality oflife by "self-management of their own condition" and "developing a more
independent way oflife". It also discusses "empowering volunteers" to "giv[e] better support
to people with dystonia. I asked myself what does it mean to "self-manage" your condition
when your neurologist is the gatekeeper to services? Would the Society be campaigning to
change the paternalistic attitudes of some neurologists and encourage them to value the
knowledge of people with dystonia? People's options are also constrained by NHS resources;
I might want more frequent Botulinum toxin injections, but ifmy health authority only funds
them once every four months, then that's what I will get. Similarly, what is a more
"independent way oflife"? It seemed to me that most people living with dystonia are
physically independent, and if this wasn't the case it was due to their age or other conditions.
Perhaps the Society meant financial independence, but how would they enable this? By
targeting prejudiced employers? Perhaps in this context independence just means being less
troublesome to your doctor262 or the central office staff.
I was also interested in the use of "empower". In the context of the proposal "empowering
volunteers" appeared to mean training them, but might also mean increasing productivity
through tighter management structures. I doubt that this would be experienced as
empowering. Nor do I think that voluntary work is inherently empowering, though this belief
also appears in The Expert Patient: A new approach to chronic disease management for the
zr century [Department of Health 2001]. The proposal appeared to define empowerment
~hen it listed the key indicators for evaluation, namely "ability to remain in paid
employment, to regain self-esteem, and to cope with everyday living despite a chronic
neurological condition". I thought it was significant that paid employment was the most
important indicator, even though most dystonias begin when people are close to retirement.
The focus seemed to be on the individual who had to address their "self-esteem problem"
(presumably by getting a job) rather than on social problems like discrimination (or equating
productivity with paid employment). Another contradiction was that although the project was
designed to increase regional control, the timetabling and appointment of personnel was done
centrally and it maintained "central reporting responsibilities".
262c.f. The British Medical Association's "think before you call your GP" advertising campaigns.
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The tension between regional and central control within the Society continued through an
exchange of'proposalsi'", all suggesting that strategising, fundraising, and supporting local
branches should take place on a regional level and be closely linked to the membership. The
Director was initially enthusiastic as regionalisation seemed to be a cost effective way of
reviving local branches, provided another arena for fundraising, reduced the risk of
defections, and could paradoxically increase central control by standardising local practices.
But it soon became a counter in the dispute between the Director and trustees who proposed
returning to the Society's "grassroots" by disbanding the central office and turning the
Director into a peripatetic "National Coordinator" [May 2001]. The proposal from the March
trustees' meeting suggested that the Society had become "more control orientated than is
necessary for what is a relatively small charity" and identified the following problems:
•
Professional skills and capabilities are almost entirely perceived to be in the central office
[ ... ] there seems to be little attempt to transfer skills in awareness raising, support,
fundraising, or welfare counselling to branch members
Members are not empowered by the lines of reporting which are in place. Whilst there is a
fair geographic spread of trustees there is no formal process for them to report back to the
members or bring members concerns to management meeting
Management values are very control-oriented [... and] priority is not given to
management tasks, which would empower and nurture branches, but rather to constrain
The culture of the Society has become essentially introspective in nature
•
•
•
When I first read this I felt like punching the air with excitement. The Society (or at least
some of the staff) were control orientated and didn't respect the knowledge of trustees or
branches, members had no influence on the management of the Society, the information flow
to the branches was limited, and the software was certainly antiquated. But it seemed that the
"cure" was more debilitating than the disease. Perhaps after a year in the field I too
"cherished" the Society's "unique culture". Or perhaps working in the office had made me
more sympathetic to what staff members were trying to achieve in a hostile economic
environment. I couldn't resist a smile, however, as I imagined the Director's reaction to his
revised job description, "a pro-active role involving very little office work [... ] line-managed
by the Chair of the Society". This was not the post for a senior executive in his late fifties
who was used to managing his workload without supervision.
After my fieldwork finished in August 2001, the Welfare Officer and office administrator
left264• This was ostensibly to move outside London, but they said that lack of support from
263"Ablueprint for regional development" January 2001; "Development of the Society in the North of England",
January 2001; "Activity priorities working party report" January 2001; "A policy for the regional structure of
the Society" May 2001; "Discussion Paper re: Strategy for Awareness and Fundraising" June 2001
264Herpost was covered part-time by the niece ofa trustee (or "Uncle Fred", as she ironically refers to him).
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trustees was the main factor in their decision. The Director resigned Sh0111yafterwards and
left before his notice period was completed, refusing the trustees' offer of a farewell lunch.
The Chair and one of the female trustees also resigned, but the remainder (who represent
regional interests in East Anglia, Essex, Yorkshire and Wales) were eagerly anticipating the
changes they will make, including switching all the software to MS Office. From December
2001 the Society was managed by the accountant and the fundraiser (who left in February
2002), with the help of a part time bookkeeper. Many of the central office functions were to
be taken over by the six Regional Offices that should be established during 2002/3.
Conclusion
Although the Society began as a self-help group, during the process of "professionalisation"
it became bureaucratic and lost touch with its membership, identifying itself with larger
neurological charities and focusing on its external networks. Maintaining good relationships
with neurologists, other patient support organisations and pharmaceuticals may initially have
been for the benefit of people living with dystonia, but became an end in itself and impaired
the Society's ability to represent the interests of its members.
Its construction of the ideal person living with dystonia (for example, in the Section 64
proposal) feeds into health service discourses about self-management of long-term illness and
becoming an expert patient, and into more diffuse ideas about "rights and responsibility" and
the development of "civil society". It also reflects QOL researchers attempts to create a
typified "dystonia patient" from the diverse and inchoate experiences of people living with
dystonia and express "their" perspective in a dystonia-specific QOL measure'". The
Society's representation of people living with dystonia is alienating and potentially
disempowering (possibly reflecting the discomfort of the able-bodied staff with disability)
and was one of the main causes of conflict with its membership. There is obviously a fine
balance between representing how disabling dystonia can be while not "wreak[ing] havoc
among recently diagnosed people,,266 [Duval 1984]. Ironically, the relationship of the staff
with the "body" of the organisation (characterised as unpredictable, disparate, and diverse)
mirrors the struggles of some people living with dystonia to gain control over their bodies.
265Thisprocess is described in chapter 8.
266Theeffect ofa US Multiple Sclerosis Society campaign that described it as a "crippler of young adults".
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Chapter 6: "Partnerships for progress"?
In chapters 4 and 5 I described people's encounters with medical and social bureaucracy and
the mediating role of the Dystonia Society (itself torn between pleasing its members and its
peer group of medical researchers and neurological organisations). In this chapter I set these
encounters in context by exploring relationships between pharmaceutical companies, patient
support organisations, doctors, and the government, and their mediation through the discourse
of QOL, using ethnography from national and international meetings of neurologists and
neurological patient support organisations. I treat QOL (and its related discourse on "the
patient's voice") as a "boundary object" around which diverse alliances can form. These
alliances are explored these further in the context of submissions to the National Institute of
Clinical Excellence.
The traditional model of science as the "pit of the peach" with society as its "soft flesh" has
been discarded as authors recognise that society does more than merely slow or speed up the
inexorable advance of science [Latour 1998]. Latour uses the example of the French
Association for the treatment of muscular dystrophy, a hybrid research organisation that has
funded more research on the human genome than the French government after raising £80
million in a telethon. Their headquarters "illustrates the limits of a metaphor that would
separate science from society" as it contains a "jumble" of patients, lab workers,
administrators and curious donors. This prompts Latour to ask, "Where is the science? Where
is the society? They are now entangled to the point where they cannot be separated any
longer,,267 [ibid]. He is impressed by the way people with muscular dystrophy "turned genetic
determinism (which, in many domains, is used as a way to render nature even more
deterministic) into an instrument of unexpected freedom" by using it to generate their own
science policy, a potential noted by Novas and Rose [2000]2(18. QOL measures can also be
used as an oppositional habitus despite the biomedical understandings inscribed within them.
For example, Alan's response to his social worker's refusal to request an adapted shower was
"washing yourself with a sponge in your pants - I don't call that quality of life" (chapter 3).
In the next section I take an ecological perspective on QOL and track the flow ofQOL
measures and concepts through a network of allies and social worlds. My analysis is mainly
based on "actor network theory" [Law 1982; Latour 1987]. but also looks at QOL as a
267 c.f. Studies of CJD involving a "complex web of meat. ministers, bones, proteins, virus, and beef eaters".
268c.f. Heath's study of interaction between scientists and people with Marfan's syndrome [1997].
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"boundary object" 269[Starr and Griesmer 1989] and its networks as an example of the "string
figure,,27odescribed by Haraway [in Martin 1997].
QOL measurement is an example of "interessement" where scientific entrepreneurs (QOL
researchers) recruit allies from a range oflocations (doctors, pharmaceuticals, patient support
organisations) and reinterpet their allies' concems to fit their programmatic goals (for
example, QOL data enable pharmaceuticals to differentiate similar products). They then use
their methodological authority to establish themselves as gatekeepers or "obligatory points of
passage" [Law 1982; CalIon 1986]. A second example was the use of "methods
standardisation,,271 and boundary objects during the establishment of Berkley's museum of
Zoology, which were crucial factors in its success [Star and Griesmer 1989]. Standardised
methods provided a common language for collectors and biologists, enabled amateurs to
contribute on an equal basis, and created a broad "mesh" through which objects must pass to
gain scientific recognition or money. Boundary objects were "immutable mobiles" that could
be transported over long distances, convey unchanging information, and act as "anchors and
bridges". They were not "the imposition of one world's vision on the rest" [ibid:413] but
required their users to be "marginals" as well. For example, one QOL researcher is also a
clinician, geneticist, and member of the Society'S medical advisory committee.
Although boundary objects are an important part of Actor Network Theory, it depends on
three other concepts. These are: "punctualisation" (behind each entity is a complex network
that orders other people and things and only becomes visible when the entity breaks down).
"Delegation" (entities package networks and extend them through time and space, standing in
for them in times and places remote from their origins). "Translation" (entities mutually enrol
each other by interpreting, configuring and reconfiguring each other). Actors are treated as
multi-faceted "entrepreneurs" who engage in political, social and economic activities as well
as those commonly called scientific. Knowledge, organisations and technologies are
produced by networks of human and non-human actors272. For example, the metered dose
inhaler delegates the biomedical work of controlling the dose, but doctors remain the
obligatory "passage point" for people with asthma [Prout 1996]. The device "configures the
user"[Latour 1991] as its use requires competencies that are not innate (something that is also
269Boundary objects have "different meanings in different social worlds but their structure is common enough to
more than one world to make them recognisable, a means of translation" [Star and Griesmer 1989].
270Acomplex network (like a eat's cradle) that simultaneously embodies discontinuity and connection.
271Analogous to the attempt by the developers' of the MS-specific measure described in chapter 8 to create a
"scientific" template for future measures.
272Forexample, networks built by cancer researchers to "make findings into fact" [Fujimura 1996]; the
interaction between genetic "pedigrees" and understandings of kinship [Nukaga and Cambrosio?].
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true of QOL measures [Barofsky 1996]), leading to the creation of self-help groups and
educational packages to "reprogramme" users. While users can subvert these requirements by
engaging in "anti-programmes", they can also be controlled if the device is reprogrammed to
reduce the need for human input.
Changes in the medical field, like the establishment of specialised structures to treat diseases,
often arise from social movements in other fields. For example, Pinell and Brossat studied
how the use of radiology to treat cancer in France at the beginning of the twentieth century
lead to the establishment of new medical institutions by diverse groups of actors (like the
"French-Anglo-American Cancer League" of bankers, merchants, industrialists and "society
ladies") [1988]. The institutions were expensive but "paid" for themselves as they saved
"socially valuable individuals":
[A person with cancer is] usually a fully active person [... ] a family man or woman,
an able worker, a still solid farmer, or a woman just after her menopause, etc [... ]
Obviously this social value may be greater when the cancer patient belongs to the
well-to-do classes; but in whichever he be [... he] is not a social waste
[Bergonie 1923 in Pinell and Brossat 1988]
The social cost of cancer was part of the spectre of "cancer peril" conjured up by the League
to create a sympathetic climate for their work and differentiate cancer from competing
conditions273• Utilitarian appeals are presumably less effective now or the Society would use
middle-aged "bread winners" (preferably bank managers) in their advertising rather than
children.
The image of the "string figure" (for example, the "eat's cradle") is also useful in examining
the complex international networks of health care as it simultaneously embodies discontinuity
and connection [Haraway in Martin 1997]. For Martin, it represents the anthropological ideal
of participant fieldwork embedded in the widest possible context. This enables us to trace the
connections between ideas and their "looping" trajectories, and examine heterogeneous
knots274• Her study of the immune system demonstrated that the model of the "scientific
avant-garde" was prefigured by popular ideas of the "mind-body relationship" and the effect
of the environment on the body through diet, stress, and pollutants [1994, 1997]. This
transforms our image of science by suggesting that it is participating in broader cultural
273Forexample, cancer was presented as a greater threat to young men than tuberculosis or syphilis.
274Forexample, the emphasis on ""evidence-based medicine" within the NHS brings together QOL researchers,
NHS managers, and clinicians [Faulkner 1997].
developments rather than leading them, something that is also true of the spread of QOL
discourse.
"Health Technology Assessment'<" (a large and well-funded part of the NHS Research and
Development strategy) is a good example of a string figure. The institution defines
technology as "anything that might have an observable effect on someone's life" (for
example, a questionnaire or a conversation with a health promotion specialist). Its key
features are multi-disciplinarity and a focus on cost effectiveness. However, this focus is
camouflaged by a discourse of the social implications of new technologies, in the same way
that the language of ethics conceals the implications of audit.
The elasticity ofHTA's metaphors enables uneasy partnerships to exist between
disciplines and methodologies, such as qualitative and experimental methods, and
clinical science and sociology
[Faulkner 1997]
The institution's alliances have formed around "outcome measurement" and "cost-
effectiveness". However, although it brings together the "strange bedfellows" of clinicians,
epidemiologists, health economists and sociologists, it marks out professional territory by
defining appropriate concepts, methods and agendas. Its scientific agenda focuses on
generalisability and elimination of bias, and attempts to represent "a form of aggregated
public interest". This limits opportunities for social and ethical enquiry and ensures that
"projects which do incorporate users' voices contain them within the design of the project"
[ibid]. Paradoxically, although health technology assessment arises from a distrust of
common medical techniques and authority, it draws on scientific rhetoric to legitimate itself
by using a vocabulary of experiments (randomised control trials) and instruments (QOL
measures)276. Faulkner claims that the institution has turned the NHS into a "massive lab" for
the construction of knowledge.
In the next section I look at how networks and alliances are formed in the context of my
thesis, using ethnography from the "partnerships for progress" meeting as an example of
interessement. The meeting took place at the 2001 World Congress of Neurology conference
and was organised by the European Federation for Neurological Advocacy (a campaigning
association of neurological patient support organisations). Like the Dystonia Society, the
2751t primarily reviews technologies associated with particular conditions but is also developing an inventory of
health technologies with briefings on their efficacy and cost effectiveness.
276Similarly, new QOL measures claim to replace clinical outcomes and "gold standard" measures while using
them as a source of validation (an example of "experimenters' regress" [Collins 1999]).
Federation was initiated by a doctor (the president of an association of European
neurologists) who wanted neurologists to works in partnership with patient support
organisations'{'. Although the Federation's primary objective is "improving the QOL of
people with neurological disorders", the majority of the others have clinical resource
implications, implying that improving QOL is a job for doctors. It claims it will focus on the
needs of people with neurological illness who are "not being listened to", but has already
decided to do this by addressing "equity of service" and "treatment gaps". According to the
Federation's presidenr ", patient support organisations need to work with the "powerful" (the
media, insurance and pharmaceutical companies, MEPs, doctors, and scientists) to get the
"voice of the patient" heard in the European parliament. I was intrigued by the notion of the
"voice of the patient" since I know that even within dystonia there are many contradictory
and competing voices. I also wondered whose voice would be heard in a situation where there
is a substantial imbalance of power. However, as the meeting progressed it seemed that, like
QOL, this was an "empty signifier" [Strathern 1992] that anyone could use to support their
interests.
The next speaker was the president of the European neurologists' association who apologised
for the lack of partnership between neurologists and patient support organisations in the past.
This had only occurred because they were so busy "serving" people with neurological
illnesses that they weren't able to "attend to the wider picture". Unsurprisingly, he linked
quality of care for people with neurological illnesses directly to the number of neurologists'I",
Other speakers recommended partnerships with industry, the pharmaceuticals, and the WHO,
whose new neurological Director prioritorises partnerships with patient support organisations.
A WHO neurologist even suggested partnership between psychiatry and neurology, but
comments like "schizophrenia is much too serious a disease to leave to psychiatrists" made it
clear who would be the junior partner.
The theme of partnership was taken up by a speaker from a pharmaceutical who presented the
development of new medicines as an altruistic act, a way of "giving back to the people [with
genetic disorders] who have contributed so much" by producing "niche" products rather than
277Thesplit between the association and the Federation is replicated by the International bureau for epilepsy
(medical care and science) and the Intemationalleague against epilepsy (people with epilepsy, carers and non-
medical professionals). Similar alliances have been formed in the UK, e.g. the Association of British
Neurologists with the Multiple Sclerosis Society over Beta interferon, and with the Neurological Alliance
(association of neurological patient organisations) over National Service Frameworks for neurological care.
278Alsopresident of the European Parkinson's Disease Association (the largest and richest neurological patient
support organisation).
279"TheUK has the best neurologists in Europe and patients get the worst treatment because they never see them
as there are only 300",
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"one-size-fits-all medications". He lamented the development of a schism between industry,
academia and government since the mass production of antibiotics in the 1940s, although (as
another speaker observed) this collaboration did not benefit patients as it enabled the
government to keep antibiotics secret during the Second World War to maintain its strategic
advantage.
The enthusiastic involvement ofFord and AOK insurance with the Federation was explained
firstly, by their need to appear as good "corporate citizens" ("good social values equal good
business. It really is as simple as that" [Ford]) and secondly, to manage risk within the
workforce ("to an insurance company neurology costs money, money, money" [AOK]). The
language of risk in AOK's presentation was supported by un attributed "scare" statistics280
and confident (and I suspect unsupported) assertions from the WHO. Do 80% of people in
developing countries really have "brain disorders"? Only if malnutrition has become a
neurological complaint. The parade of statistics reminded me of the president of the
Federation's description of the response of a neurologist on the panel at their press launch to
the question "what is needed to make service better?" "He immediately said '600 more
neurologists' but if anyone had asked him 'where is the evidence?' he'd have been wrong
footed".
All participants recommended European collaboration and preferably centralisation ("we
don't want everyone having to do everything"). I heard catchphrases like "international
centres of excellence" and "patient treatment without frontiers" but whether this was the best
model of care for patients was not discussedi'". There was an implicit assumption that what
was good for neurologists was good for patients. This was supported by examples like a
survey conducted by a Canadian neurologist that found while people wanted better care and
communication, they wanted these from "a balanced doctor, not a burnt out one". The
Federation was encouraged to use its power as a representative of patients to "empower,
represent, and access resources for disease". For example, by supporting people with
neurological illnesses who wanted to sue for the right to better care (as has happened in
Holland) and reviewing trial protocols to make sure they address patients' needs.
The message of the meeting seemed to be that patient support organisations have untapped
potential as they control access to people with neurological illnesses and offer legitimacy to
280Forexample, "in 30 years there will be 50% more sufferers of mental illness".
281This issue has been debated for HIV care in the UK where people living with I-lIV expressed resentment at
having to travel to London or Cambridge for optimal care.
1.,Q
projects by enabling them to claim that they include the "voice of the patients" (in its least
challenging form). However, this power could only be realised in partnership with other
organisations, particularly commercial ones, who provide the resources and marketing
expertise to sustain these "actor networks". In the next section I look at pharmaceuticals in
more detail, focusing on their marketing strategies (specifically how they use QOL), and
relationships with patient support organisations, doctors, and the govemment. These
relationships are summed up in a table in the appendix that outlines what the different
partnerships have to offer.
How pharmaceuticals use QOL
Drugs are marketed like any branded product where most of the value is contained in the
"informational envelope" surrounding the product, rather than the product itself. However,
the context of pharmaceutical marketing282 has changed since the halcyon days of the 1970s
and 80s when "physicians looked forward to the latest offerings of pharmaceutical companies
and eagerly prescribed new products [... they] paid little heed to the price of these new
innovations and purchasers [... ] paid the asking price" [Morris et al in Spilker 1996:541].
QOL data offers a clear advantage in a context of knowledgeable and sophisticated
customers, increased product competition (and need for product differentiation), price
sensitivity, (leading to lower introductory product prices and smaller price increases),
competition among physicians (making them responsive to claims that pharmaceuticals
increase patient satisfaction)283, and higher research and development costs. QOL data can
also be used to support regulatory or formulary applications=", or for marketing. It is
particularly useful for medicines in intense competition, "me-too" medicines285, medicines in
areas like cancer or cardiology where QOL data may speed up the regulatory process,
medicines that are applying to a regulatory body for an "expanded indication" to enable them
to be used more widely, and palliative medicines [Spilker and Garbus in Spilker 1996].
However, QOL data is not regarded as inherently valuable as studies are not recommended
282Standard practices include "mail and journal advertising, video and broadcast television advertising, and
desktop media (anatomic models, calendars, pens, notepads, etc.) [ ... ] communications intended to inform and
influence consumers and family caregivers such as print and television paid advertising, video news releases,
talk show appearances, and grants to patient support groups in areas of marketing interest to the pharmaceutical
company [and] forms of informational communication such as sponsored symposia and conferences, publication
of clinical evaluations in the peer-reviewed medical press, discussion panels, and other forms of sponsored peer-
to-peer communication" [Beckett in Spilker 1996:549].
283"The marketer [of Zofran] capitalised on the prescriber's initial interest in quality oflife by translating
demonstrated clinical effects into language that used the "quality oflife" buzzword to ref1ect benefits that might
be derived by patients" [Morris et al in Spilker 1996:545].
284Hospitals, health maintenance organisations, government programmes, and some insurance programmes have
established restricted formularies to control prescribing patterns.
285Copies of an existing product, slightly modified to evade copyright restrictions.
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for medicines with no competitors or that are not expected to make a profit. Broad QOL
claims, like claiming that a drug "improves" QOL when studies only show that the side-
effects are less disruptive, have become less acceptable to customers and regulators'f". They
now need to be substantiated with data from QOL measures, and there is a trend towards
making claims based on individual domain scores to enable subtler product positioning'V.
Examples include the hypertension drugs Hytrin (promises to maintain physical, mental and
sexual performance), Prinivil (lets patients stay active), Trandate (preserves vitality and
exercise tolerance), and Capoten (contributes to the patient's feeling of well-being).
Historically, pharmaceuticals, doctors, and patient support organisations have worked
together to create a climate where particular disorders can flourish. Healy explored how
pharmaceuticals "groomed" new conditions like "social phobia,,2x8 (dubbed "the panic
disorder of the 90s") after they were shown to respond to a previously under utilised category
of drug [1997]. "Social phobia" had the advantage that it did not respond to behavioural
therapy, was massively under-diagnosed (less than 3% of cases), and caught the imagination
of the WHO and patient support organisations who were supported by Roche pharmaceuticals
(the manufacturer of the main component). Potential patients were wooed through self-help
books, magazine articles, television programmes, and adverts for therapy. "Prescribers" were
invited to meetings in "expensive venues" to discuss trial results, sponsored seminars at the
Royal College of Psychiatrists, and symposia organised by distinguished psychiatrists.
Although grooming can be seen most clearly with new disorders, pharmaceuticals also "make
views of illness" by investing in awareness campaigns for established conditions like
dystonia. For example, a European study of the prevalence of dystonia and two surveys of
QOL in North America and Britain were funded by pharmaceuticals.
How pharmaceuticals work with patient support organisations
You have a significant power because you have access to patients and without
patients there are no drugs trials
Pharmaceuticals and patient support organisations can both benefit from partnership. For
example, direct-to-consumer advertising can stimulate people to visit the doctor to request a
therapy or a diagnosis, and "point of purchase" displays in chemists often contain a post-paid
2861n1997 Glaxo Wellcome had to apply to the US Food and Drugs Administration for permission to make an
asthma-specific QOL promotional claim for Salmeterol Xinaforte.
287Forexample, "promotional materials could be geared to emphasize cognitive functioning (e.g. a theme of
'when alertness counts' might be used) and pictures of patients in tasks requiring alertness can be shown (e.g. an
air traffic controller)" [Morris et al in Spilker 1996:546].
2881ncludespeople who would previously have been diagnosed as depressive or anxious-depressive.
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reply card offering the person a newsletter for people with the condition. However, as the
author of the Alzheimer's Disease society submission to NICE observed, their relationship is
not an equal one.
My experience of partnership with a pharmaceutical began at the Movement Disorders 2000
conference when I met with a pharmaceutical product manager who was planning the UK
launch of a new strain of Botulinum toxin. He wanted to discuss conducting a "patient
survey" of people living with dystonia (similar to one they had done for multiple sclerosis)
and producing a "living with dystonia" booklet. After looking disdainfully at the leaflets
stuck on the wall behind the European Dystonia Federation stall, he asked how much we
would need for a professional "shell" for the stall ("£3,000? That's nothing!"), and assured
me "we're here to help you do what you do better,,289.This project came to fruition a year
later when I helped the Society draft a membership survey (described in the previous
chapter), which provided information about members' use of Botulinum toxin. It also
generated quotes and statistics to support the UK product launch in May, timed to coincide
with the Society'S 2001 Dystonia Awareness week. The product manager gave us examples
of quotes used in Living with spasticity like "the pain is awful [ ... ] as if its actually in your
bones" and asked if we could pull anything similarly graphic from the membership survey.
Although the final quotes were apparently chosen to "balance positive and more 'hard-
hitting' ones", many members felt the balance had tipped towards the "tragedy" narrative of
disabilitl90 which could disempower newly diagnosed people living with dystonia.
The partnership was not a complete success for the Society because the pharmaceutical's
commercial interests dictated its terms. For example, the pharmaceutical later withdrew their
offer to fund a publication from the survey, as it would not add anything to their marketing
strategy. We also needed to make last minute corrections to Living with dystonia to reduce its
bias against other therapies, including a rival strain of Botulinum toxin. More successful was
a national and regional press campaign their PR firm conducted on the Society's behalf
(using statistics targeted to particular regions) that generated twenty or more press articles.
This was certainly an improvement on the Society's previous publicity strategies, which they
unkindly characterised as "Botulinum toxin - the deadliest poison", "shock, horror - my
doctor didn't know what it was", and "weep, weep, it took me 14 years to be diagnosed".
2891met him again while I was standing by my poster on QOL in dystonia, but the aspect of the research he
seemed most interested in was whether there had been any "adverse events" with a rival strain of Botulinum
toxin. We didn't receive a cheque for a new display stand.
290"Statements like 'since having dystonia it is like I have given up on life' send profound messages to non-
disabled people" [extract from a critical letter from a member].
1 '11
I discovered how common partnerships between patient support organisations and
pharmaceuticals were at an international meeting of dystonia societies held before the
Movement Disorders conference in Barcelona. The meeting was organised jointly by the
European Dystonia Federation and the Dystonia Medical Research Foundation and funded by
two manufacturers of Botulinum toxin and one that makes devices for deep brain stimulation.
Partnerships with pharmaceuticals were presented as part of a discourse of acting
"professionally": "we [patient support organisations] are not 'lay organisations"'. Itwas
implied that as knowledgeable actors we could pick and choose what we wanted from these
relationships: "obviously they will come in and push their product, but that's okay as long as
we know what's going on". However, despite the implication that we were participating in a
purely rational producer-consumer relationship, the pharmaceuticals were presented in a very
positive light: "Lex [the international director for one of the pharmaceuticals] is such a good
friend to all of us". All the organisations attending had received support from
pharmaceuticals, and some had also arranged corporate sponsorship'".
Representatives attended the meeting from the sponsoring companies, WE MOVE292, and
dystonia patient support organisations from Europe, North America, and Chile. The patient
support organisations gave presentations about their work, while WE MOVE attempted to
position its website (www.wemove.org) as the "portal" to dystoniai'". "Gatekeeper" is
obviously a useful position to compete for funding from and I watched them attempt to
consolidate this at a Movement Disorders meeting I attended later in the week (described
later in the chapter). The organisers told us that the themes of the meeting were "friendship,
sharing, opportunities, learning, understanding and collaboration" (or "cooperation" as one
delegate sceptically suggested). However, real partnerships were inhibited by differences of
power, resources, and philosophy between the organisations. For example, the Dystonia
Medical Research Foundation is able to offer a "total community" to its mcmbers'" and fund
$700,000 of medical research, much of which they have commissioned ("the researchers out
there would not be interested in dystonia unless we were there to support them,,2(5). The
291Forexample, the Dystonia Medical Research Foundation has secured McDonalds who, according to the
gresident, "love to be associated with something they can shine with".
92North American "umbrella group" of neurological organisations, like the Neurological Alliance in the UK.
293"When people come to the web they only look at the first ten pages so it's important that they come to us and
are linked to you".
294ltswebsite, www.dmrf.corn, contains information for people living with dystonia, doctors and researchers,
"patient referrals", legal advocacy, "planned giving", a bulletin board for people living with dystonia, "courage
awards" (instituted after they were criticised as "too scientific"), and even on-line shopping.
295This independence is undermined by their worshipful attitude towards biomedicine: the president described
her experience of one symposium as "so exciting to sit there and listen to these brilliant minds".
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Foundation was presented as a model for the other patient support organisations, for example,
the Chileans (patronisingly described as a "fledgling group") were advised to follow their
example and allow "one strong person to emerge as the leader". This ignored the experiences
of other countries where different models had been successful. For example, in Sweden
"loose" local networks worked better as, according to the head of Svensk Dystonie, "patients
are scared of high ambitions". Underlying the meeting was a power struggle between the
European Dystonia Federation and the Foundation as the latter wanted to develop a "World
Federation" of dystonia patient support organisations (run by the US) and had already
produced an enrolment form. As an anthropologist, I was particularly aware that there was
little understanding or respect for cultural differences. Itwas assumed that the North
American organisational style was not only the best but could be transferred to any country
without modification, an attitude shared by most international medical organisations.
The benefits of collaborating with pharmaceuticals appeared to be the key message of the
meeting. For example, one delegate described pharmaceuticals and patient support
organisations as "travelling on the same train to understanding the condition" and suggested
we could "use research to our common benefit". For me, this suggestion was undermined by
an example of joint research presented later in the meeting (The Dystonia Patient perspective,
a survey of 15,000 people living with dystonia [DMRF 2000]), which seemed to have been a
wasted opportunity. The main finding of the survey was a high incidence of depression
among people living with dystonia. While this may be true, the information was obtained by
asking "Have you and/or your family or friends ever been treated for depression?"
Considering the extreme generality of the question (basically "have you ever known anyone
with depression?") it is surprising that only 47% of people responded positively. The
pharmaceutical sponsoring the survey was planning to launch a new strain of Botulinum toxin
in North America when the FDA approved it2CJ6 and the findings of the survey were presented
with this in mind (e.g. "85% [of people treated with Botulinum toxin] would be willing to
consider trying a different Botulinum toxin ifit became available"). Although the president
attempted to distance herself from the survey by attributing it to an external PR company
("well they [the pharmaceutical] funded it, you know how it is"), the pharmaceutical
involved, which also manufactures antidepressants, thought it was a great success and offered
the Society funding to do a similar survey in the UK.
296Thepresident presented support organisations as their allies against the regulators: "patients are so eager to
get this drug, you will raise their hope again. What can we do to help'?"
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The message of "productive partnerships" was also coming from the pharmaceutical
representatives. One asked the delegates "how do we build on what you've already got?" and
suggested "we should empower everyone of you and our [local] rep to get together and have
face-to-face strategy sessions". He gave examples of past cooperation, including providing an
organisation with a directory of doctors so they could do a "waiting-room literature hit", and
distributing material jointly to doctors who "like to have something to give their patients [but]
they don't take manufacturers' propaganda". In the last example, the support organisation
was opening doors for the pharmaceutical. However, this works both ways: the Chilean group
was invited to accompany pharmaceutical representatives on their visits to doctors outside the
capital. The Chilean group was of considerable interest to the international director of one of
the pharmaceuticals who planned to "work on developing Latin America,,297 and needed a
"patient champion". He later said thoughtfully "There's no support group in Argentina and
yet they have 50 million people. How can there not be?" This caused one delegate to remark
"you could see the dollar signs in his eyes".
Patient support organisations can be important allies for pharmaceuticals and medical
organisations in applications to regulatory bodies like NICE. While NICE is not "patient
led,,298,patient support organisations have been moderately successful in getting their voices
heard. In the next section I look at submissions from the Motor Neurone Disease Association
and the Alzheimer's Disease Society to see how they represent people with these conditions
and what use they make ofQOL.
The impact of the submission from the Alzheimer's Disease Society in favour of Aricept (a
drug that slows the progress of Alzheimer's) [2000] can be seen by the "resonance" between
their submission and NICE's guidance [2001]. I was excited to hear the voices of people with
Alzheimer's (albeit mediated by the Alzheimer's Society) as they are a stigmatised group and
until recently were treated as though they had no history or future. The Society emphasised
that the contribution from people with Alzheimer's would not have been possible before
Aricept improved their "social function", an outcome ignored by the clinical trials, which
focused on memory. Nor could the submission have used QOL data as people with
Alzheimer's were previously thought to be unreliable witnesses. Three quarters of the people
questioned felt the drugs had helped, although this was difficult to measure as success
basically meant that the person's condition stayed the same. However, they also reported less
297An area the International Society for QOL Research was also planning to expand into.
2980ne neurologist claimed "anyone who believes that NICE is listening to the views of patients has been on
Mars too long" (Neurological Alliance meeting 2001).
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quantifiable outcomes like "new enthusiasm for life", improvements in mood and behaviour,
reduced anxiety and distress, restored confidence, maintenance of social relations, and
improved QOL for carers, and focused on "small everyday improvernents'Y'", The study's
focus on "user-defined outcomes" led to debates on the difference between anecdote and
evidence. For example, a powerful illustration of the drug's effect was a sample of
handwriting before taking the drug and three months after. Consequently, although the
submission was "peppered with quotes from people with Alzheimer's and their carers", the
Society were told they had no "evidence" which may be a sign that you now need to use the
language of QOL in order to be heard. As the author of the submission observed, "what is
evidence of improvement? Two points on the cognitive function scale or people who can play
snooker again or knit" [Neurological Alliance Meeting 2001].
I also read the Motor Neurone Disease Association's submission in support of Riluzole30o,
which used the language of QOL to counter the argument that the lives of people with motor
neurone disease should not be extended because their quality was so poor. Ninety one percent
of respondents disputed this and described leading fulfilling and enjoyable lives despite their
condition: "10 days before my husband died he was in a Cessna, then on a gondola lift in the
South Island of New Zealand" [MND Association2001:12]. However, the positive outcomes
were difficult to represent quantitatively. For example, for people with advanced motor
neurone disease side-effects were irrelevant, and any extra time was precious, especially if
they had a family''": "I am sure that if my five year old son was given the option of my life
prolonged - even for a day [ ... ] he would leave the NICE people in doubt that it should be
available to all" [ibid:11]. They felt better able to cope because they were doing something
"instead of waiting for events to take their natural course" [ibid:8]. Relationships with doctors
had also improved, and doctors felt more comfortable delivering a diagnosis because they
could offer some hope alongside it. Unusually, the Motor Neurone Disease association
included a "declaration of interests" at the end of the submission, which recorded receipt of
£31,500 from the manufacturers of Riluzole in 1999/00 (1% of their annual income). The
chair of their trustees had also received funding for research and travel (filtered through
European neurological associations), and was a member of the European Motor Neurone
Disease study group, which was entirely funded by the company.
299c.f. Outcomes for spasticity where changes in movement are less valuable than an overall increase in stamina,
which could increase the time spent at school, leading to a better education and job.
300Currently the only treatment for 3,000 people with motor neurone disease costing -£10 per person per day.
301Thissuggests that taking an exclusively individual focus when defining QOL omits important aspects.
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How pharmaceuticals influence doctors
People say you can't change doctors' behaviour but the pharmaceuticals make them
dance on the head of a pin
The extent to which pharmaceutical funding influences the topics and conduct of research has
been hotly debated. Since the career structure of clinical academics rewards them for
publications, there is an institutional incentive for them to work cooperatively with an
industry that can provide them with funding for research, and conformity to industrial
interests can be a criterion for publication [Abraham 1995]. There was a notorious case in the
1980s when the editors of the Archives of General Psychiatry (the most prestigious journal in
the field) were accused of succumbing to pharmaceutical influence in fore grounding the
favourable results for a trial of Alprazolam [Healy 1997]. The case was difficult to adjudicate
since the majority of senior clinicians held pharmaceutical consultancies, often using them to
fund independent research.
I know from experience that this is true in neurology; in fact the possession of a large number
of consultancies is thought to enhance the prestige of the research institute the person is
affiliated to and demonstrate the "relevance" of their work. A few personal examples of these
debates spring to mind: one neurological epidemiologist who does not accept money from
pharmaceuticals described a "positive paper" (one containing trial results that favoured a
drug) as an example of "money talking" and suggested clinicians who took "conditional
funding" risked "peddling a lie". The reputation of another neurologist who runs a clinical
trial centre was "tarnished" by receiving "drugs money". Itwas even suggested that the
diagnoses of his trial participants were "suspect" and he had to be barred from his own data in
case he attempted retrospective falsification. A internationally renowned research centre that
also performs analyses for clinical trials was shocked to be accused by an anonymous peer
reviewer302 of "serving the interests of Big Pharma".
These anecdotes are common currency among neurologists and reflect a profound unease
about accepting research funding from pharmaceuticals. For example, the ethically dubious
activity of building up an extensive private practice is excused because it make doctors less
vulnerable to financial inducements and enables them to fund their own research.
Nonetheless, many younger doctors attend quarterly meals organised by pharmaceuticals, and
few refuse hospitality at conferences and seminars. I collected a handful of conference
302Papers are anonymously peer-reviewed, but even if your reviewer doesn't congratulate you afterwards (as
happened to me), it isn't difficult to work out who it would have been, and reviewers' frankness is usually
checked by the knowledge that as authors they may soon face the people they are reviewing.
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announcements at the last medical meeting I attended, all presented like glossy holiday
brochures=" and offering plenty of opportunities between scientific sessions to see the sites,
sample the local cuisine, or play golf at the luxury hotel.
Once at the conference, the opportunities for advertising exposure are considerable, as I
discovered when I was accidentally sent the 2002 Movement Disorders conference's
"sponsorship opportunities and exhibitor prospectus". This promised "comprehensive
scientific and educational programming, and tremendous marketing opportunities will, once
again, be the hallmarks of our international congress" [my italics]. Every event or meal was
available for sponsorship (even coffee breaks at $20,000 each), as were the website,
conference literature and bags, and even the cards held by "meeters and greeters" at the
airport. If the format for the 2002 meeting remains the same as that for 2000, I calculated that
they would make at least $3 million from sponsorship, not including revenue from selling
advertising or exhibition space (30 or so pharmaceuticals exhibited in 2000).
I had a memorable experience of pharmaceutical largesse at the Movement Disorders 2000
conference in Barcelona. I had originally put my name down for a gala dinner organised at a
national monument to celebrate "10 years ofNeurobloc [Botulinum toxin A)" but was
persuaded by a colleague to join him at a less formal gathering organised by a rival company
at the Andar Azucar (a restaurant in an eighteenth century palazzo, renowned for its Castilian
cuisine). I was introduced as my colleague's PhD student and spent the meal worrying about
being exposed if I failed to memorise the pre-meal lecture on the product or mispronounced
its name304• The dinner conversation among the neurologists and pharmaceutical reps was
mainly about money: who was getting NHS merit awards, who had a large private practice,
and who had received pharmaceutical funding. One of the neurologists told me that this year
three different companies had funded him for conferences in Barcelona, New York and Israel.
The company funding his current trip picked him up at the airport and arranged his
accommodation and dinner every night. In return, he was expected to attend their sponsored
"satellite" seminars (to increase the seminars' credibility), and a 45-minute product
presentation on his return to the UK, presented as an opportunity to "feedback" on the
conference arrangements. He presumed it was worth it to them since even a single
prescription for Beta interferon guaranteed an income of £10,000 per annum. I found myself
giving advice on using QOL measures to a neurologist who assured me that "they say every
303TheEuropean Headache Federation announcement overlaid a picture of Istanbul harbour at sunset where the
name of the conference was half the size of the tagline "Istanbul- where the continents meet".
3041had been told that the company (renowned for its lavish hospitality) only invited prescribers.
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trial must have one now" [my emphasisj=". This comment represents the attitude of many
clinicians that QOL measures are ubiquitous, mysterious, and imposed from outside, if a
useful rhetorical resource when arguing for clinical freedom or increased funding.
One of the representatives estimated that their hospitality bill from this conference would be
£3,500 per doctor, but said that it was worth it to "build relationships" and "make them feel
comfortable with us". Their strategy involves forming personal relationships by covering
small areas (for example, two of the London hospitals). She felt this aim had been achieved
because all the neurologists in her group went out with her last night, even though it was
scheduled as a "free" evening. She told me that representatives need to be gregarious and
well organised ("like holiday reps") and usually had a biological or biochemical background,
although ex-medics were particularly prized. Sometimes, despite the planning, the
pharmaceuticals don't get it right: another neurologist recounted attending a sponsored event
in New York where they arrived at 10.30 pm after a three hour delay and still had to listen to
a one and a half hour presentation before they could have dinner. These stories underlined the
fact that most of the information on drugs that doctors receive comes from pharmaceuticals,
either directly, or through adverts and funded research in medical journals. A recent review of
the use of economic evaluations in the UK found that prescribers were 1110stlikely to have
received information on evaluations from pharmaceuticals and that these influenced their
prescribing in more than a quarter of cases [Drummond et al 1997]. Maynard+" has noted an
alliance between cancer doctors and pharmaceuticals. For example, over Taxanes (an
expensive group of anti-cancer drugs of limited efficacy) "the industry's smiling happily and
filling its wallets" (Neurological Alliance meeting, 2001).
How pharmaceuticals relate to the government
The pharmaceutical industry and the British government have an uneasy relationship, since
the government is both its main client and its patron as a major employer and contributor to
the economy. "Maintaining industry buoyancy" is a political choice: the government's policy
of "industry protection" means that it won't drive down the price of drugs in the UK as this
would reduce European prices and affect the "balance of payments". In 1993 the government
obstructed a Private Members bill on Medicines Information to "protect trade secrets [ ... ] if
the pharmaceutical industry is to continue to invest here" [White paper on open government
1993]. The British pharmaceutical industry has also applied pressure on the government to
305Hehad begun the conversation by describing his prescribing patterns in great detail, suggesting that he was
confusing me with one of the reps.
306A controversial health economist and advocate for QAL Ys.
relax regulations perceived as detrimental to its commercial interests+", Their close
relationship is enhanced by the number of pharmaceutical consultancies held by members of
governmental regulatory committees. It forms part of a general policy of making science
"more responsive" to industrial intcrests", which are assumed never to conflict with or
diverge from public interests. For example, in 1989 it was decided that the Medicines Control
Agency would be funded entirely from fees for licensing applications paid by
pharmaceuticals, making it "essentially a business selling its regulatory services to the
industry and promoting itself as one of the fastest licensing authorities in the world for new
drugs" [Abraham 1995:257].
The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) is an important mediator in this
relationship, although its importance has been reduced by its unpopularity. It has not even
gained support from health economists who are one of the disciplines most likely to benefit
from its activities. Maynard describes it as "a mess" and says it has become like the Scott
Intercollegiate Guideline Network which only looks at clinical effectiveness, and has "yet to
say no to any drug" (Neurological Alliance meeting, 2001). He believes that clinical
guidelines have had an unexpected and "deadly" effect as doctors use them to advocate for
funding in their speciality "driving out other treatments that might be more effective".
Maynard's hostility towards the medical profession is not surprising as in the past health
economists and doctors were not natural allies309, although this may change with their
collaboration on preference-based measures ofQOL (described in chapter 7). Economists
claimed doctors did not considering cost when prescribing, put individual before population
health, practiced covert rationing'!", and served sectional interests. For example, Maynard
accused Sackett (the founder of evidence-based medicine) of "not accepting the social ethic
associated with the pursuit of the maximum gains in terms of population health from a finite
budget" and leaving efficiency and population health to "evidence-based purchasers" [1997].
He also suggested that evidence-based medicine was an example of "the medical empire
striking back" after the market reforms to the NHS and subsequent deprofessionalisation (a
conclusion broadly shared by Armstrong [2002]). While this may be so, Maynard's solution
(that doctors be made to account for deviations from "equitable and efficient practice") would
3071nthe 1950s regarding the categorisation of brand name products using the Cohen Committee drug standards,
and during the 19705 over the scientific standards required for a clinical trial certificate [Abraham 1995].
308c.f.recent white papers on science, technology, and education ("Realising our potential" [1993]).
309Loewy and Sackett (proponents of evidence based medicine) both likened health economists to Nazis.
310Acceptance for haemodialysis in the 1970's reflected availability of places, rather than clinical indications
although this was not even acknowledged by the doctors who made the decision.
further increase government control over their activities'!'. This explains their suspicion of
NICE, which has at least brought some transparency to rationing decisions and provided a
common enemy for doctors, patients, patient support organisations and pharmaceuticals to
unite against.
As a speaker from CMC Research Institute''" explained, NICE's methodology is deeply
flawed. Firstly, pharmaceuticals are the main source of clinical data, which comes from trials
"designed according to the evidence they want". Secondly, NICE's weighting of evidence
puts randomised controlled trials at the top and clinical opinion at the bottom, even though
the trials are "fantasy science" because "small, focused groups are treated in particular
ways,,313.Finally, the trials are not designed for health economic evaluations, as the costs
associated with chronic illness are diverse '!", only valid for a short time, and specific to
particular settings. Despite these problems, NICE's expectations are high. For example,
submissions should use raw data (rarely available as pharmaceuticals buy in drugs licences
from other pharmaceuticals), and incorporate all costs, even if they can't be calculated in a
short timescale. It rarely provides well-defined questions for the submissions and expects
robust results in a very short time. Pharmaceuticals increase the confusion by encouraging
"reanalysis of data for every conceivable subgroup" to get good results, even though the
studies were designed to answer particular questions and the results may not be applicable to
other patients. They also occasionally conceal unexpected deaths, or "adverse events" as they
are more usually described. PBAC (the Australian version of NICE) had to reject 661
submissions for methodological reasons, including "suspect amalgamations of data", during
its first few years of operation [Hill 2000].
Pharmaceuticals also negotiate directly with health authorities as potential customers for their
"disease management packages". Between 1997 and 1999 one London health authority was
offered an asthma care service for primary care, an epilepsy service for primary and
secondary care, and a prevention programme for coronary heart disease in primary care
[Greenhalgh et al 2000]. While recognising that "the spirit of 'new Labour' strongly supports
efforts to align commercial and NHS interests" (for example, Private Finance Initiatives for
hospitals), Greenhalgh felt these new developments should be carefully monitored. Potential
311This is consonant with NHS reforms, which simultaneously give greater autonomy to doctors through primary
care trusts, and reduce traditional freedoms like the "right" to practice privately after becoming a consultant.
312CMCanalyse trial data, advise pharmaceutical clients on the value or validity of their product claims, and
"groom" submissions to NICE.
313RCTpopulations are self-selecting, compliant, well monitored, and likely to benefit from the treatment.
314Comprising direct (drug costs), indirect (loss of productivity), and intangible (pain and suffering).
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risks include special relationships developing for purchasing (involving agreements that
restrict prescribing), breaches of patient confidentiality, failure to obtain informed consent,
bias against less lucrative interventions (for example, counselling for depression), and
escalation of costs.
Partnerships between doctors and patient support organisations
Let's get the user in front of the man {sic} with the purse strings
This is a finely balanced alliance, for example, the Society'S close relationship with doctors
has been criticised by members who do not see it as an impartial advocate. One member, who
had been barred from the National Hospital after threatening the staff, left an abusive
message on the Society'S answer-phone accusing them of "lick[ing] up to the National [... ]
you sold your soul to the National for funding to keep the organisation open". This hostility
was reflected at the branch organisers' conference where people described their relationships
with their consultants as superficial ("you see the consultant and he's like a little god [...] The
rest of us wait for hours and hours") and expressed frustration at Health Authority
bureaucracll5• However, when it represents the views of members, the Society is criticised
by neurologists for misrepresenting the quality of services for political purposes. One letter
from a specialist clinic blamed them for "damaging public perception" of their services,
"demoralising" staff, and threatening a "programme of improvement [from] which patients
will stand to derive clear benefits". Others feel that their voluntary work for the Society is not
recognised: one correspondent was especially piqued that no mention was made of the talk
for which he "gave up a Saturday [... J while other speakers have been mentioned". He also
drew attention to his centre's "valuable, regional and consistent service to sufferers over the
last 12 years" which had never received the appreciation he felt it deserved.
The relationship between neurologists and patient support organisations was the subject of a
Neurological Alliance meeting I attended at the 2001 World Congress of Neurology. The first
speaker (a general neurologist) perceived the barriers to partnership as mutual indifference,
mistrust, professional jealousy, and fears about confidentiality (for example, discussing
someone's case with a patient support organisation's welfare officer). "Problem areas" in the
relationship were "wacky treatments", somatofonn disorders ("there are people active in local
branches who insist they have multiple sclerosis but have never been diagnosed"), angry
3150ne recounted the problems he had had ordering a table for the physiotherapy department; "eventually I had
to buy it myself. £20 - that's just a doctor's lunchtime drinks bill".
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patients'" ("support groups should hold 'getting to grips' sessions that enable people to
overcome their post-diagnosis anger"), factionalism, disorganised patient support groups
("some are run as luncheon clubs for the branch officers"), denial, collusion, and low quality
healthcare. Note that only the last of these could be attributed to the neurologist. He observed
that the diseases neurologists diagnosed were not represented by the spread of support
groups317where currently "the multiple sclerosis tail wags the migraine dog". However,
partnerships with "upmarket support groups" (my emphasis) could improve neurological
services by focusing criticism on the NHS, particularly in the light of the expectations raised
by the NHS plarr'": "under the NHS and GMC [General Medical Committee] rules health
authorities have to listen to patients. Let's get the user in front of the man [sic] with the purse
strings':". The speaker felt patient support organisations should argue for neurological care to
be as great a government priority as heart disease and cancer as "when doctors do they are
accused of empire building".
Collaboration between doctors and patient support organisations was also encouraged in
international settings. The aforementioned meeting of dystonia societies highlighted the
importance of participating in international medical networks as "we [patient support
organisations] influence just by being there". For example, dystonia was originally excluded
from the International Classification ofImpairment, Disability and Handicap but the
President of the European Dystonia Federation used his connections to "get something in at
the last minute" (described in chapter 9). Similarly, the President of the Movement Disorders
Society emphasised their intention to involve patient support organisations by "critically
discuss[ing]" not just clinical trials, but "public health issues" and "quality of life,,32o.The
new emphasis on partnership was signalled by the presence on the conference rostrum of the
President of the European Parkinson's Disease Association (and the Federation for
Neurological Advocacy) who was introduced as someone who could "speak on behalf of the
316Andpatient support groups, ME organisations were "too political and have alienated doctors".
317>50% of new referrals are "medically unexplained" and so don't have a support organisation (or at least, not
with a medical advisory board or pharmaceutical funding), even though "these are disabled people too".
318Thispromises patient information, choice, protection, advocacy, right of redress, scrutiny of the NHS, patient
re£resentation throughout the NHS, and expression of patients' views through NICE.
31 He recounted having someone with primary-progressive multiple sclerosis in his office who wanted a
prescription for Beta interferon (then restricted to relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis as it is not as effective in
other forms). He phoned up a public health official at the man's health authority and asked them to explain to
the man why he couldn't have the prescription. The official authorised the speaker to write the prescription.
While this can be seen as a victory for "patient power", I felt the speaker had acted unethically by using the
r:atient in this way since they were unlikely to obtain clinical benefit from the prescription.
2°This was only covered by three research presentations at the Movement Disorders 2000 conference and none
of the plenary sessions, confirming my belief that QOL is more evident in clinical rhetoric than practice.
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US National Institutes of Health for the quality of their web site. The Huntingdon's Disease
Association then asked about the involvement of pharmaceuticals with support groups. They
were particularly concerned that patients were being used as "lobby fodder", for example, to
influence EC directives on prescribing in favour of pharmaceuticals. This issue was only
discussed after an attempt had been made to undermine the credibility of the questioner by
suggesting that the issue of dependence was specific to Huntingdon's Disease Association
because they only had one pharmaceutical working in their area324. WE MOVE cited
unconditional "educational grants" as a good example of "co-operation" between patient
support organisations and pharmaceuticals without "undue influence". But other participants
gave examples of educational grants for surveys that specified which PR company should be
used, or grants for publications that failed to mention subtypes of the disorder which did not
respond to the drug that the sponsoring pharmaceutical produced.
It seemed to me that the message coming from the meeting was that collaboration with the
Movement Disorders Society would be on its terms. For example, it would meet with
"leaders" but not patients, and preferred patient support organisations to be filtered through
WE MOVE. One organisation suggested that their events should be listed in the Society
journal so that doctors could participate, but was told that this was a "scientific journal" and
that the WE MOVE web site (which is mainly used by other patient support organisations)
would be more appropriate. The Society president also asked for feedback on the "booths"
that had been made available to patient support organisations at the back of the main hall. It
was pointed out that these were actually "little tables", which looked "shabby" alongside the
pharmaceuticals' stands, many of which incorporated espresso bars and club-style seating
("we voluntaries always get stuck with the smallest, least desirable space"). According to
National Organisation for Rare Disorders, the solution to the problem was to get WE MOVE
(which had the largest stall and, unlike the other patient support organisations, was allowed to
hire professional-looking furniture) to distribute literature for the patient support
organisations, thus "saving" them the trip to the conference!
Conclusion
The discourses of QOL and the "voice of the patient" bring together a diverse range of actors
in international networks325, supported by financial and institutional interests in chronic
illness. But the rhetoric of "partnership" conceals imbalances of power and resources, even
within groups of actors (for example, the Dystonia Medical Research Foundation and Chilean
324Unlike the US Parkinson's Disease Association with twelve.
325These relationships are summarised in a table in the appendix.
dystonia society). The concept of QOL is difficult to stabilise and define, which may explain
its utility as an "empty signifier" that can contain a range of meanings [Strathern 1992].
Characterising it as a boundary object risks reifying it and disguising the fact that it operates
in a similar, capillary way to Foucault's description of power. The concept of the "voice of
the patient" can also be used as a form of ventriloquism to justify everything from faster
drugs regulation to better conference furniture for patient support organisations. However, its
"celebration" may enable future opportunities for subversion, as when real "patients" speak,
it will be less easy to silence or contain them.
Although measures of QOL do not do what they claim, namely measuring what people say
gives quality to their lives and representing the "patient's perspective", they are widely used
and have become politically important because different groups of actors feel they have to
engage with them to accomplish their goals. For example: doctors bidding for funding,
patient support organisations raising awareness of their condition, and pharmaceuticals
marketing new products. As with audit, once a procedure has been established, everything
needs to be represented in that manner, making the procedure seem natural and inevitable.
While it is then difficult to return to the beginning and ask how we ended up here, this is
undoubtedly a role for anthropology, and is something I attempt to do in the first chapter of
the next section on QOL.
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Section 3: Quality of Life
Chapter 7: Defining and measuring Quality of Life
In the first six chapters I described people's experiences ofliving with dystonia and
attempted to understand why it has such a severe effect on some people's quality oflife. I
began to explore the problems with representing dystonia and separating the experience of
dystonia from the fabric of people's lives in order to measure its impact. I hypothesised that
what is distinctive about dystonia is the way it is interpreted and responded to by people
living with dystonia and the rest of society, rather than its physical symptoms. In the next
three chapters, I investigate whether this distinctiveness can be represented by QOL measures
and ask if they offer much more than the clinical measures they resemble, using participant
observation on a multiple sclerosis-specific measure to illustrate my points. I argue that the
range of health states covered by QOL measures at the Intemational Society for Quality of
Life Research conference and the inclusiveness of the WHO's Intemational Classification
tool are evidence of an increasing "medicalisation of disability" and extension of the "clinical
gaze". I also argue that although QOL is represented in terms of "caring", it is actually about
"efficiency and cost" [Kleinman 1996]. The language ofQOL therefore operates analogously
to the current cone em with "ethics" in anthropology, which is used to present audit in a
positive light (c.f. [Strathem 2000]). Finally, I continue to explore the ways in which the
discourse of QOL has become an important rhetorical resource.
The first chapter in this section examines how QOL is defined, measured, and "transformed"
by health economists into a tool for resource allocation. I review the history of QOL research
in medicine and explore how it continues to be influenced by its anthropometric origins,
despite the discipline's expansion and professionalisation. The second chapter is an
ethnographic study of QOL that explores the "unscience" at the heart of Science, using
participant observation during the creation of a multiple sclerosis-specific measure, and a
European survey of the QOL of people living with dystonia. The final chapter looks at the use
ofQOL scores intemationally (in the form of the "Disability Adjusted Life Year") to
compare the quality and value of people's lives. It describes the efforts of organisations like
the Dystonia Society to ensure their condition's inclusion in the WHO's Global Burden of
Disease rankings, which affects the proportion of resources allocated to alleviating it. It also
explores how changing attitudes to health and disability (connected to discourses of QOL and
the "patient's voice") have affected the WHO's attempts to create a universal classification of
health.
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QOL
There are two types of QOL measure: "generic", which can be used in sick and "healthy"
populations, cover all diseases, and are brief and easier to translate; and "disease-specific",
which are generated from interviews with clinicians and people with particular conditions and
are only appropriate to that condition. Although disease-specific measures are popular with
patients and clinicians because the items are obviously relevanr'"; generic measures are
widely used as they express outcomes in a standard numerical format that enables
comparison. They have grown exponentially over the past decade, funded by national health
services, pharmaceuticals and the US health insurance industry. For example, the RAND
Corporation funded the SF_36327 (the most commonly used generic measure). Medline, the
main index for medical papers, first used the phrase "quality of life" as a heading in 1975.
Since then tens of thousands of papers have been published (12,329 in the past 3 years alone
[1999-2001]), and there has been a proliferation of study groups, conferences and special
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This remarkable growth can be linked to increasing cost consciousness in medicine, risk
management by health care providers, and the need for more sensitive measures to compare
treatments for chronic illness. Consequently, many studies have an element of advocacy as
well as evaluation [Najam and Levine 1981], which is particularly true for expensive
therapies like transplantation [Joralmen and Fujinaga 1994]. Their scientific basis is now so
established that the PD MED trial of drugs for Parkinson's disease uses the Parkinson's
Disease 39-item Questionnaire [Peto et a11995] as its main outcome measure.
\Vhat is QOL?
QOL is used to describe what a person feels about their life when they evaluate it as a whole.
However, this is not necessarily what QOL measures assess as they are biased towards
"physical function" [Leplege and Hunt 1997]. Although this is the easiest aspect to measure
326There are nearly 20 disease-specific measures for Multiple Sclerosis.
327TheSF-36 contains two domains, physical and mental, divided into eight sections: physical function, role
limitation physical, pain (all physical), and health perception, and vitality, social function, role limitation
emotional and mental health (all mental). In theory the domains do not overlap, though "vitality" includes
physical tiredness, "health perceptions" usually reflect mental rather than physical health, and the role limitation
variables conflate different sources of limitation [Rose et al 1999]. It is not a sensitive measure as strong "floor"
and "ceiling" effects have been observed (where the majority of respondents are grouped at one end of the scale)
[Ruta et al 1998; O'Mahony et al 1998]). The wide "confidence intervals" (the range of scores that the actual
score is most likely to be within) [McHomey et a11996] limit its use to large studies where the volume of data
cancels out individual irregularities. Studies using the SF-36 experience missing data [O'Mahony et a11998]
and low response rates [Parker et aI1998], possibly due to ambiguities in the phrasing of the items [Jenkinson
1995]. It also focuses on ability to _work, rather than be a parent, family member, or citizen [Wiersma 1988].
328Thediscipline had its own journal in 1991 (Quality of Life Research) and its first conference in 1994.
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and crosscheck (replicating the privileging of the tangible that has distorted recent Higher
Education reforms), population and patient surveys suggest it is not the most important
determinant of QOL329 [McDowell and Newell 1987; Bowling 1995; Rothwell 1997; Karlsen
et a11999]. A comparison of how people living with HIV and their doctors determined health
change found the assessment of both groups was influenced by their interests rather than
disease severity variables'", undermining the conventional association of doctor/objective
and patient/subjective [Ruocco and Holmes 1998].
Researchers use QOL loosely: one popular edited collection entitled Quality of life after
open-heart surgery [Walter 1992] focused on common medical outcomes like clinical
measures and survival times. Descriptions of the measures (QOL, health status, well-being)
are used interchangeably, even though they have different implications and problems. For
example, "heath-related QOL" implies that QOL can be separated into health and non-health
related components. The proliferation of measures also prevents them from becoming a
framework for comparison: one review found 159 different measures cited in 75 articles, 136
of which had been used only once [Gill and Feinstein 1994]. In the absence of a "gold
standard" some researchers simply multiply the number of measures used: in one study
pancreatic transplant recipients were sent 11 different measures [Milde et al 1992].
Representing QOL as a measurable property or "commodity" is part of a move towards
models of life that are linked to the production and maximisation of human resources
[Escobar 1994]. For example, the WHO's definition of health prioritorises an "economically
productive life". If the main determinants ofQOL are social and environmental [Bowling
1995; Bullinger et aI1998], it can be improved by action at the level of society, but this is
obscured when it is located in the "natural" body of the individual [Taussig 1980]. This
reinforces the "decomposability" of society by reducing "social processes and structures" to
individual attributes and "detach[ing] knowledge, action and events fr0111their social
settings,,331 [Young 1980].
QOL measurement is a classic example of an "explanatory science", which:
329People with multiple sclerosis and Parkinson's disease in studies by Rothwell [1997] and Karlsen et al [1999]
were more concerned about mental health and vitality. Similarly, epilepsy-specific measures focus on the
frequency and severity of seizures, physical function and paid employment, while people with epilepsy worry
about being labelled epileptic and feeling stigmatised [Scambler and Hopkins 1990].
330People living with HIV were influenced by depression, overall function. financial worries, life satisfaction,
and medication concerns, while doctors were most influenced by patients' health worries, presumably because
this affected their use of services. .
331Astudy exploring the hospitalisation of people with Alzheimer's demonstrated that their carers' QOL scores
were a better predictor this than their own [de Froidment et al 1999].
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Aim[s] to cover a wide range of different phenomena with a small number of
principles. [Its] explanatory power [... ] comes from its ability to deploy a small
number of well-understood expressions to cover a wide variety of cases. But this
explanatory power has its price [which is] to constrict our ability to represent
situations accurately
[Cartwright 1983]
The abstraction that takes place during the development of measures ofQOL has
methodological as well as political consequences as the context in which measures are
created and used is important. For example, measures created with people in hospital are less
sensitive in other environments [Jenkinson 1994]. Similarly, the counterintuitive conclusion
that the health of transplant recipients is as good as the general population's (for example,
Caine et al [1990]) may be explained by strong feelings of gratitude towards their doctors (the
"saviour effect") and the socialisation process prior to donation [Joralmen and Fujinaga
1996]. Ignoring context may also cause resources to be targeted to the wrong areas: in the late
1980s the National Epilepsy Centre in Japan aimed to improve the QOL of people with
epilepsy through surgery but although they reported a general improvement, this did not
include areas like employment [Mihara 1994 in Yeh 1996]. The lack of improvement in this
area was explained as behavioural problems from living with a chronic illness, which could
be cured by offering surgery earlier. This conclusion ignores the high unemployment rate for
people with epilepsy (10 to 20 times that of the general populatiorr'Y) and demonstrates how
"progressive" discourses like QOL can be used to shift social responsibility. Yeh concludes
"blame for lack of social integration is placed on personal characteristics, thus shadowing the
blatant reality that few spaces in a 'socially integrated' Japan exist for individuals with
disabilities" [1996].
QOL measurement is part of the "medicalisation of human distress" [Heath 1999] where
common experiences like grief are pathologised and placed within a normative framework,
and doctors are invited to become "moral philosophers, counsellors, or social reformers"
[Leplege and Hunt 1997]. For example, the range of health states represented by disease-
specific measures at the 1999 International Society for Quality of Life Research conference,
many rare, previously untreatable, or not defined as a condition, may be an example of
"creeping medicalisation" where "well" people become the target of medical interventions
focusing on the "subjective individual" rather than the physical case [Illich 1976]. On the
other hand, many clinicians and patient representatives are clamouring for disease-specific
332InGermany, where people with disabilities must compose 6% of adults working in the private sector, the
employment rate of people with disabilities is 5%, in Japan where the equivalent requirement is 1.6%, the rate
is 1.41% [Yeh 1996].
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measures to "validate" their condition [Hacking 1995] and enable it to compete for treatment
resources. For example, the project to develop a measure for dystonia was initiated by the
Dystonia Society who used the scores from generic measures of QOL to demonstrate that the
impact of dystonia is equivalent to epilepsy, depression and multiple sclerosis [Camfield et al
2000].
In the next section, instead of merely recording the history of QOL measurement, I aim to
provide a genealogy that exposes its "disreputable origins and unpalatable functions"
[Foucault 1973]. For example, to enhance QOL's scientific respectability, many researchers
claim descent from "psychometrics" presumably unaware of the discipline's link with the
eugenics movement, which gives credence to suggestions by Pfeiffer et al of the eugenic
potential of Disability Adjusted Life Years and the WHO's International Classification tool. I
also explore the historical role of statistics in surveying and controlling the populatiotr'f '.
Interestingly, statistics did not originate from within the discipline of mathematics. The
Victorian statisticians were social reformers rather than mathematicians producing "facts" to
advance their programmes. The development of statistics at the beginning of the last century
as a scientific specialty, as well as a form of intervention, was largely due to the work of
Galton, Pearson (his collaborator and successor), and Fisher. All of these men were
eugenicists: Fisher gave his first scientific paper to the Cambridge Eugenics Society, and
Pearson was a "Professor of Eugenics", in addition to heading the first university statistics
department. Like the WHO, the early statisticians collected (or created) facts in order to
intervene. According to Pearson's biography of Galton, his goal was to exert the same control
over human evolution that man exerted over other creatures. Galton also popularised
"anthropometry" as a way to discover "all that [a man] ever has been, and all that he will be"
as he believed that physical and mental measures provided the key to human nature.
Influenced by the work of Lombroso (and other criminal anthropologists) he developed a
technique to uncover a "criminal type" by fusing photographs of individual criminals on a
photographic plate334•
Mackenzie traces the eugenicists' view of human nature Cthe person as largely the sum of a
number of potentially measurable abilities and personality traits") and human populations
("manipulable aggregates of such abilities and traits") to its origin in a society where the
333Drawing on MacKenzie's critical account of statistics in Britain 1865 -1930 [1981].
334This technique was replicated in 2000 using images of women considered beautiful in different societies to
create the "beauty of the Millenium", Unsurprisingly, the result was a European with a heavy tan.
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ultimate criterion of a person's worth was quantitative [1981 :34]. The reduction of people to
their wage rates or to "marks" in a "eugenic examination" is an example of reification
[Lukacs 1971] where people, or more precisely their abstract labour power, are treated as
things. A similar process occurs with Disability Adjusted Life Years where people with
disabilities are made synonymous with fixed diagnoses, assessed using scales that are biased
towards economic functioning, and valued according to their "social utility".
Galton was also the first to argue that intelligence was an individual, inherited characteristic
and developed methodologies like "twin studies" (with Pearson) to demonstrate this. He
believed that every individual possessed a fixed amount of the characteristics that make up
"civic worth,,335,which was distributed according to a "Gaussian curve" (or normal
distribution) in the same way as physical characteristics. He used Booth's social survey of
London [1903] to map a social structure over this curve so criminals and middle-class
professionals ("the brains of the nation") were at opposite ends of the curve, while the
"respectable working classes" formed the majority in the centre.
Since civic worth was hereditary, the only way to increase the amount in society was promote
the fertility of the "better classes" and reduce that of the "inferior". Galton believed that
money spent on environmental reforms would be wasted since you couldn't improve "the
human raw material", a belief that resonates with the Disability Adjusted Life Year's bias
against non-curative interventions for people with disabilities. In both cases the logic
displaces responsibility for success or survival onto the individual and removes the need for
social intervention to address inequalities. He advocated both "negative" and "positive"
eugenics: negative eugenics involved preventing criminals and the insane from reproducing
by segregation and sterilization. He also wanted to discourage reproduction by people with
low IQs or incomes+", possibly by stopping their unemployment benefit if they had more
than two children. Positive eugenics was a more subtle strategy of introducing family
allowances and tax breaks to encourage the middle classes to have larger families.
Interestingly these still form part of new-right policy on the family.
Eugenic proposals gained a surprising amount of popular support. The Eugenics Society was
founded in 1907 and had over one thousand members by 1914, mainly doctors, academics,
335Civicworth was never defined, and was later interpreted as "intelligence quotient" or IQ. Psychologists
attempted to give his model an empirical basis by testing the intelligence of people in different classes.
336Hisdisciple Darwin regretfully commented that correlation techniques needed to improve before income
could be reliably used as a variable.
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and other professionals. Keynes and Beveridge were members, as were the majority of the
Fabian socialists (including the Webbs, HG Wells, and George Bernard Shaw) who saw it as
the logical extension to their commitment to a planned society. Support for eugenics fitted
well with a belief in the meritocracy, and the insistence on the individual and cognitive
determinants of success reflected the experience of the professional middle classes. This
individualizing approach is reflected in the disability weightings for the Disability Adjusted
Life Year, which ignores the effect of social support and the environment on the experiences
of people with disabilities.
Despite widespread support for eugenics from those frightened by the "urban residuum,,337
(now called the "underclass"), there were dissenting voices. Chesterton claimed that "the
eugenicist was the employer" and objected to the idea of "herding and breeding the workers
like cattle" [1922: 147]. The eugenicists attempted to increase their control over the working
classes through the IQ test whose validity was apparently proved by its correlation with the
father's occupation. This enabled the professional middle classes to define the terms under
which working class children achieved social mobility.
The respectability of eugenics was diminished by the actions of the Nazis in the 1930s who
passed bills for the sterilization of criminals (including political "criminals"), "the feeble
minded,,338, people with disabilities and the "insane". The eugenicists were also attacked by
their core constituency who realised that a eugenic utopia would have little need for social
workers, family doctors, and public health officers. Their legacy was the IQ test, which
crystallized the assumption that "ability is an individually possessed 'thing' that can at least
potentially be measured, and that the results of this process ought to bear an important
relation to an individual's social position" [Mackenzie 1981 :49]. Rose describes the IQ test as
a paramount example of all tests, which codify, mathematise and normalise difference"
[1990:140]. Tests are an indispensable tool for governance as they can quickly and
economically differentiate individuals within any schema. They make individuals "knowable,
calculable and administrable" and enable them to be differentiated from others and evaluated
in relation to them, and to the "norm". The IQ test, for example, was soon transformed from a
device for diagnosing the pathological to one for hierarchising the normal. Both the IQ test
and QOL measurement enable "a calculation to be made about personal fortunes in terms of
an assessment of individual capacities" [ibid].
337Thiswas described as a "natural" category (a degenerate form of H01110 Sapiens) however the majority were
"reclaimed" when they were able to get jobs in the labour shortage after the Second World War.
mBritain debated a "Feebleminded persons (control)" bill in 1912.
There are obvious similarities between the IQ test and QOL measures, not least because the
IQ test was the first time an "abstract" (and undefined) quality had been measured with the
same apparent accuracy as height or weight. Another link is that Spearman, Burt and
Thomson, psychologist disciples of Galton and Pearson, developed "psychometrics", which is
one of the "disreputable" ancestors of QOL. This enabled psychology to establish itself as the
appropriate authority to adjudicate on the lives of individuals and manage them to maximise
their "social utility" and minimize the "social danger" their difference might create [Rose
1990]. Measures ofIQ and QOL are implicitly linked to interventions, enable the exertion of
control over individuals, lead to the creation of types, assume that the ultimate measure of a
person's "life quality" (or quality oflife) is stable and quantitative, and ignore the role of the
environment.
Despite their methodological flaws, their usefulness to a range of groups ensures their
continued use as a way of creating classifications and hierarchies. For example, the
International Society of QOL Research furthers its "mission" to promote the study of health-
related quality of life internationally by making alliances with non-scientists who share their
discourse (a process of "translation" first observed by Star and Griesmer in Berkeley's
museum of Zoology [1989])339.
The International Society is the main disciplinary body for QOL researchers, which organises
satellite conferences at medical events, conferences on specific conditions or methodological
issues, and liases with other societies like the Society of Clinical Trials. Its official language
is English and two-thirds of the membership is from the UK and USA. The two main
disciplines represented are clinicians and economists, and a third of its members are from
pharmaceutical companies or consultancies. The society's close links with pharmaceutical
companies (who comprised seven of the eleven conference sponsors''?") enhance its
credibility and the perceived usefulness of its programme. One of the "Six good reasons to
attend" given in the promotional literature for its annual conference was to "know the
directives on QOL information that regulatory agencies will use for drugs approval". There
was also a satellite meeting preceding it (chaired by pharmaceutical representatives) that
looked at QOL and regulatory issues in Europe and the USA. The assumed consonance
between the interests of QOL researchers and pharmaceuticals was emphasised by the style of
339Forexample, the Mayor of Barcelona, who claimed at their 1999 conference in Barcelona that they had
"common aims and goals" as they were both "insisting on quality of life" and "giving voice to the people".
34°The other sponsors were the Spanish Ministry of Education and Culture, Barcelona Council, a medical
publisher and a QOL research consultancy that worked for pharmaceuticals.
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the event (lavish hospitality, sponsored social events, omnipresent pharmaceutical logos),
which resembled an international medical conference.
The most important areas covered by the presentations are summarised in the table below.
These seemed to be the growth of disease-specific measures (usually sponsored by a patient
support organisation), reduction in the length of measures to facilitate their use in health
economic analyses, translation of measures for use internationally, use ofQOL outcomes in
clinical trials (still a new area as only -5% of trials use them), and submissions from patient
organisations, pharmaceuticals, and clinicians to regulatory bodies like the National Institute
for Clinical Excellence.
Growth area Example
Patient satisfaction Measuring the QOL of patients while attending clinics
population survey Incorporating QOL measures in censuses; comparing
the health of migrants with the indigenous population
Disease-specific measures for new or rare Grave's disease
conditions, states that were not previously "Planning to undergo IVF treatment"
considered health problems, and new groups of Parents of children with asthma. caregivers for people
people with dementia
Patient-centred measures My Medical Outcomes Profile [Paterson 1996,
Paterson and Britten 1999]
Measures for specific groups Children and adolescents
More comprehensive measures The Good Life Questionnaire [Mazes and Maor 1999]
Examining equity Los Angeles Latino Eye Study examined the
association ofQOL and access to healthcare
Shorter measures or shorter versions of existing EuroQol 5-item questionnaire [Kind 1996]
measures, either for stylistic reasons or health
economic analyses
International measures and translation and WHOQOL [1995]
validation of North American and British Spanish version of the International Index of Erectile
measures Function, Hong Kong Chinese version of SF -36
More "scientific" methodologies Rasch analysis
Exploring methodological problems Using proxies for people with physical and cognitive
impairments; aggregating QOL scores to produce
single figures for health economic analyses
Using QOL in clinical trials and submissions to European Regulatory Issues in QOL assessment
regulatory bodies project
Using qualitative methods to generate material for Living a "good life" in MS [Satinovic 1999])
measures and understand people's models of
health
Although the discipline of QOL measurement seemed able to withstand a high level of
internal criticism, for example, Hunt (the designer of the first "patient self-report" measure,
the Nottingham Health Profile [Hunt and McEwen 1980]) made a keynote conference speech
called "A philosophical attack on QOL" and expressed doubts as to whether "all this [QOL]
activity had ever benefited a patient", the conference did not address some fundamental
problems with measuring QOL. These can be summarised as follows: firstly, the clinical
context in which measures are designed and used means that even individualised measures
don't represent what is important to people with limiting conditions. They also cannot use a
more inclusive definition of health as clinical measures are used as the template and source of
validation.
Secondly, QOL is a complex, holistic, and personal concept, which cannot easily be
measured. For example, how do you weight the scores of different aspects of QOL to produce
a total score, or compare conditions? The challenges of measurement are exacerbated by poor
measure design and concealed by the apparent simplicity of "global" questions ofQOL and
visual representations like the EUROQOL thermometer. Thirdly, QOL is hard to predict as
there is no direct relationship between impairment, disability, and lowered QOL, and people's
perceptions often change as their health deteriorates. Consequently, assessments of future
QOL are usually based on negative stereotypes of people with disabilities. Reduced QOL,
like disability, often results from lack of support and hostile extemal responses to the
condition, rather than the condition itself.
Fourthly, different measures express different conceptions of QOL. However, these are rarely
stated explicitly, making it difficult to tell what they are actually measuring. QOL measures
naturalise assumptions about health and performance (for example, the importance of
independence in "activities of daily living") and draw the boundaries of normality even
tighter. Finally, QOL measures assume not only that Westem conceptions of QOL and
measurement practices are applicable across cultures, but also that intemally homogenous
cultures still exist
Some of these criticisms have been acknowledged within the discipline. For example, Hunt
argues that the "emphasis on psychometric harmony not individual meaning" leads to the
removal of items that are relevant to individuals. She also observes that the aggregation of
scores from different domains creates a false homogeneity, and the "rush" to develop
measures before developing their underlying conceptual models means that we cannot be sure
what they are measuring [1999]. More fundamentally, Hunt believes QOL does not fit within
positivism as it is "vital and unique" to the individual: "we cannot measure what we cannot
define". She also criticises the ethics of QOL research, citing the implication that "there is a
normative level of function to which we should all aspire" [Leplege and Hunt 1997], and the
"false promises" of doctors and pharmaceuticals that a product will enhance QOL rather than
merely alleviate symptoms [1999]341.However, for the reasons I address in the following
341TheGood Life Questionnaire [Mozes and Maor 1999], which is described as "an attempt to define the
essence of human existence", is an example of this hubris. It demonstrates the developers' role in defining what
chapters, these reservations have not checked the growth of QOL measurement. In the next
section I explore the conceptual and methodological issues with QOL in greater detail.
Historically, there has been little consensus over what constitutes a "good life" and how it
should be measured, and this is also true ofQOL measurement today342. For example,
Downie identifies four models of QOL ("significant toil", "choice", "happiness or well-
being", and "social factors"), which are individually plausible, but incommensurable and
unquantifiable [1999]. He suggests that it be measured using a combination of subjective and
objective approaches as the latter enables external measurement of activities, endowments,
and resources'?'. But which approach (or whose judgement) should take priority? If someone
with an illness or disability expresses satisfaction with their life, it is insulting to assume, like
one of the designers of the Disability Adjusted Life Year, that this is "false consciousness"
[Murray in Murray and Lopez 1996]. The lack of correlation between subjective and
"objective"/external judgements ofQOL may suggest that different things are being
measured [Wu et al 1997; Brown and Gordon 1999], for example, predictors of QOL,
adjustment to disability, the presence of psychiatric disorders, or personality traits such as
h dri . 344hypoc on naSlS .
Contrary to common assumption, there is no direct relationship between functional
limitations, disability, and loss of QOL [Wilson and Cleary 1995] as the relationship is
mediated by cognitive [Barofsky 1996] and sociocultural factors [Guarnaccia in Spilker et al
1996]. To imply that there is, risks reinforcing disablist stereotypes [Leplege and Hunt 1997].
Low quality of life is actually related to "impairments that produce fatigue, constant or
unpredictable pain, and to physical and social environments that discourage them from
becoming empowered and acting as agents in their own lives" [Albrecht and Devlieger 1999].
The long-term effects of a condition depend on individual resources and social context345• In
fact, the only constant is the variety of conditions in which people flourish if they are
grounded in autonomy and self-determination [Hodge 1990]. The process of adaptation to a
counts at QOL, for example, scoring is weighted in favour of "life plans" (60:40) rather than "pleasures".
Although respondents can define their own pleasures and plans, the list of suggestions indicates what would be
appropriate. For example, two of the six suggested life plans relate to fulfilment in your career.
342Evidenced by the low level of agreement between different raters on many measures of QOL [Aaronson
1990; Sprangers and Aaronson 1992].
343Thus avoiding a doctor prescribing antidepressants for "a single mother living in damp housing in an area of
multiple deprivation" to improve her QOL "even though the life lived remains exactly as it was before" [ibid].
344Muldoon's population study found all SF-36 domains correlated significantly with neuroticism [1998].
345Whether a person can substitute other valued activities for the ones they are cannot perform [Ormel et al
1997]. For example, Murphy described "retreating" into his mind when his body became paralysed [1987].
condition is described as "response shift" [Sprangers and Schwartz 1999] and may account
for the "disability paradox" [Albrecht and Devlieger 1999] where some people with
disabilities report a higher QOL than the general population. Of course, this is only a paradox
if we assume that diminished QOL and satisfaction necessarily result from physical
difference and that the only significant criteria to consider are medical [Koch 2000]. Many
people living with dystonia (quoted in the first three chapters) testified to the positive life
changes and raised self-esteem that developed from their condition, suggesting that "the view
that illness in some personally significant way leads to a reduction in self-worth need not be
true" [Drummond 2000].
Health economic measures (examined later in the chapter) demonstrate the difficulty of
predicting QOL [Koch 2000,2001], particularly as people's perceptions often change: over a
four-month period a quarter of people living with AIDS revised their "advance directives"
which had rejected life-sustaining treatment [Weissman et al 1999]. Too often these measures
are more about "the way 'they' [able-bodied] think 'we' [disabled] live, than the way 'we'
actually live,,346[Darke 2002]. For example, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (or Motor
Neurone Disease) is a chronic, progressive, neurological condition that has been used as the
paradigm oflow QOL in debates over euthanasia+": But some people with the condition
present a different picture, describing the physical restriction as "life enhancing" [Goldblatt
1993], and "an adventure in life" and tool for spiritual exploration [Young and McNicoll
1998]. The technological and social support offered to Steven Hawking (a famous physicist
with Motor Neurone Disease, c.f [Hawking 1993]) enables him to describe his current life as
"certainly happier" than his life pre-diagnosis. Reduced QOL after disablement often results
from isolation, stigma, and fear of being a burden on the community. Itmay be this, rather
than the disability itself, that precipitates requests for euthanasia [Miller 1993; Auslander and
Gold 1999]. Existing measures of disability "create" low QOL scores by only asking about
problems, incorporating a tacit model of disqualification [Ziebland et al 1993], and recording
"underlying disability" which is what would be experienced ifpeople could not adapt or seek
help [Agree 1999].
Neglecting the "individual meaning of illness" has created the false impression that "the
measurement of QOL is simple and feasible" [Parmentier 1994]. Drummond suggests that,
"the process of attributing value to a subjective condition is best conceived of as an aesthetic
346Forexample, only 18% of Accident and Emergency staff believed people with traumatic spinal cord injuries
c~uld achieve an a~ceptable life qual,ity, compared to 92% ofp~ople wit~1these injuries [Gerhart et aI1994].
34Dr Jack Kevorkian (a North Amencan advocate for euthanasia) consciously chose a person with motor
neurone disease as his first client after Michigan passed a ban on "assisted suicide".
one, involving an emotional engagement with (rather than rational evaluation of) everyday
experience" [2000]. For example, one study of older people found they focused on "being,
belonging and becoming" rather than health [Raphael et al 1997], while people living with
multiple sclerosis defined "living a good life with MS" as being an "active and constructive
participant" [Satinovic 1999].
Providing a robust assessment of your QOL involves introspection, reflection and judgment
[Barofsky 1996], essentially becoming the contemporary role model of the "reflective self'
[Giddens 1991]. This is particularly true for conditions like focal dystonia and epilepsy where
relatively good physical function needs to be reconciled with poor psychological well-being:
"many patients with epilepsy are unable to express numerically the constant anxiety due to
the unpredictability of the next seizure or occasional difficulties with finding words" [Selai
and Rosser 1995]. The rubric of some measures exacerbates the problem, for example, the
Functional Limitations Profile requires people to complete it with reference to how they are
feeling today and to make this judgement only on the basis of their health [Patrick and Peach
1989]. This requires the person to make two judgements for each response: "1 am not driving
today" should only be affirmed if they are not driving today for health reasons, rather than
because they never learnt to drive. Jenkinson gives the following example of the cognitive
contortions required to respond to "I have attempted suicide":
Respondents must not tick 'Yes' if they have attempted suicide today, but did so
because their spouse has been killed in a car accident (this is, after all, not a problem
.with their health). Maybe it would be legitimate to tick "Yes" if the respondent
reasoned that their mental health had been adversely affected by a relative's death,
and they had attempted suicide today (just before filling in the questionnaire in fact)
[Jenkinson 1995]
He observes that, "questions such as these must make researchers sit back and take stock of
how such questionnaires are interpreted (or re-interpreted) by respondents if results from such
measures are to be of any meaningful use whatsoever". An example from my own research
was an interviewee who asked a friend to fill in the QOL in dystonia questionnaire because
she found the retrospective questions too distressing, but suspected that he had done so
"sarcastically" as "he felt some of the things were so obvious they didn't need to be asked".
A single QOL score (a requirement of health economic analysis':") can be obtained through
global QOL questions that invite the subject to weigh different areas of their life in making
348The single figure is combined with data on health preferences [e.g. Rosser and Kind 1978] to produce
QualitylDisability Adjusted Life Years, which can be used to guide resource allocation.
their assessment. For example, "on this thermometer [marked 0-100] [... ] indicate how good
or bad your own health is today" [EUROQOL 1990]. However, it is difficult to know what
these questions measure/", something that is concealed by their apparent simplicity [Selai
and Trimble 1997]. For example, the response "yes, I am better" could refer to resolution of
the disorder, readjustment, or redefinition350 [Beaton et al 1999]. The questions are most
likely to record psychological well-being, or "health perceptions", which correlate strongly
with future deterioration (this is not surprising as believing that you are going to deteriorate
probably causes deterioration). This suggests QOL is actually "a reflection of the way that
patients perceive and react to their health status and to other non-medical aspects of their
lives" [Gill and Feinstein 1994].
QOL measures assume that "human life consists of a series of essentially discrete
components or dimensions, each of which is amenable to independent measurement"
[Joralmen and Fujinaga 1994]. However, the concept is holistic, not "reductivist" and cannot
be measured by breaking it down into specific characteristics. Attempts have been made to
define common domains ofQOL (for example, [WHOQOL 1998]) but the links between the
domains and their relative significance has been little explored. The need for a more holistic
measure of QOL links to debates over whether it can be expressed in a single figure for health
economic analysis [Kaplan and Anderson 1997]. Some researchers describe combining
different domains in a single score as "adding apples and oranges" [Stewart and Ware 1992],
especially when questions about levels of functioning are aggregated with how the person
feels about the situation [Muldoon et al 1998]. Others (responding in the same metaphor)
claim that it's "the overall evaluation of the basket of fruit that's important" [Hays et al
1993]. Some researchers also question whether we can compare QOL scores from different
conditions (for example, eating disorders, angina, and heart transplants [Keilen et al 1994]) as
the researcher is invited to "play God" in assigning relative weights to very different
experiences.
While the differences in results from QOL measures probably arise from their different
models ofQOL351, developers are more likely to describe their "psychometric properties"
349A population survey in Israel found that only 48% of the global rating could be explained by the domains of
the SF-36 (refer note 1) [Mozes et aI1997], although this could also be a criticism of the SF-36.
350Patient satisfaction studies also fail to explore how people transform experiences into evaluations of a service
as a whole [Williams et aI1998], for example, being satisfied with a treatment can encompass feelings of
resignation and helplessness and a belief that the treatment is useless [Kilian et al 1999].
351Ziebland [1993] distinguishes four models of disability underlying measures used for rheumatoid arthritis:
functional, subjective distress, comparative, and dependence. All of these contain questionable assumptions, for
example, the second assumes that dependence is pathological (the Stanford Arthritis Healthy Activities
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than their philosophical underpinning [Keedwell and Snaith 1996; Ziebland et al 1993]. This,
combined with the "pragmatism of clinical practice", means that "many measures make no
reference to the concepts that they are trying to measure [... ] It is rather like possessing a
thermometer and knowing that it is intended to identify patients with a fever but not knowing
that what it actually measures is temperature" [Wilkin et al 1992: 18]. Measures contain (and
naturalise) normative assumptions about what constitutes health, posing the central question
for QOL, which is whose values are being measured? This is often difficult to discern, as
many researchers do not indicate how the items were generated. Using interviews with people
living with the condition makes it more likely that their concerns will be included, but this is
not certain (as I demonstrate in the next chapter) because ofthe way people's responses are
homogenised and made "quantifiable" during the development process. Some researchers
argue that if the measure incorporates values that differ from or conflict with the subject's
(for example, defining QOL as a function of income level and education), it is measuring
something other than QOL [Minaire 1993; Brown and Gordon 1999].
Where surveys and questionnaires begin with the assumption of 'disease burden' and
a medical model oflife quality, the assumptions of those positions - not the
individual's health state - is often what is typically measured. The questions asked
and the tenor of their presentation defines the parameters of the data while limiting the
potential for survey population response. It is a dialogue with only one speaker
[Koch 2000]
For example, although the correlation of measures with clinical variables is taken as a sign
that they tap areas of interest to the patient, it is more likely to mean they tap areas of interest
to the clinician. Seedhouse criticises the privileging of sickness as an obstacle to social
function over unemployment, poor education, etc. but warns that this was inevitable
considering the relative power of clinicians and academic social scientists: "opting to tackle a
more powerful political opponent on his own terms is not a particularly intelligent tactic"
[1996]. This problem was previously identified by Ardener in his description of "muted"
groups who fail to "modify dominant structures by their own 'rules" because of the "totally
reality-defining nature of such structures" [1989: 130]. This should be a cautionary note to
patient support organisations who fail to realise that the "neutral" technology of QOL is using
them as much as they are using it.
One response to suggestions that QOL measures don't address the changes that are important
to patients has been to produce individualised measures where patients identify the areas that
Questionnaire score is increased to "much difficulty" if the person received assistance from a person or aid,
regardless of their assessment of the degree of difficulty [Fries et aI1982]).
are important to them and rate their treatment according to its effect on those areas [Guyatt
1993] 352. The "Measure Your Medical Outcome Profile" [Paterson 1996] is an unusual
example as it was validated against interviews with people with asthma, rather than another
QOL measure. However, although it picked up treatment effects, it didn't observe medication
avoidance and reduction, which were key themes in people's accounts [Paterson and Britten
1999]. This suggests their ability to represent what is important to the patient is limited by the
influence of the context in which they are designed and used. While these measures have
been used in a few aggregated studies (despite obvious problems of data interpretation), they
are still something of a curiosity since they cannot be used comparatively or for health
economic analyses.
Health economics: QOL's "evil twin"?
Health economic analysis demonstrates the double-edged nature of QOL measurement and
the way it simultaneously constructs what it records. While organisations like the Dystonia
Society can use QOL to demonstrate the severe impact of dystonia and the cost-effectiveness
of treatments, they are ultimately vulnerable to its being used against them (as happened to
the Motor Neurone Disease Association) to argue that the lives of people living with dystonia
are literally not worth living and no money should be diverted from other conditions in order
to prolong them. This logic reaches its extremity with Disability Adjusted Life Years where
QOL scores are used to estimate just how much of a "burden" on society the continued
existence of people living with dystonia or other limiting conditions represents (this process
is described in chapter 9).
The main unit of comparison for British decisions on the availability of treatments is the
Quality Adjusted Life Year (QAL Y). This is based on two dubious assumptions: that is
possible for external observers to value QOL in different health states from 0 (worst possible
state) to 1 (best possible state), and that we can be fairly certain of the number of years a
person would live in a particular state. QALYs are calculated in three stages: firstly,
valuations of different health states are obtained (obtaining "preferences"); secondly,
preferences and QOL scores are combined in "preference-based measures"; and, finally,
QALYs are calculated using the scores from these measures and information about costs.
They are inherently discriminative as a person with "perfect" health (i.e. a score of 1) who
352Forexample, the Patient Generated Index [Ruta et al1994] defines QOL as "the extent to which our hopes
and ambitions are matched by our experiences" [Calnan 1984] and explores this gap by asking people to list the
five most important areas affected by their condition, and the Schedule for the Evaluation ofIndividual Quality
of Life asks people to nominate the five most important areas of their life and assess the impact of their
condition on these (taking the risk that it may have little or no impact) [0 'Boyle et al 1992].
was going to live ten years would gain ten QALYs (i.e. 1 x 10) from an intervention, but a
person with only half-perfect health (0.5) would only gain five (i.e. 0.5 x 10), making them
less worthy of treatment [Jenkinson and McGee 1998].
In the remainder of this chapter I examine in more detail how QALYs are calculated and
used. I also critique the assumption that external observers can provide accurate, numerical
valuations of QOL in different health states. I argue that health economic analyses can sustain
a vicious circle where anticipated QOL is low, so interventions are not funded because they
appear poor value, reducing the QOL of people with the condition. In fact, Koch argues
persuasively that the process turns "eugenic assumptions" into "social science fact" by
assuming "that an individual or group's life quality can be described in a rigorous manner
based solely on the presence or absence of physical conditions deviating from those of the
normal population [... ]; that future life quality can be accurately predicted solely on the basis
of current physical condition irrespective of social values or context [... and] that positive life
quality cannot be achieved in the presence of physical defects" [2000].
How QALYs are used?
QALYs provide an apparently neutral and scientific justification for politically sensitive
decisions on resource allocation.
Once complex administrative decisions have been reduced to simple, and usually
quantified, comparisons of cost and benefit, it comes to seem irrational (or
improper ...) not to act in accordance with the numbers
[Ashmore et a11989]
However, despite the rhetoric, they are rarely the decisive factor in decision-making as they
are difficult to defend to the general public and can be criticised on ethical and
methodological grounds. The provocative suggestion by Maynard353 that hospitals shut their
intensive care units and divert the money to hip replacements exposes the limitations of an
approach based solely on cost per QAL y354. In the following examples QALYs are used to
353Speaking at an MS Society conference 2001.
354Forexample, the following table for NHS purchasers shows how comparisons of various interventions are
made using QALYs [Mason et aI1993]. However, this does not help decision-making as the ethical and political
I . f h . Iissues (for example, the re ative power 0 t e specia ities) are so enormous.
Treatment ('ost per QAL Y (lIK. 1990)
Cholesterol testing and treatment by diet (adults aged 40-6<) £220
Neurosurgical intervention for head iniurv £240
Advice to stop smoking from (il' £270
Hyp_ertensive treatment to prevent stroke (aged 45-(4) £940
Pacemaker implantation £1.100
Hip replacement £1.180
Heart transplantation n.X40
Hospital haemodialysis £21.<)70
Erythropoietin for anaemia in patient receiving dialysis (assuming no increase in survival) .£ 126.290
identify the most cost effective treatment for a condition (which is then compared with
interventions in other specialities'j"), to argue for or against funding for new treatments
(Botulinum toxin for dystonia and Beta interferon for MS), to decide which treatments to
fund (the Oregon experiment), and to prioritorise waiting lists.
Treatment options for people with angina [Williams 1985]
The health economist Williams asked three cardiologists to judge the life expectancy and
health of people with angina, including some who had had coronary artery bypass grafting356•
He used the patient profiles to calculate an average gain from surgery of 1.5 QALYs for
people with mild angina and 3.5 for people with severe. He also calculated that only 67%
people would benefit from surgery (gaining six years of life), 30% would stay the same (life
expectancy five years), and 3% would die (losing their life expectancy of five years), so the
overall measure ofQALYs gained would be 11 years/67% - five years/3% = 7.22 QALYs.
67% People who benefited from surgery Gained an extra 6 years of life (11 years)
30% People who didn't benefit from surgery Didn't gain any years so life expectancy still 5 years
3% Died Lost 5 years of life
He concluded that bypass grafting compared favourably with valve replacement for aortic
stenosis and the implantation of pacemakers for heart block, and was better than heart
transplantation and treatment of renal failure. However, it was less cost effective than a hip
~
replacement (the author's favourite measure of value), though possibly more useful for
individuals with angina! This study provoked popular debate about using QALYs to allocate
resources [Ashmore et a11989].
Use of Beta Interferon in Secondary Progressive Multiple Sclerosis IForbes et a11999]
QALYs were famously used to justify the Department of Health's decision not to fund Beta
interferon for people with secondary progressive MS. The study reported that 18 people
needed to be treated for 30 months to delay one person's deterioration to wheelchair-
dependence by nine months357 [Forbes et a11999]. Even when the social costs of wheelchair-
dependence were included (estimated as 15-20% of the costs of the disease), the cost per
QALY gained was £1,024,667. This compared poorly with similar studies between 1995-98
where the median cost per QALY was £15,625. The response to the high profile campaign
against the decision, orchestrated jointly by the MS Society and the Association of British
355Thechoice of a cardiac treatment for review is significant as Cardiology is a prestigious speciality, practicing
expensive "high technology" medicine that historically has shielded its practices from scrutiny or comparison.
356Foran anthropological critique of this technique, see Bates [1990].
357Theequation used was cost per QALY gained = net cost of treat men tinumber ofQALYs gained (where this =
total cost of treatment - costs averted [from reduced relapses and wheelchair dependence]) [ibid].
Neurologists358, suggests that treatments for very disabling conditions (particularly affecting
young adults) have a stronger claim on resources that may outweigh their relative
inefficiency.
Treatment options for people with dystonia [Gudex et a11997]
Gudex generated QALYs to assess the benefit of Botulinum toxin as a treatment for focal
dystonia. However, the type of dystonia, duration of treatment, method of obtaining
preferences for health states, and the characteristics of the participants caused considerable
variation in the number of QALYs gained from the treatment. Despite these methodological
problems, the study was used by the Dystonia Society to lobby successfully for health
authority funding for Botulinum toxin, and an increase in the number of clinics giving
injections.
The "Oregon experiment" [Oregon Health Services Commission 1991]
This was the most comprehensive attempt to derive a set of priorities using a preference-
based measure (the Quality of Wellbeing scale [Kaplan and Anderson 1987]). The context to
the experiment was that in 1988 Oregon ran out of money for its Medicaid programme'j". It
decided to deny coverage to organ transplantation (including a seven year old boy requiring a
bone marrow transplant) to fund maternity care for 1,500 women. There was a public outcry
and so the following year, when Oregon wanted to cut services to extend Medicaid to cover
100% of costs instead of 67%, it decided to involve the public in the decision making
process, even though ultimately they had little influence on the final outcome.
It carried out a telephone survey of 1001 people who were asked to rate a certain number of
health states between 0 (death) and 1(perfect health). 709 health states were rated in total and
the ratings were combined with information from health professionals about treatment cost
and efficacy to create "condition-treatment" pairs, put in order of priority. These pairs were
substantially reordered by the Oregon health commissioners before the proposal was
submitted to the Federal Government. Itwas rejected because the Government thought that
the results of the telephone survey were irrelevant and might contravene the Americans with
Disabilities act by underestimating the QOL of people with disabilities. The proposal was
resubmitted with treatments evaluated on the basis of three "objective" criteria: probability of
death, probability of a complete cure, and cost of avoiding death. It was rejected again for
358Therelationship between the MS Society and the ABN is strengthened by the funding provided by the MS
Society to research units run by ABN Officers.
359Medicaid provides poor Americans with free healthcare.
contravening the act by expressing preference for treatments that cured conditions completely
as this discriminated against people with chronic conditions and disabilities. Oregon
eventually limited its prioritorisation process to the probability of preventing death as this
would not be covered by the act. If any pairs tied on that basis, the cost of treatment was the
tie-breaker. If the pairs still tied, they were ordered alphabetically by diagnosis - a sad
conclusion to the Oregon experiment'I", The main problems with the experiment were that
treating the decision as a unitary one (the "people's perspective") ignored differences in
preference (for example, elderly people did not want to fund obstetric care), having to
contravene the "life saving imperative" in prioritorising treatments demoralised participants,
and the range of costs to be avoided or benefits sought were not clearly identified. Ultimately,
participants were suspicious about the genuineness of the consultation and felt they were
being given responsibility without power [Blumstein 1997].
Prioritorising waiting lists
"Priority scoring systems" which attempt to equitably allocate positions on hospital waiting
lists have been used successfully in Australasia, Canada, and Sweden361• The main arguments
in favour are that they make the management of waiting lists "transparent" (another audit
buzz-word), they lead to patients being treated in order of need, and they make it possible to
set minimum thresholds of need for referral onto waiting lists. In the UK scoring systems
have been used at hospitals in Salisbury [Lack and Armand Smith 1997], London [Gudex et
a11990], and Carmarthen, sparking debates over what clinical and social criteria should be
used to decide the relative priority of patients, and who should decide on the criteria and their
relative weight. The systems have also caused "clustering" of conditions, which makes it
difficult to prepare balanced theatre list: ten hours of hip replacements are not satisfying for
experienced surgeons or educational for trainees.
360Thetop five ailments were severe/moderate head injury, haematoma (blood clot) or oedema (fluid
accumulation) with loss of consciousness; insulin dependent diabetes; peritonitis (inflammation of the lining of
the abdominal cavity); acute glomerulonephritis (kidney disease); and pneumothorax (air between lung and
chest wall) and haemothorax (blood in chest). The bottom five were mental disorders with no effective
treatments; infertility; hepatorenal syndrome (liver failure leading to renal failure); spastic syndrome (voice
disorder); and disorders of refraction (affecting cornea and lens) and accommodation (eye muscles).
361Studies of cataract surgery in Sweden found that centres using formal scoring systems were more successful
at adhering to waiting times than those without [Lundstrom et al 1996] and in Australia the fears about
"gaming" by doctors and patients (exaggerating the case for priority to secure treatment earlier) were not
realised [Street and Duckett 1996]. However, an evaluation of surgical priority criteria in New Zealand showed
wide variation between surgeons' judgements and the score patients obtained on the scoring system, suggesting
that different definitions of priority were being used [Dennett and Parry 1998].
How are QALVS calculated?
The three stages in the process (described below) are obtaining people's preferences for
different health states, combining these with QOL scores to create preference-based measures
of health, and calculating QALYs using scores from these measures and information about
costs.
1. Obtaining preferences
Single scores from QOL measures are combined with "preferences" for different health states
(revealingly called "utilities") obtained from samples of "healthy" volunteers and health
professionals by asking them to make judgements about QOL in hypothetical situations. The
techniques for obtaining preferences can be divided into "comparative methods", where
individuals compare the imagined experiences of people with health conditions, and "choice-
based methods", where individuals imagine what their QOL would be with a particular
condition. Although the latter are considered more reliable as respondents are required to
make a sacrifice to return full health362, their complexity often produces bizarre outcomes.
For example, participants from a study using the Rosser Scale described "feeling a lack of
ambition" as 45% worse than "complete bowel incontinence" [Rosser et al 1992].
The main problem with these techniques is their assumption that individuals with little or no
experience of illness or disability can estimate QOL in different conditions, and predict what
their reaction to them would be. This was not the case in a study of people with late-onset
disabilities, as the majority had never imagined having a limiting condition in the future, even
if they had acted as a carer to a family member [Koch 2001]. However, all noted unexpected
benefits from being disabled in social, family, spiritual, and even professional areas.
Individual evaluations of health states differ according to the person's background and
previous experience of illness [Froberg and Kane 1989]. For example, older respondents to
the time trade-off technique were less prepared to live 10 years with diminished health
[Robinson et al 1997].
People's responses to health valuation questions are artefacts of an artificial research process.
The difference between the perspective of a health economist and a lay person is illustrated
by the creator of the Rosser scale's observation that subjects who evaluated states of health
using their interview procedure "experienced the interview as traumatic and felt that it
changed their perception of illness" [Kind et aI1982]. People do not usually make good
362"Economists are wary of approaches that don't involve people sacrificing one thing they value to get another"
[Williams 1999].
judgements when asked to assess the experience of hypothetical illness states [Kahneman and
Varey 1991; Nord 2001] and find it hard to imagine the transition from one health state to
another after treatment. People tend to prefer low risk interventions that spread the benefits,
even if the expected value is lower, and score them more favourably if they are likely to
benefit [Richardson and Nord 1997]. Different experimental tasks (for example, gambling life
expectancy on a cure, or rating conditions from 0-100) produce different valuations of health
states. This is also the case with preference-based measures as they encapsulate the designer's
perspective on resource allocation (for example, favouring curative interventions or targeting
the worst-off). The following table demonstrates this by using the Health Utilities Index
[Furlong et a12001] and "person trade-off' scores [Murray 1994] to estimate the benefits of
two interventions, the first to cure 100 people with condition A, and the second, to take 30
people with condition B to a functional level corresponding with condition A.
Name of measure Intervention 1 Intervention 2
Health Utilities Index 400 QALYs 240 QALYs
Person trade-off 80 QALYs 126QALYs
[Nord 2001]
Another core assumption for health economic analysis is that preference techniques produce
equal-interval level scales363, so we can be sure what different valuations mean (for example,
a valuation of 0.5 means that a health state is half as valuable as full health, but twice as
valuable as one valued 0.25). However, this was challenged by a recent study, asking people
with prostate cancer to use different methods to value prostate cancer-related health states,
where none of the methods produced equal-interval level scales [Cook et al 2001]. This
suggests that it would be unwise to use health economic measures as a basis for decision-
making, a conclusion that surprisingly has not affected the NHS's enthusiasm for the
technology.
2. Combining preferences and QOL scores in preference-based measures of health
Although it is possible to combine a single score from a QOL measure (for example, the total
score for the SF-36) with preferences elicited by the techniques described above, preference-
based measures that combine the two in the same measure are considered to be more
accurate364• However, there is considerable variation in preference scores between the
363Where data is ordered and the distances between values on one part are equal to those on another part so it can
be used like a thermometer [Jenkinson and McGee 1998].
364Thismay change with the move to shorter QOL measures, for example, creating a single score for the SF-36
and reducing its items to 12 (the SF-I2).
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measures365, suggesting that what you are trying to prove is a big factor in your choice of
measure (as with QOL measures). This was surreally demonstrated by a researcher with
physical disabilities who rated himself using three different measures:
In the Health Utilities Index (Mark 1) the author scored 0.53, which means he is
halfway between being healthy and being dead. In the Health Utilities Index (Mark II)
he scored 0.13 for the multi-attribute value function and 0.63 for the multi-attribute
utility function. The 0.13 score indicates that his quality of life is low, but the 0.63
score that he is not as bad off as one might suppose. On the Quality of Wellbeing
Scale he scored 0.48, again not a very healthy result. He lost most of the points on the
measures because he uses a wheelchair reflecting the 'experts' stereotypes of
wheelchair users
[Pfeiffer 1998]
I provide further detail on the five established preference based measures'?" in the appendix.
3. Calculating QALYs from preference-based measures and data 011 costs
In this section I use a hypothetical example from Spiegelhalter of four programmes bidding
for funding [1992] to show how QALYs might be used in health resource allocation and
highlight the role of "discount rates" 367 in shaping the data in particular directions.
1. To provide 100 middle-aged women with short-term treatment to relieve anxiety or
depression (q=0.75 [assigned a preference score ofO.75]) estimated to remove
symptoms for on average seven months.
2. To try out a new neurosurgical treatment on 100 middle aged patients with the
same symptoms in (1). If successful, it will relieve symptoms for life, but it carries a
24% risk of death during operation.
3. To provide 10 patients with advanced cancer with treatment that will give them two
extra years of reasonable quality life (q=0.75).
4. To carry out one heart transplant on a 5 year old child, who without the operation is
expected to live two years with poor quality (q=O.SO); if the child survives the post
operative period (there is 20% initial mortality) he or she will return to healthy life
[ibid]
Assuming a 5% discount rate for future years, all four options provide about 15 QALYs, but
two different aspects of equity are involved. The first is that while in 1 and 2 the patients are
similar to start with, 1 guarantees a small benefit for all while 2 envisages large variation
among patients (and also trades off mortality and QOL). The second concerns the numbers
365A comparison of the preference scores for moderate, considerable, and severe levels of disability found ranges
ofO.70-0.995, 0.40-0.94, and 0.10-0.85 respectively [Nord 2001].
366TheNorth American Quality of Wellbeing scale [Kaplan and Anderson 1987], Rosser Disability/distress scale
[Rosser and Kind 1978). Health Utilities Index 1 to 3 [Furlong et al 2001) and the European ISD [Sintonen
2001) and EQ-5D or EUROQOL [Kind 1996).
367Discount rates assume that years in the distant future are worth less than years in the immediate future. They
are usually set at inflation to reflect depreciation of capital, but this can be used to justify postponing investment.
and initial health of patients in each option: if resources should be concentrated on the people
who can benefit most (a Rawlsian rather than a Utilitarian perspective) then option 4 should
be funded.
Changing the discount rate (an apparently "technical" decision) changes the situation entirely,
as the table below shows:
0% discount rate 5% discount 10'Yo discount rate
rate
Option 1 (in QALYs gained) 15 15 15
Option 2 (in QALYs gained) 30 15 10
Option 3 (in QALYs gained) 15 15 15
Option 4 (in QALYs gained) 57 15 8
Implications of discount rates Favours interventions Standard rate Favours inunediate
with long-term benefit; averse to
consequences risk of early death
, .
[ Spiegelhalter et al 1992]
Spiegelhalter wonders if those who rated anxiety or depression at 0.75 realised this could be
used to justify the high operative mortality in option 2, and observes, "If the means of
assessing values from individuals does not reflect the use to which they will be put [... it]
could give rise to dubious conclusions" [ibid].
Conclusion
There are two main reasons why QALYs are not a sound basis for health economic analyses.
Firstly, they place a low value on health states with a high degree of discomfort and distress,
and do not acknowledge that people not only cope with these states ("It's funny how quickly
it becomes part of you", Philip chapter 3), but place greater value on them as time passes ("In
a strange way, I am now quite proud to have dystonia", Geoff chapter 2). They are also
underpinned by a utilitarian philosophy, which causes them to be weighted against the
elderly368 [Grimley Evans 1992] and people with disabilities as "full" recovery from a life-
threatening condition will always be worth more QALYs for the young and healthy369.
Secondly, the poor quality of data available for most interventions makes it difficult to
calculate QALYs. Accurate cost estimates are hard to obtain, especially for private costs like
family care, and life expectancy has to be estimated from a very small group for each
condition-treatment combination. However, this complexity and fragility is disguised by the
way the analyses are presented, for example, as summarised tables that suggest quick and
easy solutions and don't acknowledge that cost per QALY figures are only "best estimates of
averages" [Petrou and Renton 1993]
368Proponents of the "fair innings" approach [e.g. Williams 1997] argue that this bias is insufficient as young
Eeople should always be treated ahead of old, even where the old person would benefit more.
69What Nord calls "utilitarian ageism" [Nord et al 1996].
Health economic analysis in general has limited explanatory power as it is rooted in
individual consumer theory370 and looks at activities solely in terms of health benefit. This
makes it difficult to explain why a person continues to smoke since they are irrationally
trading a "current negative" (reduced health and life expectancy) for a "future positive" at
zero or negative cost. While economists emphasise that "cost" should not be interpreted as
"money required in exchange for a particular commodity" (the common use of the word), but
as "opportunities foregone by employing scarce resources" (or "opportunity cost"), they often
find themselves using money to make comparisons as it is a familiar, if skeletal, measure of
value. But basing valuations on "the total amount that individuals are willing to pay for health
improvement" is problematic because it assumes that they are the rational and well-informed
"ideal consumer" of economic theory, and is obviously affected by their income level
[Drummond 1986].
The assumptions underlying QOL measurement and health economic analysis of aggregate
representation, correspondence to reality, stability of preferences, and neutrality of
quantification do not stand up to further investigation. For example, "correspondence to
reality" assumes that the categories used by the analyst correspond with everyday
evaluations. In fact, they are abstract, artificial, and bear little resemblance to the judgements
people make in real situations where the choice is not between "carefully defined categories"
but "ill-defined courses of action [... ] which are complex, diffuse, and subject to change"
[Mulkay et aI1989]. The assumption of "stability of preferences" ignores that fact that the
process of measurement changes respondents' evaluations. Consequently, Mulkay
recommends "we treat participants' expectations as variable social phenomena and their
evaluative responses, not as expressions of stable underlying preferences, but as reactions to
socially defined situations [1989: 105]. While the analyst assumes that preference values have
a real meaning to the respondent and express quantifications that are already implicit in the
way they think about health states, the smooth distribution of preferences is more likely to be
"the respondent's recognition of a quantification already implicit in the analyst's prearranged
categories". In fact, "[QALYs are] the interpretative outcome of a special, and indeed rather
peculiar, form of social interaction between economists and ordinary people" [ibid: 106].
Although QALYs are presented as "an accurate reflection of [ordinary people's] preference",
they are only able to express this through a measurement procedure "constructed in terms of
37°Critiqued by economic anthropologists like Polanyi [1958].
social scientists' preconceptions" [ibid.l Oc]. The same criticism could be made ofQOL
measures that claim to represent "the patient's voice" but actually "mute" it [Ardener 1975]
by only including utterances that fit with the developers' preconceptions and goals, a
situation I explore in the next chapter.
Chapter 8: An ethnography of QOL measurement
In this chapter, I describe how measures of QOL are created, using ethnography from
participant observation during the creation of a disease-specific measure for multiple sclerosis
(the 29-item Multiple Sclerosis Impact Scale or MSIS-29). This supports my claim that QOL
measures do not speak in the "voice of the patient" as it shows how the items identified by
people living with multiple sclerosis are systematically removed from the measure to enhance
its "scientific" properties. I then examine the use of QOL measures in survey research,
drawing on my experience coordinating a European survey of the QOL of people living with
dystonia [Camfield et al 2000, 2002; Ben-Shlomo et al 2002]).
Designing measures of QOL: the MSIS-29
When measures are created, as on other occasions where Science is practiced, the rules set
out in handbooks like Streiner and Norman [1989] are used flexibly, mainly as resources in
disputes between different actors. This was even true of the MSIS-29 project whose explicit
aim was to create a "scientifically sound patient-based measure" which would be a "gold
standard" for future measures and "combine patient perspective with rigorous psychometric
methods" [Hobart et al200 1]. The singular ("patient perspective") is significant since the aim
was to take the different perspectives of people living with multiple sclerosis and aggregate
them into one person who, by representing no one (no item should be recognisable to its
contributor) could represent everyone.
My field notes from the project contest the measure's claim to represent the "patient
perspective", but what may be more interesting is that this is the new justification for and way
of judging measures ofQOL. This is reminiscent of the primatologists studied by Haraway
who claim that their enterprise is not about "power and control" but "translates the active
voice of their subjects" [1989:8]. However, while there are people who are patients at
different times and contexts, "the patient" is as artificial a construct as "the third world
woman" [Mohanty et a1 1991] and created for the same reason, as an object of intervention.
Kane exposes the futility of this sort ofreification in her description of working on an AIDS
prevention project which not only assumed a culture of intravenous drug users but "a culture
of the non-drug injecting, non-HIV-positive spouses or sex partners of drug-injecting, HIV-
infected persons" [Kane and Mason 1992]. While people with limiting conditions are "natives
who can speak for themselves ..371, can they be heard? (c.f. [Armstrong 1984; Spivak 1996,
371A gay slogan born of frustration with the anthropological response to AIDS/HIV [Frankenberg 1995].
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Crossley and Crossley 2001]). Or do current discursive conditions ensure that they remain a
"muted group", unless they are prepared to speak either as a consumer or in the language of
QOL (a process Bourdieu calls symbolic violence [1991]). Perhaps we should be suspicious
of the motivations of researchers and advocates who want to "give patients a voice" as "no
activist wants to keep the subaltern in the space of difference [... ] You don't give the bloody
subaltern voice, you work against subaltemity" [Spivak 1996].
I worked for six months as temporary coordinator on this project so I could observe how the
measure was created and "validated" against existing measures, and the organiser372 could
participate in an unsuccessful funding application for a dystonia-specific measure. This
period covered the reduction of the scale from 129 to 29 items after the first and second field
tests, but I have also used "grey literature" and informal interviews to follow the measure
from its inception. The project, supported by the MS Society, aimed to produce a self-report
measure to evaluate expensive new treatments like Beta interferon "using outcomes that are
important to patients" [Hobart et a12001].
The first phase of the project involved 30 semi-structured interviews with a representative
sample of people living with multiple sclerosis. The interviews were transcribed and the
coordinator and another investigator separately extracted statements about the impact of
multiple sclerosis. Although the two sets of statements were fairly similar, the project team
described the coordinator's set as "over-inclusive". They attributed this to her inexperience
with outcome measures, implying that a more experienced person would have automatically
excluded statements that would not fit in a measure. ". The statements were reviewed to
exclude areas that the team did not think related to QOL (for example, reactions to diagnosis),
even where they were key parts of the person's narrative. They were then organised into
symptoms, activities of daily living, emotional impact of multiple sclerosis, doctor-related
statements, drug side-effects, financial strain, required planning, public response, relapses,
impact on and responses of significant others, and wheelchair-related statements. Items
related to "coping with multiple sclerosis" and the "positive impact of multiple sclerosis"
were excluded as "irrelevant", although they were obviously relevant to the people who
generated them. This may be an example of the way measures of disability "create" low QOL
by focusing on the negative [Ziebland et al 1993].
J72The team members were a clinical neurologist and "psychometrician" (organiser), another neurologist, a
social scientist experienced in measure design, a psychologist, a statistician, and a QOL expert.
373Subsequently, I read a set of interviews for a different measure where the interviewer kept the focus on
symptoms and treatments, probing these areas aggressively and cutting the interviewee Sh011when they
attempted to change the topic or give "irrelevant" detail.
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The initial questionnaire was divided into two sections on "subjective distress" (mixing
physical symptoms and "psychosocial" problems), and limitations to activities of daily living.
The items were made more specific; for example, splitting "fatigue" into "physical" and
"mental" (a slightly superfluous division since mental fatigue is experienced in the body). 38
new items were added, some suggested by focus groups of health professionals. Other new
items came from a review of existing measures, making the validation process seem
tautologous since the new measure would be validated against measures that had served as its
source and template (as was the case for diagnostic measures for Multiple Personality
Disorder [Hacking 1995]).
The second draft was tested in two groups of people living with multiple sclerosis374 and four
more items were added (body image, tinnitus, limitations in walking, and feelings of loss
related to your multiple sclerosis), none of which made it to the final measure. The team were
concerned that the large number of items might tire respondents and distort the data, and that
the MS Society database (the source of addresses for the field test) contained an unknown
proportion of people without multiple sclerosis375• A quarter of the participants received two
questionnaires: one to be completed immediately, the other 10 days later to check that the
responses to the measure were reproducible. This was not wholly successful, as many
respondents didn't complete the second questionnaire at all. Others returned it with the first
questionnaire, or returned it late, or returned the first questionnaire late because they had used
that to "check their answers"!
The next phase used psychometric methods to reduce the questionnaire to 35-40 items
(considered to be the optimum size), taking it even further from the original interviews.
When two items correlated highly with each other (>0.7), the one with worse psychometric
properties would be eliminated'I", unless it was thought to be "clinically important". The
three items on sex and body image were cut because of missing data, even though excluding
these aspects as difficult to measure increases the artificial and disembodied appearance of
measures ofQOL. This reduced the items to 42 (there is a table of correlations between the
374Half of who had participated in the original interviews; it would have been fascinating to have observed their
reaction to this alchemical transformation of their narratives.
375This is also true of the Dystonia Society where even some of the branch organisers have not been diagnosed
with dystonia. We conducted a pilot study to estimate how many members needed to be mailed to get a
sufficient sample of people living with MS, but we still had to trust that people without the condition wouldn't
bother to fill in the form since we had no way of excluding their responses.
376These were items that were most or least frequently ticked (indicating that they were either very common or
rare), had high floor/ceiling effects (indicating that they weren't sensitive measures), or missing data (>5%).
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original items in the appendix) and these were then "factor-analysed" to produce models
showing how many factors underlay the items. The factor analysis produced six possible
models containing between two and seven factors, three of which were equally plausible. The
choice of the two-factor model (physical and psychological) appeared to be made because it
felt most "natural" and mirrored other successful measures, even though it explained the
smallest amount of variance in scores (only 47%). This shows how the culture ofQOL
measures makes them actors in their own right (c.f. Callon and the electric fridge) as they are
saturated with collective memories and expectations that direct future interactions. It also
poses the question "who is using who?"
The final phase of item reduction involved deleting another 10 items from the 39_item377
scale to make it more "economical". I reconstruct the motivation for the deletions below.
Complex items were obvious candidates for deletion, as were ones that correlated with more
than one factor (despite the pervasive influence of Cartesian mind-body dualism, this would
be true of most statements that people make about their health). An item on long-term work
plans was removed as it correlated with two items on use of transport. To me this represented
a waste of data as under a social model of disablement the strong correlation between the
ability to continue working and the availability of accessible transport would merit further
research. After extensive debate an item on the effect on partner or family was removed,
giving the measure an exclusively individual focus. Two symptoms-related items were also
removed, I suspect because they are common symptoms that are unlikely to respond to
treatment and so would not be useful when evaluating treatments.
Deleted items from the 39-item two-factor solution
Item Possible reason for cut
1.30 MS has limited ability to walk Similar to item 5 in the final measure
indoors "difficulties moving about indoors"
1.84 Bothered by difficulties planning Loaded on physical and psychological factors
things on an everyday basis
1.94 Bothered by feeling you had Loaded on physical and psychological factors
missed out on things through your MS
1.60 Bothered by the effect of MS 011 Insufficiently focused on the individual?
your spouse/partner or family
1.4 Bothered by hot or cold Common symptom of MS that would be
temperatures making your MS worse unlikely to respond to treatment?
1.79 Bothered by having to change Correlated with 1.80 Bothered by the effect of
long term work plans MS on your driving, and 1.81 Bothered by
problems using transport (item 17, MSIS-29).
1.51 Bothered bv feeling frustrated Loaded on physical and psychological factors
1.41 Bothered by getting tired when Similar to item 23 in MSIS-29 "feeling
you do thil1.f;S mentally fatigued"
1.2 Bothered bv pills and needles, Common symptom ofMS that would be
377Three were deleted because they didn't belong strongly to either factor ("bothered by numbness or lack of
sensation", "bothered by problems in vision when reading", "bothered by problems with constipation").
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tinKling or burning sensations unlikely to respond to treatment?
1.5 Bothered by pain Explained the lowest amount of variance,
possibly because it was in the wrong factor?
~,....Italics - part of 'psychological well-being factor
The final 29-item measure (20 physical, 9 psychological) is in the appendix.
In the next section, I look at how the final items correlated with the deleted ones to gain an
insight into the reduction process. I also examine why, of the eleven themes drawn from
interviews with people with multiple sclerosis, only symptoms, activities of daily living,
"emotional impact of multiple sclerosis", and "required planning" were included378, despite
the importance of the others to people living with multiple sclerosis (and anyone who wants
to understand life with multiple sclerosis). Finally, I discuss other representations of life with
multiple sclerosis that could have been created from the same data by analysing six of the
original interviews.
When I looked more closely at the final scale, I was interested to see that many of the items
correlated, for example, 2 and 3 (gripping and carrying), and 11 and 21 (body not doing what
you want and feeling unwell), even though this seemed to contravene the rules of the
psychometric methodology. The item on "feeling unwell" was particularly interesting as its
correlations with the deleted items "having to limit what you do because of tiredness" and
"your body not doing what you want it to do" suggested distinct components of
"unwellness": alienation, constraint, tiredness, and frustration, any of which could be
affirmed when someone ticked that item. Similarly, although problems maintaining attention
during tasks, organising things, thinking clearly, and learning new ways of doing things are
all aspects of concentratiorr'{" (item 27), I felt these were qualitatively different experiences
that could have different impacts, depending on your lifestyle. These correlations underline
the fact that people's experiences are not neatly compartmentalised in preparation for their
measurement.
Most of the correlations made sense on some levee80 except the one between
gripping/carrying and swallowing food. The mystery was solved when I looked at the original
378public response, financial strain, drug side-effects, doctor-related statements, relapses, impact on and
responses of significant others (mentioned indirectly in item12 "having to depend on others to do things for
ou"), and wheelchair-related statements were excluded.
r79problems with vision also correlated with concentration but I think this was an example of an external factor
affecting concentration rather than a part of concentration; however, the decision had already been made to
exclude the item on vision as it didn't belong clearly to either factor.
38°1presume tinnitus. which correlated with ability to do physically demanding tasks, is a "third variable" as it
occurs when someone has severe MS.
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scale where the item on swallowing is preceded by ones about fine hand movements,
suggesting that people filling the measure in quickly (or tiredly) had ticked it by accident. I
was intrigued by the link between employment goals and problems using transport, and also
between wheelchair use and uncertainty about what the future holds'?". I had no difficulty
understanding the correlation between wheelchair use and reduced spontaneity. The most
interesting aspect for me was that many of the deleted items were significant, but this
criterion wasn't sufficient. They also needed to be good indices to the area oflife beneath the
sightline of the measure, enabling the measure to see more while simultaneously seeing less.
Correlations between the MSIS-293112 and deleted items
Tinnitus (ringing in the ear)
Do physically demanding tasks? Limited your ability to run
1. Limited your ability to sit
Made it difficult for you to swallow some foods
Limited your ability to use both hands doing things
Grip things tightly (e.g. turning on taps)? Made it difficult for you to hold things
2. Made it difficult for vou to carry things
Difficulties achieving as much as you would like at
work or during your regular daily activities
Carry things? Made it difficult for you to swallow some foods
3. Made it difficult for vou to grip things tightly
4. Problems with your balance'? Difficulties moving about outdoors
Difficulties moving about outdoors
5. Difficulties moving about indoors? Limited your ability to walk
6. Being clurnsv? No correlations
7. Stiffness? No correlations
8. Heavv arms and/or legs? Weakness anywhere in your body
9. Tremor of vour arms or legs? No correlations
10. Spasms in vour limbs? No correlations
Your body not doing what you want it to Having to limit what you do because of tiredness
11. do? Feeling unwell
Having to depend on others to do things
12. for vou? No correlations
Limitations in your social and leisure
13. activities at home No correlations
Being stuck at home more than you would
14. like to be? Difficulties with self-care activities
Difticulties using your hands in everyday
15. tasks? No correlations
Having to cut down the amount of time
you spent on work or other daily
16. activities? No correlations
17 Problems using transport'? Having to change your goals concerning employment
18. Taking longer to do things? No correlations
Having to use a wheelchair
19. Difficultv doing things spontaneously? Uncertainty about what the future holds for you
20. Needing to go to the toilet uraentlv? No correlations
Feeling unwell? Having to limit what you do because of tiredness
21. Your body not doing what you want it to do
22. Problem s .~It't'pillg?
23. F'eeling mentallv fatigued?
381This supports other studies [e.g. Duval 1984] where the wheelchair is a symbol of dependence and despair.
38ZThe rubric to the items was either "in the past two weeks, how much have you been bothered by ... " or (for
items 1-3) "[ ... ], has your MS limited your ability to .,." and there were five possible responses.
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24. Worries related to your MS? No correlations
25. Feeline anxious or tense?
Feeling irritable, impatient, or short
26. tempered?
Problems with your vision when reading
Problems maintaining your attention during tasks
Difficulties organizing things
Problems concentrating? Difficulties thinking clearly
27. Difficulties learning new ways of doing things
28. Lack of confldencet
29. Feetine depressed? No correlations.. .
Italics = part of "psychological well-being factor
The final stage was the validation of the MSIS-29 against six commonly used measures (two
multiple sclerosis-specific), which were sent alongside it in batches of three. This is standard
practice, although I wonder how plowing through four similar measures, one after the other,
affects responses. On the basis of these somewhat tautologous comparisons the MSIS-29 was
judged valid (for example, the physical domain of the scale correlated with the main clinical
measure). The measure was not affected by the age of the respondent or how long they had
had multiple sclerosis (which seems a little suspicious), but it wasn't possible to calculate the
effect of class as there was so much missing demographic data383•
Although I believe that within the context of QOL measurement the MSIS-29 is a relatively
good measure (and probably superior to many of its contemporaries), it is interesting to return
to the original interviews and note how few of the themes made it to the final measure. I
summarise how the themes were covered in the table below.
Theme How covered
Developing coping strategies, adapting, not dwelling on the Excluded as "irrelevant"
past
Effect on sex, e.z. erectile dysfunction Excluded as too much missing data
Frustration at inability to do basic tasks, unreliability, Included - items I I, 15, 18
slowness, alienation from body
Confinement, loss of independence (e.g. ability to drive), lack Included - items 14, 17, 19
of spontaneity
Anger, resentment, lack of sympathy towards others' physical Not adequately covered - item 26
problems mentions "feeling irritable, impatient or
short tempered"
Public reactions ("I fell over on the platform and it was about Not included
4 o'clock in the afternoon and everybody was looking at me
like 'you must be drunk' and I sort of resented that I was just
on my way home from work or something and there was
nothing I could do"), embarrassment - particularly around
walking and toilet use, secrecy ("I'm afraid that my friends
are going to have the same [negative] reaction that I did"),
guilt and shame
Refocusing on self as a useful effect of diagnosis, increased Excluded as "irrelevant"
assertiveness ("if somebody was really rude to me I would just
take it. Now I really stand up for myself'), becoming a "nicer
383 At least five female respondents had refused to fill the employment section in as the standard classification
from the Office of Population and Census classifies women on their partner's employment. Another had filled in
her female partner's occupation and suggested we calculate it on this!
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person"
Work as central to life and self-definition (vit's stopped me Not adequately covered - item 16
doing the work that I love") mentions "having to cut down the amount
of time you spend on work or other daily
activities"
Changed relation to quotidian time, and to past and future Not included
("it's preventing me from getting involved in a very serious
relationship [... J I don't want to be a burden to somebody ten
years from now")
Role reversal in primary relationships ("it does feel a bit Not adequately covered - item 12
strange that she is doing all the heavy lifting and not me [... J mentions "having to depend on others to
you have to sit there like a lemon and do nothing"), do things for you"
discomfort with dependency, support from your family or
pressure to deny your condition, importance of self-control
and resisting others' attempts to control you
Uncertainty, problems planning ahead, others' perception of Not included
illness and health as dichotomous ("either you have to be
hobbling along and they realize you're ill or you have to be
completely weJ1")
During this section I have documented the process where, for many sound and scientific
reasons, the patient's voice seems to get smaller as the measure develops. I suspect that if
people living with multiple sclerosis had been as influential in the development process as the
other stakeholders'I", the measure would not look like a clinical measure (even down to its
individual focus), and the positive aspects of living with multiple sclerosis, which are less
visible to an outsider, would not have been dismissed as irrelevant. The final measure follows
the conventions of audit by privileging experiences that are individual, pre-packaged and
quantifiable, and neglecting those that are diffuse or ambiguous. In the next section I look at
one of the main uses for QOL measures, drawing on fieldwork from a European survey of the
QOL of people living with dystonia.
Using QOL measures in survey research: The dystonia QOL questionnaire
The dystonia QOL questionnaire arose from a vague desire to "do something for people
living with dystonia" (whose experiences were not acknowledged in popular and medical
discourses) using the database from the epidemiological study, and a more pragmatic one of
holding the participating centres together while a strategy for future collaboration was
developed. The European Dystonia Federation (who had part-funded the epidemiological
study385 to generate figures for lobbying) wanted to create a team of researchers equal in
eminence to the group who worked with the Dystonia Medical Research Foundation in the
US to bolster their authority and create a more equal relationship with the Foundation.
3g4Thedirector of the MS Society (an able-bodied, middle-aged, male "charity professional") attended few
project meetings so could not balance "expert opinion" with the equally reified "patient perspective".
~gSTheremainder came from two British pharmaceuticals who market rival brands of Botulinum toxin.
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This was the first postal questionnaire my collaborators and I had drafted so our first attempt
looked like a written version of a semi-structured interview. This was rejected because of the
problem of translating responses into English and coding them for statistical analysis. The
next draft was produced with the help of a psychologist (known for disproving theories about
the psychological causation of dystonia) and a neurologist turned "psychometrician". It
contained a brief biographical section, and a range of QOL measures covering depression,
anxiety, social support, leisure activities, self-esteem, stigma, acceptance of illness, and
general QOL (SF-36). Although these were either the most commonly used or the only
measures of each concept, they had a number of problems. For example: many of the physical
symptoms of anxiety in the Beck Anxiety Index overlapped with those of dystonia [Beck
1981]; the choice of activities like hunting and fishing suggested that the leisure activities
scale was locale (ifnot class) specific [Kelly et aI1987]; and the ambiguous wording of the
acceptance of illness measure [Felton and Revenson 1984] meant that we had to exclude it
from the final analysis as we had no idea what the person who filled it in had intended. The
only measure we could find for stigma was originally designed for people with colostomies
after bowel cancer [Macdonald and Anderson 1984], an experience I now suspect has little in
common with dystonia. This suggests that the designers envisaged a continuum of stigma
where the differences between ratings are ones of quantity rather than quality.
After discussing the questionnaire with people living with dystonia, staff from the Dystonia
Society, and other neurologists, we piloted it with members of the Society, receiving 80
completed questionnaires. The pilot was successful in the sense that there was little missing
data and the feedback in the "free-text" section was generally positive. But my interviews
with six of the respondents gave me a completely different perspective on the value of survey
research. Basically, once a questionnaire leaves the research office anything can happen to it.
Even if you have constructed it to "configure" the ideal user [Woolgar 1991], it can be
"destabilised" by their not behaving in the expected manner or engaging in "anti-
programmes" [Latour 1992] like using a proxy respondent, missing out questions, answering
"sarcastically", or responding on the basis of age or other conditions'f".
Before we mailed out the questionnaire researchers from each centre387 met in London to
discuss its content and the quality of the translation. Translating the measures brought some
of the problems with QOL measurement into sharp focus, for example, the implicit
386Destabilisation has been explored by sociologists of technology who have studied designers' attempts to
restrict the way their products are used (for example, Prout's study of the metered dose inhaler [1996]).
387London. Innsbruck, Turku, Bordeaux. Barcelona, Rome, and Munich.
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assumption that a measure of QOL is as culturally neutral and reproducible as a thermometer
and that northern European and American conceptions of health are grounded in human
biology and represent the norm from which other societies deviate. Hunt observes ironically
that "the ethnocentricity of assuming that a measure developed in, say, the USA, or England,
will be applicable (after adaptation) in pretty much any country or language in the world [ ... ]
is highlighted if one imagines the chances of a health questionnaire developed in Bali,
Nigeria, or Hong Kong, being deemed suitable for use in Newcastle, Newark, or Nice"
[1999]. For translation to be possible there needs to be a similar concept of health in both
cultures, used in the same way, with the same relationship to other values, and a comparable
system of health care and medical education, an assumption that doesn't even seem plausible
in Europe, let alone internationally [Leplege and Verdier 1995; Anderson 1996].
Currently, there are two styles of translation: "source oriented" (produces a measure that
compares well with the original but contains items that are irrelevant in the new culture), and
"target oriented" (aims for conceptual rather than semantic equivalence, often producing a
measure with a different structure to the original). We adopted the first approach, which is
preferred by QOL researchers because the second produces a measure that is not comparable
in the formal sense. However, if the new measure is meaningless to the respondents and does
not measure the same concepts as the original, the results cannot be compared anyway. This
point was made by a participant at a workshop I attended on "cross-cultural issues in
instrument development" but was dismissed by the organiser who "didn't want to get into
that sort of philosophical thing". While involving the author of the original measure is
supposed to ensure that the same concepts are conveyed in translation, this assumes that the
measure is derived from a conceptual model of QOL, something I have suggested is rarely
the case.
Although translation issues are theoretically less acute in Europe [Aaronson et aI1992],
problems have arisen translating items related to psychological and emotional states, social
function and daily activities. For example, in the US "social activities" (items 6 and 10 of the
SF-36) means different activities with different people, while in Russia it means, "to
participate in political meetings or act like a trade union leader" [Intemational Quality of Life
Assessment, unpublished report]. Items that are translatable but "culture-linked" (for
example, many of the items in the Leisure Activities scale), or do not have an equivalent in
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the target language are usually excluded388, which can present a problem where there are
large differences between cultures389 (the existence of internally homogenous "cultures" is
assumed). We asked the lead researcher from each centre to "back-translate" the new
measures for comprehensibility and were pleased with the results of this, although arguably
we had only demonstrated that it was comprehensible to multi-lingual, university-educated
health professionals, many of whom had worked with the original measures.
On the same occasion we mentioned our plan to produce a dystonia-specific QOL measure,
only to discover that the Austrian centre was already producing a measure for focal dystonias
affecting the eyes and neck (the 24 item Cranio-cervical Dystonia Questionnaire [Mueller
2000]). I was unsure about the utility of this combination since cervical dystonia, which can
be painful and exhausting, is very different from blepharospasm. Although blepharospasm is
less painful, it is potentially more disabling (if people's eyes close unexpectedly or "lock"
closed) and affects people who are at least 10 years older. Itmight, therefore, be difficult to
represent both experiences in a single measure, particularly one with only 24 items.
When the first questionnaires came back we realised that many of the questions designed to
establish the social class of the respondent (for example, by educational level) were
insufficiently detailed. We sent out a supplementary sheet asking about vocational
qualifications, father's job, and whether the respondent's first job was manual or non-manual.
However, we were not able to use it in the analysis as only half of the participating centres
returned them. We did have complete data on whether people had continued education after
16 or obtained a degree, but although we found significant differences between their QOL
scores these results were excluded from the papers after the referees advised us that they were
"not interesting to neurologists".
The pace of the project was often frustratingly slow as I could only spend one day per week
on it, and much of my work (for example, classifying the different forms of dystonia'")
required endorsement from the consultant neurologist who was responsible for the
epidemiological study. My collaborator was also the grant holder for five other research
388This occurred with the QUALIOST measure and meant that the most important item for French groups (to
find it difficult to manage but have to continue anyway) was excluded, an example of'vthe common compromise
between meaningful content and common structure of the tool" [Leplege and Marquis 1999].
389Forexample, the majority of functional items in French blindness scales were inapplicable to Francophone
Mali (e.g. Can you drive a car? Can you see street lamps?) [Leplege et al 1999].
390This did not require medical training since it was mainly about working out what the respondent wanted to
convey (e.g. whether a mild movement in the eye was blepharospasm or a nervous tick; whether they really had
movement everywhere in their body or just wanted to emphasise how ill they felt).
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projects employing four staff, did undergraduate and postgraduate teaching, had NHS and
private patients in two different hospitals, and was the Society's medical adviser so could
spare me little time. I usually worked alone, entering the data into SPSS, removing errors, and
carrying out routine analyses to compare the mean scores for different instruments and
establish whether the differences were significant. I presented the initial results in the Society
and European Dystonia Federation newsletters, at the World Dystonia Leadership meeting,
and at the Movement Disorders conference in Barcelona, where there were a small but
growing number of QOL studies':", The statistics were also used in press releases for the
2001 Dystonia Awareness week to support the True Impact of Dystonia booklet [TDS 2001].
Despite the methodological problems described earlier, which reduced my confidence in the
results, the survey produced some interesting and unexpected findings that provoked as many
questions as they answered. Although we found significant differences between QOL scores
from people living with dystonia, the general population, and people living with other
neurological illnesses (drawn from other studies using the SF-36), we found few between the
different types of focal dystonia, once the results were adjusted to acknowledge different ages
of onset. There are a number of possible explanations, which involve hypotheses about where
the "real" experience of dystonia resides (the body, the person, or the social context) and how
it should be measured (for example, brain scans, personality tests or studies exploring the
prejudice of the population towards people living with dystonia). Is dystonia not (as is
generally supposed) an arbitrary categorisation for conditions caused by the basal ganglia, but
a coherent experience that is qualitatively different from others? Or is it the similar problems
people have communicating their experience and getting it acknowledged and taken seriously
by medical gatekeepers that create the experience of dystonia? Is it in the experience of
muscle spasms, wherever they are located (so having spasms in your hand when you sign a
cheque would be no different to your eyes locking shut while crossing a busy road)? Is it
about individual reactions? ("fighting it" or "giving in"). Or is it just that existing measures of
QOL are not sensitive to the experiences of people living with dystonia?
The explanation you choose may depend on your position. For example, the Chair of the
European Dystonia Federation believes your experience of dystonia depends on your "moral
fibre", while my collaborators prefer the insensitivity of general measures since they are
currently designing a dystonia-specific measure. My experience of working with and
listening to people living with dystonia suggest that while the demands it places on your body
)91Although we placed papers from the study in neurological journals. we were rejected from the British Medical
Journal (the main general medicine journal in the UK) as "not of general interest".
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are an important part of having dystonia (as is your ability to adjust to them), the frustration
caused trying to communicate your experience to others ("at times I though I was going mad
and other people think you are too"), the isolation arising from their refusal to acknowledge it
("neither my husband nor my family could understand why I could not open my eyes: 'such a
simple thing to do' l"), and the discrimination from their inability to understand it ("the lack
of awareness and ignorance from my employers are devastating and exasperating") are the
most important parts of the experience.
I found two aspects of the survey particularly interesting: firstly, the process supported
Latour's characterisation of research as increasing rather than decreasing the complexities of
life and adding "new ingredients to the collective process" [1998]. Secondly, it confirmed my
suspicion that QOL measures did not offer more information than clinical or psychological
tests since the elements that make the experience of one condition different from another
cannot always be quantified or represented in an individually-focused measure.
Conclusion
These examples illustrate some fundamental problems with QOL measurement. Firstly, it
supposes that every individual has a certain amount ofQOL that can be measured and
compared by separating it into conceptual domains and devising indicators to represent them.
It is assumed that these indicators measure what is important and relevant to people living
with a chronic illness (rather than to doctors or pharmaceuticals) and that studies using these
measures are really listening to the patient. Secondly, it assumes that what people say about'
their level of function corresponds to actual behaviour. For example, while someone may be
physically capable of ''walking I km" [Ware and Sherbourne 1992], there may be other, non-
individual factors that prevent them from doing so, which is why scores from physiotherapy
assessments cannot predict performance outside that environment. And finally it maintains
that QOL measurement is Scientific, even when adjustments represent the developer's
"common sense". For example, setting higher cut-off scores on the Beck Depression
Inventory to diagnose depression in women [Beck et al 1961]. Paradoxically, the further QOL
measurement moves from Science, the more scientistic its vocabulary becomes.
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Chapter 9: Realising the potential of QOL: The World
Health Organisation
In chapters 7 and 8 I examined how QOL measures are developed and used, especially in
health economic analyses. I argued that the "feel-good" language of QOL obscures the way
"facts" created by QOL measures about the lives of people with limiting conditions are used
to direct resource allocation. I reinforce the point in this chapter by an exploration of the
WHO's use ofQOL which shows how the discourse can move from the relatively benign
goal of representing a broader range of life experiences, to classifying and managing those
experiences, and finally, to valuing and controlling the lives of the experiencers in the
interests of projective risk management. I examine the WHO's use ofQOL through three
related projects: firstly, the development of a multilingual, multidimensional QOL measure to
be used internationally with "healthy" and sick populations (the WHOQOL-l 00 [WHOQOL
1995] and WHOQOL-BREF [1996]). Secondly, the creation and revision of a universal
classification of health (the International Classification of Impairment, Disease and
Handicap); and finally, the Global Burden of Disease Project, which uses health economic
analyses to set international priorities for health spending using the Disability Adjusted Life
Year.
The \VHOQOL-IOO
Internationally. the WHO has been one of the keenest advocates ofQOL, which is consonant
with its holistic definition of health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity [... ] whose realisation requires the
action of many other social and economic sectors,,392. In 1991 the WHO formed the
WHOQOL group to develop a measure that would assess QOL3!)3, rather than merely the
impact of disease and impairment, perceived health, or functional status, as existing "QOL"
measures did (c.f. chapter 7). This measure would combat "the increasingly mechanistic
model of medicine" and use QOL assessments to introduce a "humanistic element into
healthcare", supporting the WHO's "continued promotion of an holistic approach to health
and healthcare" [WHO 1996]. QOL was defined as an "individual's perceptions of their
position in life in the context of the culture and value systems in which they live and in
relation to their goals, expectations, standards and concerns". The definition reflects the
392First set out in the Alma Ala declaration of 1978
393Described by Fallowficld [1990] as "the missing measurement in health".
WHOQOL group's view that it refers to a subjective evaluation embedded in a cultural,
social and environmental context.
This is inspiring rhetoric, but does the WHOQOL-l 00 measure successfully address the
problems outlined in chapter 7? The short answer is only at the cost of its ability to provide
meaningful measurement: by covering everything it effectively tells us nothing". For
example, many domains cannot distinguish between respondents on the key variables of
country of origin or health status. The association between the importance and quality of
domains in people's lives is generally low (except in the case of spirituality, one of the few
attributes that people can contro!). Finally, curves plotted with data from different countries
showed that responses to the items were concentrated in the centre of the scale. While this
could mean that the WHOQOL represents dimensions that are common to all humans, it
could also mean that it represents nothing more than the human tendency to circle the middle
number in a questionnaire, particularly when you are uncertain what is being asked [Bourdieu
1984]. However, despite its methodological shortcomings the WHOQOL's development
process (it was developed simultaneously in 15 countries and includes a domain of country-
specific items [Skevington 1999]395)provides much of anthropological interest, which I do
not have space to address in this thesis. While it has not yet challenged the ascendancy of the
SF-36, the WHOQOL group's development of a brief version of the scale (WHOQOL-BREF,
26 questions) suggests this may be its next ambition.
In the next section I look at the creation and revision of a universal classification of health
(the International Classification of Impairment, Disease and Handicap [ICIDH] and its
successor the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health [ICF]) by the
WHO. I investigate what the transition from ICIDH to ICF over the past two decades tells us
about attitudes to health and disability, and why the ICF fails to "challenge mainstream ideas
on how we understand health and disability" [WHO 2001].
3941t has 100 questions, divided between 24 universal and one country-specific section, which cover physical,
cognitive/psychological, level of independence, social relations, environmental and spiritual, for example, "how
available to you is the information that you need in everyday life'?"
395Forexample, the composition of the focus group that produces the items was not always considered by the
national research centres - in Turkey the country-specific domain is "social pressure" which includes an item on
the pressure city dwellers experience from rural relatives who expect them to arrange jobs and accommodation
[Fidaner et al 1999). Of course, a focus group of rural Turks might experience these networks as sustaining
rather than constraining.
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International Classification of Impairment, Disability and Handicap (subtitle: "a
manual of classification relating to the consequences of disease") [\VHO 1980]
The ICIDH has been used for QOL research, population surveys, vocational assessment, and
as a basis for social policy since 1980396.It represents disablement as a linear and
unidirectional path: firstly, from "Disease" to "Impairment" ("any loss or abnormality of
psychological, physical, or anatomical structure or function"). Secondly, from Impairment to
"Disability" ("any restriction or lack (resulting from an impairment) of ability to perform an
activitl97 in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being"). Finally,
from Disability to "Handicap" ("a disadvantage for a given individual, resulting from an
impairment or a disability, that limits or prevents the fulfilment of a role that is normal
(depending on age, sex and social and cultural factors) for that individual"). Handicap occurs
when an individual cannot fulfil seven "survival" roles (orientation, physical independence,
mobility, occupation, social integration, and economic self-sufficiency, and "other,,398),
chosen to ensure universal applicability.
Disease ~ Impairment ~ Disability -+ Handicap
The classificatory role and biomedical focus of the ICIDH is obvious from the elaborate
codes in the impairment section399, which are more extensive and detailed than those of either
disability or handicap [Ingstad and Whyte 1995]. Although it claims to have been influenced
by both medical and social models, its representation of disablement follows medical
convention. While the text acknowledges the complexity of the relationship between
Impairment, Disability and Handicap, the diagram shows them linked by arrows going in one
direction. It also implies that the problems of people with disabilities are best solved by
person-level, medical interventions rather than social ones. This is why Bickenbach
characterises it as "at best [... ] a tool for research, administrative and planning uses by
medical professionals and physiotherapists who, for their purposes, focus entirely on the
individual impairments and treat the environment as unchangeable" [1999].
3961nItaly and Belgium, it has been used to determine people's eligibility for residential care and assistive
devices, and in the Netherlands, Germany and Scotland, their ability to work. American insurance companies
have used it to make decisions about funding treatment and it was also used in the 1988 UK opes survey
(leading to the "discovery" of 3 million more people with disabilities since the 1971 survey [Abberley 1992]).
3971mpairment tries to be universal by using "basic" activities like "grasping", but these are more difficult to
conceptualise as they are abstractions from the concrete and actual activity of grasping an object.
398These survival roles are drawn from Maslow's five-level "hierarchy of human needs" [1970].
399Forexample. "language impairments" is 3 but a second digit can be added to indicate "impairment of voice
production" and a third for people who use a "substitute voice" or have "indistinct speech" [Pfeiffer 1998].
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This perspective is reinforced by the language used to describe Handicap, which suggests that
people are disadvantaged by their disabilities rather than the environment, and that handicaps
are caused by impairments and disabilities'i" Although Handicap is described as a
classification of "circumstances in which disabled people are likely to find themselves",
because it does not mention the social and environmental factors that create these
circumstances it gives the impression that handicaps are merely complex disabilities't",
making it difficult to record or address environmental problems [Bickenbach et a11999;
Chapireau and Colvez 1998]. Stating that Handicap is influenced by values also implies that
Disability and Impairment are neutral and universal categories.
The model also represents disability as an illness or disease [Chamie 1995]. For example, its
reference to the sick role ("the sick person is unable to sustain his [sic] accustomed social role
and cannot maintain his customary relationships with others") is not applicable to people with
disabilities (or living with dystonia) who may have minimal contact with healthcare systems
and will never "recover" in the sense that Parsons intended. The ICIDH can therefore be seen
as part of the "medicalisation of disability" [Friedson 1970], which gives control over the
lives of people with disabilities to health professionals who may have little idea of people's
performance in their home environment or QOL. The broadness of its definitions suggests it
represents an extension of the "clinical gaze". For example, it could be used to label the
behaviour of political dissidents and homosexuals as "abnormal", and further medicalise
pregnancy and menstruation [Dickson 1996; Shakespeare 1995], It could also strengthen the
normative role of medicine: "the ICIDH is based on Western, able-bodied, male, middle class
ideas of normal which are viewed as desirable and praise worthy" [Pfeiffer 2000]. For
example, deviations from the norm listed in Disability include "cultural shock (such as
immigrants), moving in different identities (e.g. transvestism and passing, such as black
passing for white), pseudo-feeblemindedness, and breaking taboos" [Wood 1980: 149].
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health [\VHO 1997J
The WHO noted these problems with the ICIDH and in 2001 it replaced it with the ICF (after
seven years of consultation and redrafting) as a more accurate representation of its approach
to health. The ICF is based on the "biopsychosocial" model, which supposedly synthesises
the medical and social approaches to disablement'[" (note that this is the biopsychosocial
rather than the "sociobiopsycho" or "psychosocialbio" model). It aims to be universally
400e.g.People have handicaps of mobility because "their disabilities interfere with their ability to get around".
40lReinforced by the domain's explicit reference to the individual's competence and abilities.
402C.f.Armstrong [1987].
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applicable and provides detailed definitions of the items so users can make them intelligible
in local languages and cultures. The ICF's classifications of disablement are intended to be
linguistically and etiologically neutral to enable its use as a common tool for policy. For
example, there should be no predictable correlations between health conditions and aspects of
disablement. However, its use of neutral language often slides into euphemism, reducing
clarity and obscuring "the very real consequences of disablement" [Bury 2000] (c.f. the
section on language in chapter 1).
The ICF's three dimensions are "Impairments", "Activity limitations" (previously Disability),
and "Participation restrictions" (previously Handicap403) which are intended to be
multidirectional, equal in significance, and represent different facets of disablement.
Impairments ~
Corresponds with Body
Activity limitations ~
Person
Participation restrictions
Society
Its press release claims it will "challenge mainstream ideas on how we understand health and
disability" by putting physical and mental health conditions on an "equal footing" ("a person
may not be able to attend work because of a cold or angina, but also because of depression"),
focusing on how people live with their health conditions, and recording social and
environmental barriers to "achieving aproductive and fulfilling life" [WHO 2001, my
italics]. The ICF does this by collapsing different models of disability into "medical" and
"social" models, which are both concerned with "managing" "problems". Consequently,
interventions are prescribed for each dimension (for example, rehabilitation or provision of
assistive devices for "Activity limitations"). Its version of the social model bears so little
resemblance to what is commonly meant by the term (see chapter 1) that disability activists
have dubbed it the "social (services)" model404• The two models are actually rhetorical
devices, which were only created so they could be "synthesised" in the biopsychosocial
model ("[an] incorporation [... ] that otherwise would be quite impossible" [Finkelstein
1999]). Although ICF has also attempted to replace the disabled/non-disabled dichotomy with
a continuum40s, this is undercut by the detailed classification codes, which provide an insight
into its concept of health:
403It claims to extend Handicap from "survival roles" to all areas of life by using a list of environmental factors
to identify person-level determinants of disablement (note the ICF is still operating at the level of the person
rather than society), however, critics suggest it only represents one dimension of Handicap [Bury 2000].
4041t is in fact the "administrative" model, which is a subsidiary of the medical model [Oliver 1996].
405c.f. Foucault [1979] and Martin [2000] on the replacement of the normality/abnormality dichotomy with a
classification of bodies on a continuum where differences are positional rather than essential.
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Developing a language concerned with disablement which is to serve as a frame of
reference for the 'consequences of health conditions' surely already presumes that
disability is a health condition! In which case [the ICF] cannot be anything else than a
rewording of the 'medical' model of disability in order to include some words from
the social model and thereby placate the criticism of disabled people
[Finkelstein 1999]
The ICF continues the ICIDH's functional definition of health, which devalues people who
cannot do ''wealth producing labour" [Pfeiffer 2000]. It also disenfranchises people with
disabilities by continuing to construct disability in terms of the sick role where social rights
are linked to "getting well" by following the doctor's orders. In fact, the effect of taking a
"universalist" approach to disability (described in chapter 1) while maintaining a biomedical
perspective is to continue the work of the ICIDH in extending the clinical gaze as widely as
possible. Despite the inspiring rhetoric, disability is still conceptualised as "a 'complex
collection of conditions' (i.e. problems) to be managed in the well-established manner by
PWAs rather than as unique lifestyles that require unprecedented, original, and creative
support systems" [Finkelstein 1999]. The continued representation of disability as a burden
paves the way for the Global Burden of Disease project, which is described in the last part of
this chapter. Finkelstein also notes the supreme irony that "the highly political demand for a
continually expanding health and medical service consistent with the medical model" has
been attributed to the social model and "projected into the ideological aims of disabled people
trying to create their own natural services and professions" [ibid].
The WHO's Global Burden of Disease Project
In contrast to the first two initiatives described in this chapter, the Global Burden project is
explicitly biomedical, most obviously in its assumption that disease is the main cause of ill
health (thoroughly critiqued in Williams [2000]) and medicine its only cure. This conceals
the way many health sector interventions have non-health sector returns (and vice versa406)
and imposes closure on other ways of discussing causation and cure407 [Taussig 1980]. For
example, its main tool, the DALY, represents health as an individual rather than community-
level problem, and implies that health intervention alone can raise life expectancies to the
standard level, even though in many countries the burden measured by DALYs is of disease
and underdevelopment, not disease alone408.
406Forexample, female education also reduces infant mortality and increases contraceptive use.
407Forexample, the position of road traffic "accidents" at number nine in the table may relate to the World
Bank's encouragement of car use to stimulate economic development. The World Bank also put the cost of
mental health problems in a "discretionary" category so the state is not held responsible [Kleinman 1996].
408For example, 15.9% ofDALYs lost worldwide are attributable to childhood malnutrition, and 6.8% to poor
water and sanitation [Global Burden of Disease results 1990, in Murray and Lopez 1997].
190
Like QOL, the Global Burden of Disease project has been very successful in publicising its
endeavours and recruiting new participants, particularly among neurologists and neurological
patient support organisations who were previously neglected in favour of more glamorous
specialties.
There is no doubt that as a marketing or 'attention-seeking' activity, the Global
Burden of Disease enterprise currently has no rivals in the health policy field
[Williams 2000]
I first encountered the Global Burden Project in 1999 when an enthusiastic Italian neurologist
who was then working for the WHO asked me to join a team putting together a "position
paper" on the social and economic impact of dystonia. The head of the European Dystonia
Federation, an Italian professor of neurology and a junior colleague, the neurologist from the
ESDE study, and I assembled at a London club with our laptops for a day of brainstorming.
What we were doing, the neurologist from the WHO told us, was "marketing" dystonia; in
fact she defined herself as a "neurological account manager". We were making it into a
"product" (by constructing it as a coherent condition) and selling it to the WHO. She told us
that although this might seem like a strange activity, we were lucky to have this opportunity
(through her connections to the European Dystonia Federation) as many conditions who had
not submitted a paper would be unrepresented when the WHO calculated the Global Burden
and their impact would not be acknowledged'?",
Our task was aided by her production of a similar paper on headache that she was happy for
us to use as a template. In fact the most difficult part of the process was making sure that all
references to headache had been deleted from the final document. The exercise reminded me
both of the Dystonia Society's struggles to get dystonia included in the Disability Living
Allowance handbook of conditions as "if we [dystonia] are not in the book, we don't exist",
and the comments made to the Branch Officers conference about the need to market dystonia
using the strategies of the pharmaceuticals. Submitting "identikit" position papers seemed a
pointless exercise since the WHO committee would still need to use their professional (and
personal) experience to assess them, as they would all say the same thing. I suspect this may
also be true of disease-specific measures whose individual and biomedical focus often causes
them to omit what is most distinctive about a condition in order to make it more visible by
"concretising" it in a measure. However, as the example of league tables demonstrates, once a
409She felt this was especially true because the head of the WHO's neurological division was not a neurologist
but "a Russian expert on substance abuse".
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form of audit has been agreed, people are compelled to participate and to represent their
experience in those terms to be sure of it "counting".
The Global Burden Project theoretically enables the identification and prioritorisation of the
main international health problems internationally so resources can be allocated more
effectively. For example, one consequence of the publication of the first results in 1990
[Murray and Lopez 1997] was increased interest in pharmaceutical interventions to relieve
depression in low and middle-income countries as it was ranked as the fourth main cause of
DALYs lost worldwide't'" [Murray and Lopez 2000]. This was capitalised on by
phannaceuticals who changed their strategy to market directly to health officials in these
countries and included the results in their marketing materials. However, the utility of the
rankings has been disputed as they assume an implausibly high level of accuracy for statistics
on the cause of death"!', decontextualise diseases, and compare the incomparable'Y. The
Global Burden results resemble the QOL rankings undertaken in US counties and cities in the
1970s (reviewed by Flax [1978]). Although the data on the individual indicators of QOL was
interesting, if surreal (one indicator was number of scooters per head of population), the
aggregation of scores to produce a ranking was implausible, especially considering the
variable quality of the data. The problem of data quality applies to a greater extent here as the
indicators are difficult to interpret, there are variations in the data collected in different
countries, regional variations may not be picked up by a countrywide measure (for example,
differences in female health and life expectancy between northern and southern India), and
there is little local consultation to determine what diseases people find most burdensome (for
example, in some parts of Mexico a particular skin disease is so common that it would be
considered pathological not to have it [Helman 2000]).
This approach also disguises striking differences in the pattern of disease and expenditure in
rich and poor countries. Worldwide, non-communicable diseases are responsible for 56% of
death and communicable diseases 34%. Among the richest 20% of countries the ratio is 85%
to 8%, but among the poorest, it is 34% to 56% [Gwatkin 1997]. Rich countries only account
for 11.6% of the Global Burden, but 90.2% of recorded health expenditure.
410The top ten causes were lower respiratory infections, diarrhoeal diseases, perinatal disorders, unipolar major
depression, ischaemic heart disease, cerebrovascular disease, tuberculosis, measles, road-traffic accidents, and
congenital abnormalities.
411These only give the proximal causes of death so HIV -related pneumonia would be a "lower respiratory
infection" [Prior 1997).
412Forexample, HIV and heart disease have different epidemiologies and effects [Schwartlander 1997]: HIV is
preventable, mainly affects young adults and families, and in poor countries mortality increased by 500%
between 1990-6. Heart disease is prevalent in rich countries, affects older adults, and mortality has plateaued.
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The Global Burden Project has been accused of discriminating against people with
disabilities as it uses "disability" interchangeably with "ill-health" (contrary to WHO policy)
and represents them as a drain on society: "[it] assumes that individuals with a disability lie
somewhere between life and premature death" [Groce et a11999]. The DALY table of
disability weightings confirms this as it states with frightening precision that the value
(presumably to society rather than the person) of one year for 1,000 people without
disabilities is equivalent to one year for 9,254 people with quadriplegia, 4,202 with dementia,
2,660 blind people, 1,686 with Down's syndrome without cardiac malformation, 1,499 deaf
people, 1,236 infertile people, and 1,025 underweight or overweight peopJe413 [Murray in
Murray and Lopez 1996a].
Disability Adjusted Life Years
The DALY was ostensibly developed for three reasons; to enable the inclusion of non-fatal
health outcomes in debates on international health policy; to provide neutral figures on
population health for policy decisions; and to facilitate cost effectiveness analysis [Murray
1996]. The latter aim may be why the World Bank sponsored the development of the
measure. The DALY's designers aimed to open "the black box of the decision-maker's
relative values" to "public scrutiny and influence" by making the value choices incorporated
in them explicit (the discourse of transparency, critiqued by observers of audit culture) [ibid].
They also believed that tackling disease would promote global equality [Murray 1996],
although DALYs focus on cost-effectiveness rather than equity'!",
DALY s are created by combining preferences for health states (or "disabi lity weights") with
the numbers of years lived with a condition and any reduction in life expectancy due to that
condition. This figure is then modified by "age weights" that attribute different values to the
lives of people at different ages and a "discount rate" that favours different types of
intervention (for example, acute over preventative). I describe this in detail later in the
chapter.
The creation of universal disability weights is arguably the most important part of the process
as if these do not represent the common experience ofpeopJe living with a condition they
cannot be used to calculate the condition's "global burden". I have two problems with this
part of the process: Firstly, I don't believe there is a common experience of any condition
413People whose weight differs from the norm by two standard deviations in either direction are "disabled".
414Forexample, "age weighting" implies a focus on the societal usefulness of people's life years rather than
individual quality of life [Arneson and Nord 1999].
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even within one society (this is certainly true of dystonia). Secondly, if this common
experience existed it could not be accessed by asking healthy people what they imagined life
would be like with a particular condition (which is what the methodology involves), nor
could it be represented quantitatively. In the next section, I support these assertions by
looking at how the disability weights were derived.
Stage 1: Deriving disability weights
Twenty two "indicator conditions" were assessed for their impact on QOL by a panel of
"experts" during a two-day meeting at WHO's Geneva headquarters in 1989. None of the
experts represented an organisation of people with disabilities, or had a disability, which may
have reduced their estimate ofQOL in each condition415. The panel's task was to give a
numerical value to "the average individual with the condition described, taking into account
the average social response or milieu" [Murray and Lopez 199Ga]. This construct of the
"average individual" in an "average society" is an example of the way that the process of
measurement (quantification) "makes up" classes of people [Hacking 198G].
The disability weights were assigned using two different "person trade-off,416 questions. The
first one, which invites the respondent to compare the value of disabled and non-disabled
lives, is reproduced below:
PT01: You are a decision maker who has enough money to buy only one of two
mutually exclusive health interventions. If you purchase intervention A, you will
extend the life of 1,000 healthy (non disabled) individuals for exactly one year, at
which point they will all die. If you do not purchase intervention A, they will all die
today. The alternative use of your scarce resources is intervention B, with which you
can extend the life of n individuals with a particular disabling condition for one year.
If you do not buy intervention B they will all die today; if you do purchase
intervention B, they will die at the end of exactly one year
[Murray and Lopez 1996a]
The sample response given in the manual is that "if the participant judges that 1,000 healthy
people would have an equal claim on the resources as 8,000 people with some severe
disability, the weight assigned to that particular disability is equal to 1 minus 1,000 divided
by 8,000, or 0.875" [Murray and Lopez 199Gb].
415Able-bodied health professionals are prone to seeing people's lives in terms of their medical needs (or "using
[a] specific medical diagnosis as a proxy for the entire life experience" [Groce et al 1999]), rather than seeing
health care as one component of a full life [Makas 1993].
41bperson trade-off is a grotesque but literal description of what the methodology requires.
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In the second question, subjects are asked to value cures for chronic conditions relative to
interventions that extend life, for example, "how many people cured of blindness would be
equal to prolonging the lives of 1,000 people?" Although participants who do not wish to
discriminate between people with and without disabilities in the first question could answer
n=l,OOO, this would prevent them from recording the condition's impact on QOL in the
second question (which is phrased in a slightly less discriminatory manner) as participants are
not allowed to give two different weightings. Arnesen and Nord describe how this scenario
occurred at a meeting of European researchers working with DALY s:
In PT01, the response that extended life for disabled people is as valuable as extended
life for 1,000 people without disabilities was regarded as unreasonable. Anyone who
chose this option was told that he or she was implying that being disabled is as good
as being non-disabled and that there is no need to spend resources on disabled people.
It was suggested that he or she should therefore indicate a number higher than 1,000
[1999]
The weightings are then averaged, and the indicator conditions ranked in order of seriousness,
and grouped in threes (each group has a defined range of average scores). Seven groups of
conditions were identified and labelled with a "disability level" from 1 to 7. The midpoint of
each group was taken as the score for that level of disability, producing a 7-point scale417 that
was used to assess the treated and untreated impact of hundreds of conditions. The
methodology relies on the quality of evaluations made by a small group of presumably "all-
knowing" experts who needed to know not only "the lifetime sequelae of each condition", but
the valuations people would attach to them at each stage and the effectiveness of typical
treatments [Williams 1999b].
Ustun (a WHO researcher who coordinated the revision of the International Classification of
Impairment, Disability and Handicap) repeated the method for producing disability weights
with a different set of "experts" (healthcare professionals, policy makers, people with
disabilities and their carers) from 14 countries to assess the robustness of the weightings
produced by the original study [Ustun et al 1999]. Although the order of the ranking was
similar, he found significant differences between countries on 13 of the 17 health conditions,
417 Disability Severity Indicator condition lMurray and Lopez I990b: II]
das~
weiJ:ht
I 000·002 Vitiligo on face; weight tor height less than 2 standard deviations
2 0.02·0.12 Watery diarrhoea; severe sore throat; severe anaemia
3 OI2·().24 Radius fracture in stiff cast; infertility; erectile dysfunction; rheumatoid arthritis; angina
4 O.24'().36 Below-the-knee amputation; deafness
5 0.36-0.50 Rcctovaginal fistula; mild mental retardation; Down's svndrome
6 0.50-0.70 I lnipolar major depression; blindness; paraplegia
7 0.70-1.00 Active psychosis. dementia. severe migraine. quadriplegia
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and between groups of informants on 5 health conditions. The differences suggest that the
assumptions that universal weights are possible'l", and that health professionals represent the
preferences of the societies they come from were both incorrect. This was reinforced by a
study in Zimbabwe that found high levels of agreement between the original weightings and
those of Zimbabwean health professionals (p =0.91), but low ones between health
professionals and the public (p=O.IS), and the public and the original weightings (p=0.12),
suggesting that "GBD values represent those of an international elite of healthcare
workers,.419 [Jeisma et aI1999]. They caution that "the greater the divergence of the local
culture from the individualist western world view, the less likely that GBD weights will be
applicable" [ibidt20• Universal weightings would only be useful if resources were to be
reallocated internationally to produce more DALYs, for example, from Alzheimer's disease
in the US to cerebral malaria in Africa, but this is very unlikely to occur [James and Foster
1999].
Stage 2: Calculating DALYs
The disability weighting for a condition is multiplied by the number of years lived with the
condition, and added to the reduction in life expectancy caused by the condition. For
example, for a person with Down's syndrome the calculation would be 0.43 (disability weight
for Down's syndrome) x 40 (average life expectancy with Down's syndrome) + 42.5 (number
of years lost from the "standard" life expectancy [the greatest recorded life expectancy of 80-
82.5 years] due to Down's syndrome) = 59.7. When years with a condition and years lost to a
condition have been calculated, these are modified by "age weights" that attribute different
values to the lives of people at different ages and a "discount rate" that favours different types
of intervention.
1. Calculating years lost to a condition
There are two points to note about this methodology: Firstly, in deciding to use a Japanese
figure as the standard life expectancy (82.5 years for women and an estimated 80 years for
men, although the actual male figure was 76.5) the authors effectively applies an age weight
of greater than one in countries where the life expectancy is less than this. For example, iflife
418Forexample, IIIV was ranked low in Japan, Spain, Turkey, Luxembourg and the UK, but first in Eygpt and
Tunisia, reflecting the fact that it is usually fatal in poorer countries.
41'!Differences were greatest for reproductive disabilities, and cognitive and sensory disorders. Jeisma et al
suggest that this is because the former are a threat to the collective, while the latter are an individual problem
that can be accommodated within the community [1999].
42°Hacking notes that statistical laws for social data were found in the West where libertarian, individualistic and
atomistic concepts of person and state were popular, rather than the East where collectivist and holistic attitudes
were more common [1990].
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expectancy were 40 years (as in some African countries), then each year of life would carry
an age weight of2. In poorer countries this has the bizarre effect of biasing interventions
towards older adults, as years of life gained by those who have survived into old age have
higher weights than those gained by younger adults421 [Williams 1999b]. Ironically the
justification for this is equity as otherwise interventions to help people in richer countries
who have longer life expectancies would appear to be better value as they would save more
years of life.
Secondly, the assumed difference in life expectancy between men and women of2.5 years is
considerably smaller than the observed difference in low mortality populations. This
discriminates against women by reducing the female contribution to the global burden
relative to the male, therefore reducing the proportion of resources that will be allocated to
"female" problems like breast cancer.
2. Age weighting
Lives lived at different ages have been valued using instrumental rather than intrinsic
criteria422• For example, the lifetime is weighted so it is most valuable in the twenties and
thirties when people are supporting others rather than receiving support, and least valuable in
childhood and old age (there is less "social value" in preventing a baby from dying as they
may not survive to adulthood, or prolonging the life of an older adult) [Murray 1996]. This is
an example of the "human capital" approach which the designers claim to have rejected.
Anand and Hanson suggest ironically that the instrumental perspective be taken to its logical
conclusion by extending it to include occupation and ability to pay tax [1997].
3. Discount rates
Future health problems are "discounted" at a rate of 3% per year (chosen because it is the rate
of inflation in many Western countries), which favours future-oriented interventions'f".
While preventative and child-oriented interventions are obviously important in the long-term,
the discount rate currently discriminates against poor countries whose problems are more
immediate (if the current generation doesn't survive there won't be any future ones).
421This is also true with international comparisons where old people in richer countries have higher equity
weights than young adults in poorer ones.
422Anand and Sen argue instead for a "universalism of life claims" where there is a common intrinsic value to
life, regardless of the age at which it is lived [1994].
42JThis point is more obvious in the Spiegelhalter table in chapter 7 which compares different interventions.
Criticisms of the DALY
DALY s have been criticised for being universalising, inequitable, unparticipatory (and
potentially discriminatory), and representing an exclusively biomedical word view.
The main example of their universal ising approach is the assumption of the disability
weightings that impairment will always result in a certain level of disability, even though the
influence of context means that the range of any weighting must be so large as to make it
"dangerously imprecise and arguably meaningless'Y" [Metts 2001]. The value attached to
any disability state varies markedly between cultural groups and even impairment may not be
measurable cross-culturally'Y [Groce and Zola 1993; Whyte and Ingstad 1995; Groce et al
1999]. An absolute disability weight implies that the lives of people with disabilities will not
be affected by healthcare and social and economic support as their level of disability is solely
determined by their diagnosis (a justification for not funding these interventions). The
weightings also fail to distinguish between functional limitations associated with illness and
age426, and cannot measure the presence of more than one condition since this is currently
calculated using an additive model (for example, the disability weight for someone who was
blind and depressed would be 0.60 + 0.60 = 1.20, considerably worse than death).
The inequity ofDALYs arises from their failure to acknowledge people's circumstances. For
example, the Global Burden project's definition of the "burden" of disease appears to be
closer to the "aggregate quantity of disease", rather than the actual burden of disease.
Researching the actual burden would require information about the circumstances of people
with limiting health conditions (for example, availability of family support networks, access
to public services), particularly if resource allocation was designed to reduce it [Anand and
Hanson 1997]. The designers argue for "treating like health outcomes as like" [Murray
1994:431] but this can lead to inequity depending on how "likeness" is characterised (for
example, whether it includes wealth or access to public services [Anand and Hanson 1997]).
The DALY is ethnocentric as although it is mainly used in developing countries, the indicator
conditions used in its creation reflect the preoccupations of a westem industrialised society
with an advanced medical system [James and Foster 1999] (as does the choice of discount
424Forexample, paraplegia (assumed to result in a 50-70% decrease in QOL) would result in a much greater
decrease if the person were a member of a nomadic tribe that prized physical prowess, or a lesser one if they
were a Professor with an endowed chair at a prestigious university [ibid].
425Forexample, the North American DSM-IV psychiatric criteria were redrafted to enable the diagnosis of
"mania" within Amish and Mennonite communities (e.g. "excessive involvement in pleasurable activity"
became "racing one's horse and carriage too fast") [Martin 2000].
426Forexample, the most severe level of disability includes states where the person needs assistance with eating
or toilet use, which seems to imply that infants are disabled.
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rate). For example, quadriplegia is rare in the developing world because people would not
survive such severe injuries.
The unparticipatory nature ofDALYs arises from their use of a "disease scenario" approach
to create disability weights, which limited participation to health professionals. Wider
participation, especially of people with disabilities, might also have avoided the assumption
that impairment is always a negative experience. Accounts from people with severe
disabilities (for example, Motor Neurone Disease [Hawking 1993; Goldblatt 1993; Young
and McNicoll1998]) suggest that disability can improve people's QOL and may be
economically beneficial by creating jobs as support-workers, manufacturers of assistive
devices, etc.
The designers decided not to measure "handicap" as they believed this would discriminate
against people with disabilities by measuring their "adaptation" rather than their real
condition (which presumably exists outside their experience of it)427.However, this decision
excludes interventions like workplace support for people with disabilities from funding as
they are not rehabilitative or life-extending. The DALY approach assumes that the lives of
people with disabilities have less value than those of people without disabilities, and
consequently that they are less entitled to scarce health resources for interventions that would
extend their lives [Anand and Hanson 1997; Arneson and Nord 1999].
According to the weighting scheme used in the production ofDALYs, the years that
Franklin Delano Roosevelt spent as president of the United States, were years of 'life
lost' to disability, as are the many years that the astrophysicist Stephen Hawking has
spent teaching and writing. This is because the only calculation possible is of the
deficits that are incurred by the very existence of the disability itself. Although
DALY s may help economists and ethicists distribute health care to the masses, we
fear that it may also allow them to more easily justify the disenfranchisement of an
entire segment of humanity
[Groce et a11999]
One researcher with disabilities provocatively linked DALY s and the Latimer case in Canada
(the prosecution of a father who killed his disabled daughter to "end her suffering") as they
both support the claim that "a life lived with disabilities has less value than a life lived
without disabilities, based on evidence of 'suffering' derived from biomedical expertise"
[Rock 2000t28•
4270ne designer even suggested that people with disabilities who reported health and happiness were
experiencing "false consciousness" [Murray in Murray and Lopez 1996a].
428 Many Canadian disability activities believe that the trial and subsequent appeals put Tracey Latimer's QOL
on trial rather than her father's actions.
199
Pfeiffer suggests that this could lead to eugenic policies as if countries are asked to reduce
their number ofDALYs to receive funding from the World Bank, the quickest way to do this
would be to reduce the number of people with disabilities.
To conclude, the DALY's configuration of suffering as an economic indicator makes it a
"'thin' and abstract representation" of people's experience of disease and disability, which
nonetheless influences the responses of those offering social and medical support.
The moral and political issues [... ] cannot be made to fit into this econometric index.
Likewise, the index is unable to map cultural, ethnic, and gender differences [and]
focuses on the individual sufferer, denying that suffering is a social experience. [...
This] may in time also thin out the social experience of suffering [... ] by becoming
part of the apparatus of cultural suffering that creates societal norms, which in tum
shapes the social role and social behaviour of the ill, and what should be the practices
of families and health-care providers
[Kleinman and Kleinman 1996:14]
Conclusion
The examples I have examined in this chapter demonstrate that, despite the apparently
benevolent nature of QOL, like other expert know ledges it can be used in ways its originators
could never have imagined. In common with other measures, it constructs what it appears
only to be observing, and these constructions merit our attention because they affect how
people with limiting conditions are thought about and responded to. QOL measurement can
therefore become a Scientific justification for not addressing inequality, as the statistical
instruments of the eugenicists did during the previous century.
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Conclusion
In this thesis I address five main questions. Firstly, how the twin rhetorics ofQOL and the
"voice of the patient" are used as resources in the struggles of doctors, patient support
organisations, and pharmaceuticals, each trying to position themselves within a crowded
"field" and welcoming the "moral capital" they provide. I explore the dynamics of these
struggles using the concepts of field and capital from Bourdieu and the "power-knowledge
complex" from Foucault. Secondly, how QOL measures can represent "invisible" conditions
like dystonia that lack even an adequate clinical definition, making them visible and
accountable. Thirdly, whether QOL measurement, which is clearly an extension of the
clinical gaze, is an example of medica lis ation? I suggest instead that it is "bureacratisation"
through the medium of health, which affects both doctors and patients (evidenced by their
shared dissatisfaction with clinical encounters). Fourthly, whether QOL measurement
represents an extension of audit culture into the previously sacred space of health? I argue
that no area of contemporary life is safe from this particular technology. The idea that
everyone has a quantity of QOL that can be measured and maximised is an example of a
contemporary mode of thought ("economic rationality") which the measures crystallise and
sustain by implicitly training those who use them in this way ofthinking429• The exponential
growth of QOL arises from the way the QOL industry has "enrolled" a range of actors in its
project who use the technology, and in tum are used by it43o• Finally, whether the voices of
patients are being heard and what can be done to facilitate this. I argue that even though
narratives of illness are limited by the conventions of their genre, they currently offer the best
approach to understanding the experiences of people with limiting conditions. However, there
are few places where these stories can be heard, and this is particularly true of medical
environments, due to pressure of resources, procedures, and gaps in the training of doctors431•
While patients can speak through the language of QOL, it transforms their concerns in a way
that can only be described as "symbolic violence" [Bourdieu 1991], effectively "muting"
them [Ardener 1975]. This is also true of patient support organisations who have seized upon
the discourse of QOL without considering that it might ultimately be used against their
members.
429c.f. Rose and Miller's description of the reform of the UK economy in the 1970s [1990].
430c.f. Latour [1987, 1992] et al on "actor network theory" and the "social life" of technologies.
431According to Frank [1998]. the role of illness stories is ''to express what cannot be expressed in the clinic
where people ostensibly go to talk about illness".
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In the next section I will enlarge on these points and make some suggestions for future
research. As this thesis has illustrated, dystonia is extremely difficult to define and represent,
even within medical discourses. This affects people with dystonia who need to understand
their condition, integrate in their lives, and represent it to others so they can have their
experiences acknowledged and gain access to social and economic resources. The latter goal
is shared by dystonia patient support organisations who recognise the marketing potential of
QOL measurement. For example, how it might contribute to dystonia's "branding" as a
coherent and mainstream neurological condition.
Studies using QOL measures have made the negative aspects of the impact of dystonia visible
and comparable, and have provoked some interesting questions. For example, drug-induced
dystonia is a common side effect of Parkinson's disease and yet people with Parkinson's
disease and dystonia report better health than people with dystonia alone [Camfield 2000,
Camfield et al 2002]. This question can only be answered through a qualitative approach,
which explores the social construction of dystonia by engaging with and contextualising the
experiences of people living with dystonia. As I describe in chapter 8, the Scientific
methodology for creating measures ofQOL ensures they are no more representative of the
experiences of people with limiting conditions than clinical measures. What does it mean to
say someone with cervical dystonia has a worse score on a QOL measure than someone with
Parkinson's disease? While it may mean that they have less of whatever it is that QOL
measures measure, it does not necessarily tell us anything about their quality of life, nor can it
explain why cervical dystonia might have this effect.
QOL scores become meaningful when you need to compare the impact of different conditions
to allocate resources, compete against other patient support organisations for grant or donor
money, or convince your doctor or family that you have a serious condition. For example, the
credibility of the Alzheimer's disease society's submission to NICE was questioned because
their evidence of improvement was "anecdotal" rather than from measures of QOL. The
words of people with Alzheimer's are thus only audible if they are translated into the
scientific and quantitative language ofQOL; in the same way that the voice of the patient is
most likely to be heard if they are speaking as a consumer. This has important implications
for understanding how patients' narratives are heard and valued in contemporary Britain432•
432As Arizpe said of Mexico, "everyone seems preoccupied with the Campesinos, but very few people are
interested in them" [Mohanty et al 1991].
I believe that measures ofQOL are particularly poor at representing the experiences of people
living with dystonia because much of its impact is due to people's inability to represent their
experiences and have them acknowledged and validated by medical and social gatekeepers.
However, precisely because dystonia is so rarely represented in popular and medical
discourses, any representation (no matter how thin) is welcomed as it enhances the
condition's credibility and means that people living with dystonia are less likely to be
dismissed as malingerers or sornatiserst". The fact that QOL has become an issue within
medicine may indicate a change in the structure of medical perception and create a discursive
space where the voices of people with limiting conditions can be "heard". Even though QOL
has been put on the agenda by doctors and pharmaceuticals, it could become an "oppositional
habitus" [Crossley and Crossley 2001] which generates resistance and change, and has
potential as a rhetorical resource for people living with dystonia':".
The focus on physical function in QOL measurement is not necessarily a bad thing. However,
QOL measures need to be clear about their aims, and their limitations, thus avoiding the
"false promises" of doctors and pharmaceuticals that a product wi 11enhance quality of life
rather than merely alleviate symptoms=" [Hunt 1999]. In fact, I think anthropologists should
encourage modesty not only in QOL researchers, but also in doctors who could return to "a
more humble model of doctoring as 'plumbing', 'simple body work" [Scheper-Hughes
1990: 192]. Paradoxically, as research becomes more "patient-centred", many people find it
"intrusive and unacceptable" [Greenhalgh 1998], recognising it as the latest extension of the
clinical gaze.
While you do not need to "be" a person with a disability to understand the experiences of
people with disabilities (participant observation thrives on the tension between sharing and
reflecting on others' experiences without becoming the other), people's understanding of
what life would be like with a chronic condition are not aided by the valuation methods I
describe in the thesis and this can lead to bizarre and discriminatory evaluations. People's
experiences might be better approached through narratives that embed their conditions in
their lives and give them a meaning that is not wholly negative. For example, the positive
outcomes of motor neurone disease are difficult to represent quantitatively, and might even
be dismissed as irrelevant by the designers of a motor neurone disease-specific measure, as
433This was clearly the case in past, see especially chapter 4.
434People with neurological illnesses in the Netherlands have successfully used the Human Rights Act to argue
for access to treatment since denying them treatment infringed their right to a good quality of life.
43SThese claims have been checked by the scepticism of consumers who demand statistical evidence from
measures ofQOL before they will accept them, cementing QOL researchers' relationship with pharmaceuticals.
happened with the multiple sclerosis-specific measure described in chapter 8. I concur with
Kleinman that "economic measures need to be complemented by narratives, ethnographies,
and social histories that speak to the complex, even contradictory, human side of suffering"
[1996:14].
QOL measures continue to be successful because their plasticity and inoffensiveness makes
them ideal "boundary objects" [Starr and Griesmer 1989]. Although they are not successful in
their own terms (i.e. they don't represent the "patient's perspective"), they generate publicity,
provide employment (even for anthropologists), sustain QOL-related organisations, journals
and conferences, stimulate the sales of pharmaceutical interventions, and occasionally
provoke interesting research questions (for example, from a clinical perspective dystonia
appears trivial but its impact can be very severe). In one sense, therefore, QOL measures have
become an industry, which explains the variety of actors who now have a major stake in their
success and development. They are a further illustration of the growth of audit culture as
observed by Strathern et aI, indicating that even health is no longer a sacred space. I believe
that QOL measurement is a fascinating area, which merits greater academic attention,
however, the moments of surreal comedy it provides would take on a darker hue if it was
used as the WHO intends to make decisions affecting people's lives on an international scale.
Although people with limiting conditions have historically been a muted group, I suspect the
reason why these natives are not now speaking for themselves relates to the growth in social
care professionals and patient support organisations. No matter how "grass-roots" their
origins, patient support organisations tend to become large, self sustaining bureaucracies'V"
who have an interest in perpetuating relationships of dependency. Illness and disability can be
taboo subjects, even sources of fear, and this lack of engagement enables "healthy" people to
sustain negative stereotypes and believe that illness, disability, and old age will never happen
to them. Engaging with a wider range of needs (for example, the elderly, parents, people with
learning difficulties) would require fundamental changes in the way society is organised, an
imperative that is concealed by the "feel-good" language of quality of life.
My thesis highlights several issues that deserve further study: how people construct and use
narratives of causality, the "boundary maintenance" between chronic illness and disability
and what prompts someone to identify as disabled, and whether charities can develop ways of
representing people with disabilities that are "experience-near", politically aware, and
43~e sumptuous new offices of the MS Society (different coloured carpets for each department) spring to
mind.
effective for fundraising. Itwould be interesting to monitor the Dystonia Society over the
next few years as it moves to a regionalised structure and the development of the Dys-Qol
and WHOQOL measures. Two important themes highlighted by this thesis are the rise of the
"expert patient,,437 and the relationships between clinical research institutions,
pharmaceuticals and patient support organisations, both of which merit exploration. I would
also like to follow the "career" of QOL within medicine and see if it realises its subversive
potential.
437Expert patients are at the centre of a six year NHS project to "address the challenge of chronic disease".
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The Short Form 36 Health Survey
Questionnaire (SF-36)
The following questions ask for your views about your health, how you feel and how well you
are able to do your usual activities. If you are unsure about how to answer any questions,
please give the best answer you can and make any of your own comments if you like.
1. In general, would you say your health is:
(Please tick one)
Excellent D
Very good D
Good D
Fair D
Poor D
2. Compared to one year ago, how would you rate your health in general now?
Much better now than one year ago D
Somewhat better now than one year ago D
About the same D
Somewhat worse now than one year ago D
Much worse now than one year ago D
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3. HEALTH AND DAILY ACTIVITIES
The following questions are about activities you might do during a typical day.
Does your health limit you in these activities? If so, how much?
(Please tick one box on each line)
Yes, Yes, No, not
limited limited limited
a lot a little at all
a) Vigorous activities, such as running, lifting
0 0 0heavy objects, participating in strenuous sports
b) Moderate activities, such as moving a table,
D 0 Dpushing a vacuum cleaner, bowling or playing golf
c) Lifting or carrying groceries D 0 D
d) Climbing severaillights of stairs D D D
e) Climbing one flight of stairs 0 D 0
f) Bending, kneeling or stooping D D 0
g) Walking more than a mile 0 0 0
h) Walking half a mile 0 0 D
i) Walking 100 yards 0 0 0
j) Bathing and dressing yourself D 0 D
4. During the past 4 weeks, have you had any of the following problems with your work or
other regular daily activities as a result of your physical health?
(Answer Yes or No to each question)
Yes No
a) Cut down on the amount of time you spent on
D 0work or other activities
b) Accomplished less than you would like D 0
c) Were limited in the kind of work or other activities D 0
d) Had difficulty performing the work or other activities
D 0(eg. it took extra effort)
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5. During the past 4 weeks, have you had any of the following problems with your work or
other regular daily activities as a result of any emotional problems (such as feeling
depressed or anxious)?
(Answer Yes or No to each question)
Yes No
a) Cut down on the amount of time you spent on 0 0
work or other activities
b) Accomplished less than you would like 0 0
c) Didn't do work or other activities as carefully as usual 0 0
(Please tick one)
6. During the past 4 weeks, to what extent has your Not at all 0
physical health or emotional problems interiered
Slightly 0with your normal social activities with family,
friends, neighbours or groups? Moderately 0
Quite a bit 0
Extremely 0
7. How much bodily pain have you had None 0
during the past 4 weeks?
Very mild 0
Mild 0
Moderate 0
Severe 0
Very severe 0
8. During the past 4 weeks. how much did pain intariere Not at all 0
with your normal work (including work both outside the
A little bit 0home and housework)?
Moderately 0
Quite a bit 0
Extremely 0
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These questions are about how you feel and how things have been
with you during the past month. (For each question, please indicate
the one answer that comes closest to the way you have been feeling).
(Please tick one box on each line)
9. How much time during All Most A good Some A little None
the past month: of the of the bit of of the of the of the
time time the time time time time
a) Did you feel full of life? 0 0 0 0 0 0
b) Have you been a very nervous person? 0 0 0 0 0 0
c) Have you felt so down in the dumps 0 D D 0 D Dthat nothing could cheer you up?
d) Have you felt calm and peaceful? 0 0 0 D D 0
e) Did you have a lot of energy? D 0 D 0 D D
1) Have you felt downhearted and low? 0 D D 0 0 0
g) Did you feel worn out? 0 0 0 0 0 0
h) Have you been a happy person? 0 0 0 0 0 D
i) Did you fgel tired? D 0 0 0 0 D
D Has your health limited your social 0 D 0 0 0 Dactivities (like visiting friends or close
relatives)?
10. Please choose the answer that best describes how true or false each of the
following statements is for you.
(Please tick one box on each lina)
Definitely Mostly Not Mostly Definitely
true true sure false false
a) I seem to get ill more easily than
0 0 0 0 Dother people
b) I am as healthy as anybody I know 0 D 0 0 D
c) I expect my health to get worse 0 0 D D D
d) My health is excellent 0 0 0 0 0
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Appendix 2
Preference-based measures
Rosser disability/distress scale [Rosser and Kind 1978}
The Rosser scale was created from a survey of 60 doctors from different specialties who
proposed that the best criteria to assess the severity of health states were disability
(defined as "objectively assessed loss of physical and social functioning"), and distress
(defined as "subjective evaluation of factors such as pain and psychological condition").
The classification of disability was refined into eight states (from unconsciousness to no
disability) and distress into four groups (severe to no distress). Six of the most
representative health states were rated by 70 subjects (mainly health professionals) who
were told that the people in these states were young adults who would only be cured if
they were treated. Median values for the scores were transformed so that 1 was attributed
to perfect health with no distress, 0 to death, and negative values to conditions regarded as
worse than death.
Distress
rating
Disability rating A (None) B C D (Severe)
(Mild) (Moderat~
I No disability 1.000 0.995 0.990 0.967
II Slight social disability 0.990 0.986 0.973 0.932
III Severe social disability and/or slight impairment 0.980 0.972 0.956 0.912
at work. Able to do all housework) except very
heavy tasks .
IV Choice of work or performance at work very 0.964 0.956 0.942 0.870
limited. Housewives and old people able to do light
housework only, but able to go out shopping
V Unable to undertake any paid employment. 0.946 0.935 0.900 0.700
Unable to continue any education. Old people
confined to home except for escorted outings and
short walks and unable to do shopping. Housewives
only able to perform a few simple tasks
VI Confined to chair or to wheelchair or able to 0.875 0.845 0.680 0
move around in the home only with support from
an assistant
VII Confined to bed 0.677 0.564 0 -1.486
VIII Unconscious -1.028 NA NA NA
[Rosser and Kind 1978]
EQ-5D (EUROQOL) [Kind 1996}
The European EQ-5D was derived from the Nottingham Health Profile, the Sickness
Impact Profile and two existing preference-based measures (the Rosser scale and the
Quality of Wellbeing scale). Five dimensions were defined (mobility, self care, usual
activity, pain, and mood) and divided into three levels, according to whether the
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dimension represented no problem, a moderate problem, or a severe problem. This
generated 243 health states (or 245 when death and unconsciousness were included),
which were valued using the time trade-off to indicate what proportion of perfect health
they represented I.Although the measure has become one of the most widely used in
Europe, it has a number of methodological problems, which I summarise in the table
below:
Summary Problem
Influence of typographical factors on The values for some states were int1uenced by changes in the
responses number of boxes representing the various conditions and the
length of the EUROQOL thermometer.
Response consistency Inconsistent responses occurred frequently, especially on the
pain dimension, or with elderly or poorly educated respondents
[Kind 1996; Carr-Hill 1992]. The difference in responses from
different demographic groups suggests that it may not be valid
cross-culturally either.
Influence of external factors on responses Respondents tended to record higher scores for more severe
conditions if they were told that the index would be used for
resource allocation [Kind 19961-
Sensitivity The measure is not sensitive to many of the health changes that
are important to patients (e.g. fatigue) [Jenkinson et al 1997].
Use of composite health states The use of composite health states has been criticised as while
subjects are unlikely to regard all dimensions as equally
influential on health, their weighting is concealed if valuations
are made on composite conditions [Carr-Hill 1992]. Subjects
also find it difficult to relate composite conditions to real ones,
which may increase the variance in individual valuations.
15D [Sintonen 2001}
The Finnish 15D is a profile and single index measure that is available in 14 languages
and has been used in clinical studies and Finnish and Danish national population surveys
since 1986. Itwas devised in 1981 from the WHO definition of health and revised in 1986
after feedback from doctors. Two other versions have been developed for children aged 8-
11 and 12-15 years.
The 15 dimensions (breathing, mental function, speech (communication), vision,
mobility, usual activities, vitality, hearing, eating, elimination, sleeping, distress,
discomfort and symptoms, sexual activity, and depression) are measured across seven
levels of impairment (for example, for the "depression" dimension, level 1 would be "I do
not feel at all sad, melancholic or depressed" and level S "I feel extremely sad,
melancholic or depressed"; levels 6 and 7 are unconsciousness and death). The
"importance weights" for each dimension, and values for impairment levels were elicited
'Respondents were also asked to rate their current health status on the EUROQOL thermometer to gain a
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from population samples who were asked to indicate the relative importance and
desirability of each aspect on a visual analogue scale.
Health Utility Index (HUI; versions 1 to 3) [Furlong et al 2001J
The Canadian HUI is a profile and single index measure that has been used in clinical
studies and Canadian national population surveys since 1989. It has been used in over 25
countries and translated into more than 15 languages. The first version is now obsolete,
but the second and third are used as complementary systems that measure different
aspects of disability, for example, the "emotion" attribute in HUI 2 focuses on worry and
anxiety, while HUI 3 focuses on happiness versus depression. Generally, the HUI 2 is
recommended for clinical studies and RUI 3 for long-term follow-up and population
health surveys.
The HUI covers eight "attributes" (vision, hearing, speech, emotion, self-care, pain or
discomfort, learning and school ability, and physical activity ability), measured across six
levels of impairment (for example, in HUB level 1 of the "emotion" attribute is happy
and interested in life", level 6 is "so unhappy that life is not worthwhile"). Preferences
were derived from a combination of visual analogue scale (a 100 point "feeling
thermometer") and "standard gamble" methods. Assessing the value of the HUI system is
difficult as the literature validates it exclusively in terms of existing preference-based
measures, which provided the content for the measure.
sense of the difference between people's evaluation of their own health states and those of others.
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Appendix 3
Multiple Sclerosis Impact Scale (MSIS-29)
• The following questions ask for your views about the impactofMS on your day-to-day life during
the past two weeks
• For each statement, please circle the one number that best describes your situation
• Please answer all questions
'~-"---'-~--"--'~--'-"--'¥
In the past two weeks, how much has your MS Not at A Quite a
limited your ability to ••• all little Moderately bit Extremely
1 Do physically demanding tasks? 1 2 3 4 5
2 Grip things tightly (e.g. turning on taps)? 1 2 3 4 5
3 Carry things? 1 2 3 4 5
--------.-~--
In the past two weeks, how much have you Not at A Quite a
been bothered by .•• all little Moderately bit Extremely
4 Problems with your balance? 1 2 3 4 5
5 Difficulties moving about indoors? 1 2 3 4 5
6 Being clumsy? I 2 3 4 5
7 Stiffness? 1 2 3 4 5
8 Heavy arms and/or legs? I 2 3 4 5
9 Tremor of your arms or legs? I 2 3 4 5
10 Spasms in your limbs? 1 2 3 4 5
Your body not doing what you want it to
11 do? 1 2 3 4 5
Having to depend on others to do things
12 for you? 1 2 3 4 5
Please check that you have answered all the questions before going on to the next page
®2000 Neurological Outcome Measures Unit
.-~---~~-'--~"'-~"--'--'.... , ..-..-.-- .•.-...,-" ... ,..-~--.-... -.- ..----
In the past two weeks, how much have you been Not A Quite a
bothered by ••• at all little Moderately bit Extremely
13 Limitations in your social and leisure. activities at home? 1 2 3 4 5
Being stuck at home more than you would
14 like to be? I 2 3 4 5
Difficulties using your hands in everyday
15 tasks? I 2 3 4 5
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n_____ ._ ..·H .. __ • ___ ._._ •• _ .... _ •• _
Having to cut down the amount of time you
16 spent on work or other daily activities? 2 3 4 5
Problems using transport (e.g. car, bus, train,
17 taxi, etc.)? 2 3 4 5
18 Taking longer to do things? 2 3 4 5
Difficulty doing things spontaneously (e.g.
19 going out on the spur of the moment)? 2 3 4 5
20 Needing to go to the toilet urgently? 2 3 4 5
21 Feeling unwell? 2 3 4 5
22 Problems sleeping? 2 3 4 5
23 Feeling mentally fatigued? 2 3 4 5
24 Worries related to your MS? 2 3 4 5
25 Feeling anxious or tense? 2 3 4 5
Feeling irritable, impatient, or short
26 tempered? 2 3 4 5
27 Problems concentrating? 2 3 4 5
28 Lack of confidence? 2 3 4 5
29 Feeling depressed? 2 3 4 5
Italics = part of "psychological well-being" factor
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